Raja read the prime minister's 12-page Cabinet memorandum on “possible constitutional re-arrangements” with grave misgivings. Faced with the Tunku's desire to “hive off” Singapore from Malaysia, Lee was proposing a temporary withdrawal by Singapore from Malaysia to avoid a race conflict and its dire consequences. But the envisaged disengagement would entail a heavy price: the PAP would no longer be able to influence events in Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, or influence policy in Malaysia.

The crux of Lee's proposal, laid out in a paper written on 25 January 1965 or just before, was to revert to the position before merger: autonomy for Singapore in all areas except for defence and foreign affairs, and banning Singapore citizens from taking part in political activities outside Singapore, and vice-versa.

With a ruthless eye, Raja parsed through Lee's arguments. These rested on the conviction that the moderates in UMNO would not be able to control its ultras and prevent a racial conflict, or stop it once it started. Knowing the situation that would unfold, Lee argued, the moderates would thus be prepared to use “extreme methods” to get Singapore out of Malaysia. Hence, better to disengage now, buying time and avoiding conflict in the hope that “in an improved situation we can in future go on again for a Malaysian nation”, the PM concluded.

It was a critical moment of decision, much like the moment at an old-fashioned wedding when the priest says, “Speak now or forever hold your peace.” Raja decided to say his piece.

Over four typed pages, the culture minister put on record his opposition to any adjustment that would suggest the PAP was cowed by the UMNO ultras into compromising its multiracial vision for Malaysia. He argued strenuously against detaching Singapore from Malaya – whether loosely or completely, or even temporarily – and against pulling the PAP out from Malaya. What the PAP should do instead, he advised, was to “stay put and try to rally forces against the ultras on a Malaysia-wide basis”. Of course, there were great risks for the PAP in taking that course, he acknowledged, “but these are no less for the ultras if they have to contend with forces that the PAP can spearhead on a pan-Malaysian basis”. It was the kind of judgment call that – along with boldness, brashness and a touch of brazenness – characterised Raja's approach to an uphill battle worth waging.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

INTRODUCTION

The ASEAN Guide on Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance and Ethics (ASEAN AI Guide) was endorsed at the Fourth ASEAN Digital Ministers Meeting (ADGMIN),which concluded on 2 February 2024. Premised on the importance of nurturing a “trusted AI ecosystem”, this Guide is based on seven guiding principles including transparency and simplicity, fairness and equity, security and safety, alongside other salient aspects. The discussion on the need for suitable governance levers, or at the very least, for closer tabs on AI technologies, greatly accelerated with the exponential growth of generative AI applications such as ChatGPT in 2023. Though these developments represent exciting technological breakthroughs, they also raise concerns over ethical and governance risks. Moreover, recognizing these risks and how to best mitigate them, is a matter of some urgency, given their rapid proliferation.

Some jurisdictions are attempting to implement heavy-handed legislation such as the European Union (EU) AI Act, but compared to these, the ASEAN AI Guide is a notably more light-touch approach to managing the AI space that is more strategically apt for the region. With the absence of a central legislative body in ASEAN, and with the diversity in digital capabilities and regulatory capacities among ASEAN member states (AMS), a more ambitious endeavour would miss the mark. Moreover, it has been emphasized at its release that business innovation is being prioritized over other factors and thus a less heavy-handed approach would be a better fit.

The ASEAN AI Guide forms a part of the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM2025) which is grounded in the establishment of “secure and transformative digital services, technologies and ecosystem”. While the Guide may seek to align with international best practices and standards, it is meant to serve more as a “practical guide” for organizations who bear the onus over the responsible and ethical development and deployment of AI systems, rather than as a policy playbook for governments. As such, governments and regional bodies feature as secondary facilitative actors, with the Guide homing in on the primary stages of the value chain. Although the voluntary, light-touch approach employed by the Guide provides flexibility for stakeholders, this aspect could render it ineffective on the other extreme. With these initial considerations in mind, we examine aspects of the ASEAN AI Guide which hit the mark, as well as areas that require more consideration, and suggest policy recommendations to help make it more well-rounded. Additional measures to heighten its use as a safeguard for stakeholders of AI technologies in its development and usage will also be discussed.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

INTRODUCTION

The momentum on methane reduction is picking up as governments and private sectors acknowledge its crucial role in meeting the Paris Agreement goals. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has called for fossil fuel methane emissions to be cut by 75 per cent by 2030 to keep the 1.5-degree goal in sight. Compared to carbon dioxide, methane (the second most abundant greenhouse gas) has a much stronger impact on warming temperatures. Within a 100-year time horizon, a tonne of methane in the atmosphere could cause about twenty-five times the warming as the same amount of carbon dioxide. So far, methane has accounted for about 30 per cent of global temperature rise since the Industrial Revolution.

