The latest edition of the Sundanese text was published as: Babad Majapait. Anggitan Kadir Tisna Sujana. Jakarta 1979. The following selections in English are my translations based on the Indonesian translation: Babad Majapahit. Translated by Rusman Sutiasumarga. Jakarta 1987. The pagination refers to the 1979 Sundanese version. The Indonesian translation omits some of the verses found in the Sundanese text.

[concerning Meng Qi (pp. 16–18)]

Although Chinese writers and historians have had little to say about the Mongols in Java, the peoples of Java have a long tradition of poetic references to the Mongols (always “Tatars” before the 20th century). The spread of Islam throughout most of Java interrupted the transmission and renewal of the early texts and their themes, but after the discovery and publication of the Desarwarnana, the Pararaton and the kidung literature in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Mongols once again appeared in new literary works. Whereas in Part I the narrative was drawn from all of the sources to provide a composite account, Part II takes each text separately, not to summarize, but to comment on certain salient features and questions which each one raises. We begin with the Chinese sources, proceed to the Javanese poetical histories ancient and modern, and end with the other histories, those from the world outside Yuan/Ming China and medieval Java.

The Chinese accounts

The principal Chinese account is that found in the Yuan shi, the main narrative occuring in Book 210, and supplementary material in the biographies of the generals in charge of the campaign, found in Books 131 and 162. Groeneveldt published an English translation of the relevant sections in 1876. Gaubil's Histoire de Gentchiscan et de toute la dinastie des mongous, ses successeurs, conquérans de la Chine; tirée de l'histoire chinoise, et traduite par le R. P. Gaubil (Paris, 1739) was a translation into French of material found in Chinese histories, but he did not identify his sources. Although his account is brief, it does contain material found in the Yuan shi and the Yu pi xu zi zhi tong jian gang mu. Howorth (p. xvii) wrote that Gaubil relied on the same sources for his translation as Hyacinthe (Iakinf) did in his “history of the first four Mongol Khans” (p. xix), i.e. the Yuan shi and the Yu pi xu zi zhi tong jian gang mu.

1. Introduction

The present paper is a thoroughly revised and rearranged version of a small honours thesis which was originally submitted in the Department of Indonesian and Malayan Studies, University of Sydney, in 1962. The topic was suggested by the then Head, Dr F.H. van Naerssen, who was an expert in the early history of Java, and managed to inspire some of his young students with the same interest.

The period chosen for discussion is a narrow one, AD 1292–1294, but is appropriate because of the range of sources available and because of the momentous nature of the events described there. The events were an invasion of Java and the foundation of a new capital. These events were also significant in view of the involvement of two different Asian societies, the Chinese (Mongols) and the Javanese, one a major power in continental Asia and the other located in the island world of what is now Indonesia. This juncture in early Javanese history has also been discussed in detail by N.J. Krom, in his Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiedenis [Hindu-Javanese History] (1931, pp. 346–68).

The paper aims to review, and quote at some length from, the sources, namely Javanese inscriptions, Javanese literary works and Chinese histories, and then to draw some conclusions regarding the course of events, bearing in mind the different nature of the various sources. In this way it is hoped to contribute to knowledge of a particular moment in the history of Java.

It may be useful first to situate the discussion. Geographically, we are looking at the eastern part of Java. For some centuries, this had been the site of successive centres of royal power and a civilization termed ‘Hindu- Javanese’; somewhat earlier, from the mid 8th to the mid 10th century, the same also applied to Central Java. We find ourselves thus in a period before the establishment of Islam in Java in the 16th century.

I. Gaubil's abridgement

This selection is taken from pp. 217–20 of Histoire de Gentchiscan et de toute la Dynastie des Mongous ses successeurs, conquérans de la Chine, tirée de l'histoire chinoise et traduite par le R.P. Gaubil de la Compagnie de Jesus, Missionnaire à Péking. Translated from the French by David Bade.

After some time he [Khubilai] had sent to the King of Kouaoua an official named Mengki [for Gaubil's note, see Note 1 below]. It does not say what Mengki did, nor what was the incident that made the King of Kouaoua act so terribly. The king took Mengki and with a hot iron marked him on the face as was often done to common thieves. After being thus affronted Mengki was sent away. The Chinese were indignant at seeing a Great Mandarin of their nation dishonored by a Prince treating them like barbarians, and they implored Khubilai to exact vengeance. Khubilai made an uproar over the insult done to one of his envoys, and ordered a large flotilla of warships and others to assemble in Tsuentcheou in Fokien. The Provinces of Kiamsi, of Fokien, and of Houkouang furnished 30000 resolute men, and they had no trouble arming the flotilla, the Chinese being eager to furnish everything necessary, the Mandarins of the nation being much interested and resolved to make foreign lands see at least that they were very sensitive to a dishonor done to a Minister of the son of Heaven [Note 2].