Methane is emitted in a wide variety of human activities, especially in the agricultural, energy and waste sectors. 40 per cent of anthropogenic methane emissions are traced to the energy sector, including coal mining as well as multiple stages in the oil and gas supply chain. Fossil fuel production and usage contributed 118 Mt of global methane emissions (equivalent to 2,950 MtCO2e of emissions) in 2023. Methane emissions in the coal sector come from leakages in coal mines, while emissions in the oil and gas sector mostly come from leakages or routine flaring (burning) and venting of gases. Besides being the second-largest contributing sector to methane emissions, around 40 per cent of annual fossil fuel methane emissions can be avoided using current technologies at no net cost, giving it considerable methane abatement potential compared to other sectors like waste or agriculture. This has led some to describe methane abatement in the energy sector as a “low-hanging fruit” for climate action.

In Southeast Asia, the agriculture sector contributed the largest share of methane emissions (over 51 per cent) followed by the waste sector (25 per cent) and fugitive emissions from the coal mining, oil and gas sectors (18 per cent) in 219. Fugitive emissions make up a significant share of emissions for Brunei (88 per cent), Malaysia (31 per cent), Indonesia (25 per cent) and Singapore (23 per cent). While accounting for a smaller portion of Vietnam's (15 per cent) and Thailand's (16 per cent) overall methane emissions, they still amount to large quantities. For instance, Vietnam emitted 80.9 MtCO2e of methane overall, of which 48.1 MtCO2e were fugitive emissions—similar to that of Malaysia. As such, methane is an area of concern for all six countries.

INTRODUCTION

Vietnam's relations with China and the United States (US) are full of contrasts and complexities. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) share the same political ideology and the prevailing imperative of preserving their power monopoly. Yet, China presents the most pronounced threat to Vietnam's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and opinion polls consistently suggest a prevalent distrust of China among the Vietnamese. Polls also indicate that the US is favourably perceived by the Vietnamese public but the CPV views Washington's promotion of liberal democratic values with deep apprehension, out of concern for its regime security. The CPV keenly learns from the CPC's development path and governance model whereas young Vietnamese—including children of the ruling elites—often choose the US and other Western countries over China for their education. Historically, Vietnam had been at war with both great powers. In fact, it is the classic example of a small “David” that defied all odds to survive as an independent state under the Chinese imperial shadow over millennia and to prevail over the American “Goliath” in the twentieth century. Today, Vietnam's most important trade partners are China and the US, with China being the main source of imports and the US serving as its largest export market.

As US-China strategic competition intensifies, where does Vietnam stand between the two rivals, and how does it navigate the above contrasts and complexities that essentially represent its internal competing perceptions, goals and interests in relation to the two powers? This article seeks to answer these questions by examining the domestic determinants of Vietnam's foreign policy, including geographical, historical, political, institutional, economic and security considerations.

The focus on domestic determinants to understand the making of small states’ foreign policy is part of the “counter-current” to the great-power-centric paradigm that is prevalent in the realist school of thought and general international relations commentary. This great-power bias emphasizes the structural constraints of the international system on small states, according to Thucydides’ logic that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”. It neglects the agency of small states and unique domestic conditions that differentiate one state's foreign policy decisions from another’s. Understanding the domestic conditions also helps us look beyond the simplistic categorization of “band-wagoning”, “balance of power” and “hedging” to grasp the full gamut of a country's foreign policy choices in its dealing with great powers.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

INTRODUCTION

In the 2022 general election and the 2023 state elections, Perikatan Nasional (PN) swept across Kelantan, Kedah, and Terengganu and made inroads into states long held by Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH), such as Pahang, Penang and Selangor. In the 2023 state elections, PN won 146 of 165 Malay-majority seats (90 per cent) that were up for contest. The force of PN's “green wave” was felt the most in Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) strongholds in the north and northeast regions of peninsular Malaysia or the so-called Malay heartlands, where Malays comprise more than 75 per cent of the population. PN won fourteen of fifteen parliamentary seats and thirty-three of thirty-six state seats in Kedah; three of three parliamentary seats and fourteen of fifteen state seats in Perlis; fourteen of fourteen parliamentary seats and forty-three of forty-five state seats in Kelantan, and; eight of eight parliamentary seats and thirty-two of thirty-two state seats in Terengganu.

PAS has governed Kelantan and Terengganu on and off since 1959. The two states share many commonalities such as being homogeneously Malay, predominantly rural, deeply conservative, and steeped in Islamic learning traditions. But unlike Kelantan, where PAS has been in power continuously since 1990, Terengganu's political fortune has repeatedly changed hands between BN and PAS over the past decades. This means that the political dynamic in Terengganu is more competitive than in Kelantan, especially after 2008 when even Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) candidates managed to win seats in Terengganu as part of the then-Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition with PAS. However, the tide turned in PAS's favour in the 2018 state election when it regained control of the Terengganu state government from BN by winning twenty of thirty-two seats in the state assembly. In the 2023 state election, Terengganu voters returned the PAS-led state government to power with an even stronger mandate when PN won all thirty-two state seats. For now, it looks like PAS is firmly ensconced in Terengganu, bringing the state politically closer to Kelantan.