In the 12th moon of the year 1292 the flotilla was ready; it had 1000 ships including the supply ships and others. There were 30000 soldiers not counting the sailors and provisions for a year. Chepi, a native of Poyé in the district of Paotingfou, had the general command, Kaohing, native of Juningfou, was general in command of the troops, and Yehemiche, a native of the country of the Ygour, was in command of the sailors, with Yehemiche and Chepi having made the trip to the Indes and understanding the language of Kouaoua.

The Thai-Cambodian Joint Communiqué, an agreement between Thailand and Cambodia to promote the Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site, was signed on 18 June 2008 by the Thai foreign minister Noppadon Pattama and his Cambodian counterpart Sok Anh. Noppadon had earlier been a lawyer for Thaksin Shinawatra. The Thai government coalition at the time was headed by the pro-Thaksin People Power Party, though Thaksin himself was in self-imposed exile. The anti-Thaksin movement later claimed that Thaksin and his proxies had “sold the motherland” in exchange for Thaksin's business advance in Cambodia. Using nationalist rhetoric, the movement claimed Thailand would gain nothing from the inclusion of the temple on the World Heritage list other than a little tourist business in the temple vicinity; meanwhile Thailand risked losing sovereignty over 4.6 square kilometres of land around the temple to Cambodia.

This allegation dominated the Thai public's perception of the conflict over the temple. But, as I have elaborated in the previous chapter, the temple was only one issue in the fast developing and multidimensional relations between Thailand and Cambodia since the early 1990s. This is not to say that Thaksin had no business interest in Cambodia, but until now no proof has been produced so the allegation remains hearsay. Some of PAD's claims were simply fiction, as I will discuss in the next chapter. Moreover, Thaksin's background as a transnational businessman and the conflict of interest evident in some of his domestic policies should not overshadow the development of Thai-Cambodian relations in the last two decades. In other words, it is imperative to consider the temple issue within the context of Thai-Cambodian socio-economic relations since the end of the Cold War. The bilateral cooperation over the temple of Preah Vihear was not the decision of one man but involved several successive governments and several state agencies in charge of economic affairs, foreign affairs, and national security.

After the UNESCO's World Heritage Committee had granted world heritage status to the Preah Vihear temple on 7 July 2008, the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia started to head downhill. A number of reactions are worth noting here. Firstly, on 28 July, while officials from both sides were holding an urgent meeting in Siem Reap on defusing border tension, PAD organized a rally in Bangkok at which Sondhi Limthongkul addressed the temple issue. He proposed numerous measures of retaliation against Cambodia and its leaders who were condemned for being arrogant toward Thailand. These proposals were not intended for the Samak Sundaravej government, which PAD was trying to topple, but for a new government, which PAD hoped would soon replace the Samak one. Some of the interesting issues in Sondhi's proposal were:

1. • The Thai government should set up a special taskforce to lobby the members of the UN Security Council and ask them to choose between Thailand and Cambodia.

2. • The Thai government should tell Thai business people to withdraw from Cambodia because Thailand did not promote trade and investment in Cambodia and the Thai government would not be able to assist them if conflict broke out.

3. • The Thai government should inform Thai business people in the border areas that Thailand would have to close the border if conflict broke out.

4. • The Thai government should inform the Cambodian government that the disputed area around the Preah Vihear temple belonged solely to Thailand which would defend her sovereignty with all means, including war. Sondhi added that Cambodia would not dare to fight with Thailand because her economy still depended on Thailand, but if Cambodia remained stubborn, Thailand should shut down all the 40 border checkpoints along the Thai-Cambodian border and suspend all flights from Thailand to Cambodia which would impact Cambodia greatly since 70 per cent of the flights had to transit in Thailand.

This study examines the role of Thai state agencies and the mass movement led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple located close to the Thai-Cambodian border. It also evaluates the long-term repercussions of the PAD's uncivil action within the context of Thailand's post-Cold War policy towards its neighbours in general and Cambodia in particular.

The ending of the Cold War and of the war in Cambodia in the late 1980s opened up opportunities for a new era of economic development and cooperation in Southeast Asia. Thailand positioned herself as a centre of economic cooperation in the region. Policies promoted by various state agencies reshaped the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia from enmity to economic interdependence. Thailand's support for Cambodia's proposal to list the Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage site arose from Thailand's cross-border tourism strategy.

The relationship between Thailand and Cambodia deteriorated greatly in mid-2008 when the PAD raised a protest against the proposed listing, claiming that it was linked to business deals by the former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Cambodia, and that it would sacrifice Thai ownership of a disputed area around the temple.

However, the PAD's allegation overlooks the fact that the bilateral cooperation over the listing was pursued consistently by three Thai governments and various bureaucratic agencies in an attempt to turn the once disputed monument into a symbol of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. For the first time in Southeast Asia two formerly antagonistic states were employing economic and cultural methods to settle a territorial dispute.

The ultra-nationalist movement launched by PAD not only derailed this essay in cooperation but also worked directly against Thailand's post-Cold War strategy in the region. Instead of becoming a symbol of friendship, the temple became a symbol of hatred between Thailand and Cambodia. The success of the PAD's campaign is due in part to the support which PAD received from various civic groups and institutions.

During the Cold War, when military security was a top priority, decision making on foreign policy in Thailand was a simple process with a state-centric character. It mainly involved a number of key state agencies, including the military high command, National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and government leaders. After the Cold War ended, former communist countries were welcomed into the once anti-communist regional grouping of ASEAN. The Thai state agencies appeared capable of handling the post-Cold War relationship with their former enemies fairly smoothly. Though there was a hiccup in 2003, when an angry Cambodian mob burned down the Thai embassy and business buildings in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress had allegedly said that Angkor Wat belonged to Thailand, the crisis ended quickly and a normal relationship was resumed soon after. Thai-Cambodian relations, however, spiralled downwards when a civil society movement in Thailand raised a campaign over the temple of Preah Vihear which is situated on the border between the two countries. The movement was led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), sometimes known as the Yellow Shirts. The crisis began in mid-2008, when the Cambodian government proposed to the World Heritage Committee (WHC) of the United Nation Economic Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to inscribe the ancient Brahmanic Temple of Preah Vihear on the World Heritage list, and the Thai government of Samak Sundaravej lent its support to the proposal. Several border clashes took place between Thai and Cambodian troops.

The sovereignty over the temple had first became a focal point of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia in 959 when the Cambodian government under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk demanded the Thai government withdraw its troops from the temple area. When Thailand failed to comply, Sihanouk decided to take the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which awarded the temple and the territory where it is situated to Cambodia in 1962.

The objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of PAD's uncivil action about the Preah Vihear temple. Apart from the immediate effects such as the deterioration of diplomatic relations and the deaths and damage incurred in border clashes, the nationalist campaign had longer-term repercussions which can only be properly understood within the context of Thailand's post-Cold War policy toward its neighbours in general and Cambodia in particular.

In Chapter II, I have shown that the ending of the Cold War and of the war in Cambodia in the late 1980s opened up great opportunities for a new era of economic development and cooperation in Southeast Asia. Former foes became allies and partners in both political and economic cooperation. Various cross-border schemes were launched to promote growth, spread prosperity, and build friendship among the region's states in order to compete with growing regionalism in other parts of the world. Since the government of Chatichai Choonhavan (1988–91), Thailand has positioned herself as a leader and centre of economic cooperation in the region. In the eyes of Thai policy-makers, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were no longer enemies, but potential partners in many schemes of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Cambodia became an increasingly important country for Thai exports and investment. Both countries benefited from growing trans-border economic activities. Relations between the countries reflected this growing interdependence. In other words, policies promoted by various state agencies reshaped the fundamental fact of the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia from enmity to economic interdependence. Thailand could no longer employ economic measure, such as border closure, to punish its neighbour as it had done during the Cold War. Even when the diplomatic relationship between the governments of Abhisit and Hun Sen slid downhill and several bloody border clashes took place, both sides were careful not to let trans-border business be disrupted. Although Abhisit announced he would suspend financial aid to Cambodia and revoke the maritime MOU, he quietly failed to act on his promise since Thailand would suffer in the long term.

This chapter will discuss the campaign of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) over the Preah Vihear temple and will analyse factors contributing to its success. It is true that PAD has been able to manipulate the bitter history of Thailand's past territorial losses as a powerful tool in its campaign, as several scholars have pointed out. This study will, therefore, not repeat that issue. I would like to argue that while nationalist history is indeed a crucial factor in the temple conflict, we need to take into consideration the roles of several actors, both state and non-state, in legitimizing the PAD's campaign on the temple issue. These actors, which included academics, former diplomats, independent organizations such as the National Human Rights Commission, the Administrative Court, the Constitution Court, and the media, were considered authoritative, pro-democracy, impartial, and independent. Therefore, their support gave both moral and legal legitimacy to the PAD's temple campaign.

PAD and Its Allies

PAD was a coalition of heterogeneous groups with diverse and even conflicting backgrounds and interests. What united these diverse groups was their opposition to Thaksin. The alliance can be divided into two major strands. One was a network of grassroots and mass-based civil society organizations, such as the Alternative Agriculture Network, Northern Farmers Alliance, and Southern Federation of Small Scale Fishermen, along with state enterprise labour unions which opposed Thaksin's privatization policy and various NGOs involved in issues of consumer protection, anti-privatization, human rights, environmental protection, anti-free trade policy, communitarian development, and pro-democracy issues. This wing included many who had been strong supporters of Thaksin during the early years of the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT). Many civil society leaders participated in developing the TRT's policies, and helped connect the party with the masses in rural and urban areas, especially in the north and northeast. They saw Thaksin as a champion who could rescue Thailand from the forces of Western dominated globalization, which had taken advantage of the 1997 economic crisis to loot Thailand's resources and crush the country's pride, particularly through the IMF bailout package.