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The many studies of the Baba or Chinese Peranakan of the three cities of the former Straits Settlements have provided us with an intriguing picture of a wonderfully distinct community. At the first international conference on Chinese Peranakan, I congratulated the organizers for taking the initiative to broaden the subject beyond the Malay peninsula. I also thought that what made the conference special was the way it honoured Tun Tan Cheng Lock who was one of the most important Peranakan Chinese of the twentieth century. He is remembered for his many contributions to the history of Malaya. His story, not only his leadership of Peranakan but also his success in providing a bridge between Peranakan and other Chinese, as well as between Chinese and Malays and other communities of Malaysia, was a remarkable achievement. When fully told, the story would provide us with a better sense of what the Peranakan phenomenon means for those who inherited that heritage.
I had from young seen the community largely from afar, but in the last decade, I have read some remarkable studies and become more familiar with the Singapore community as it is. This has helped me understand how the community has been developing. For example, the TV shows, the revival of certain parts of the culture and, most of all, the historic establishment of the Peranakan Museum. Some years ago, before the opening of the museum, I had the privilege to be invited by the Peranakan Association to talk about “the Peranakan in a global setting”, a topic close to the theme of this conference. At that talk, I concentrated on some features of the community that had attracted my attention. I spoke about the strength of the Peranakan family and the role of the women, especially their roles as mothers, and the effect of time and place on those who grew up in Peranakan families. I looked at the life choices made by individual Peranakan, the consequences of those choices on their later lives, and also about how they kept their identity differently from most other Chinese spread around the world.
The Chinese neighbours that I grew up with in Ipoh, Malaya in the 1930s and 1940s practised different sets of family rituals and practices. Through these acts, they felt connected with the past as immigrants from China. Done regularly, that provided many occasions for the community to come together. Living in Singapore for the past twenty years, I note how some similar activities perform the same role today. In addition, I am happy to see that the National Heritage Board and various community organizations are doing more to alert people to the value of their cultural artefacts. That, however, is not enough if there are no parallel efforts to connect key aspects of Chinese heritage with knowledge of the historical conditions that produced them.
Like other communities, most Chinese see their heritage as relevant to their lives but are not always aware that it also represents the living past. It is relevant because it is closely related to their migratory traditions within the region over the past two centuries as well as to the homes in China from where their ancestors had come. Conscious or not, what they practise and what they respect, including what they are learning from past experience, is part of their heritage. It would be a pity if the heritage's links with history are taken for granted. A better understanding of the linkages should make their heritage more meaningful to their lives.
For some fifty years, experts at UNESCO have helped the world to think of heritage sites and practices as part of the heritage of humankind. These experts have a strong sense of history, and we are thankful that they have thus enriched our lives. In particular, they have demonstrated that protecting one's heritage can improve our appreciation of what is now being lost and forgotten. Their work reminds us that familiarity with history is essential if we are to appreciate what heritage means.
We all hope that modernity and globalization have softened the differences among the peoples in Asia, but it is obvious that, where heritage is concerned, distinctive attitudes remain. Singapore is no exception. The multiple cultures of its peoples are separate from, if not at odds with, one another.
• This study was carried out in Johor and Kedah through a combination of focus groups, formal and informal interviews and long-term ethnographic participant observation. Johor was selected for this study because it is the birthplace and long-time bastion of UMNO while Kedah was of interest because of the Mahathir family legacy in the state. The study shows that the rural vote is not homogeneous; views and perceptions that could lead to electoral action differs between regions, ages and genders.
• Daily survival and rising costs of living are the key common issues that were raised across all regions. The importance of Malay rights and the priority of Islam are also important to the rural voter. Another common problem mentioned is that of the middleman who prevents allocated funds or financial assistance from reaching the average rural resident.
• Malay cultural norms, traditional obligations of loyalty and patronage politics are major factors that affect the decisions of older rural voters.
• Younger voters might be open to the idea of a new government, but they need to overcome community and family pressure to break away from generational practices of voting for Barisan Nasional.
• Some rural voters feel that they gain no benefits from having either side of the political divide in power. While these voters generally do not see the point of voting, a last-minute decision to vote may go the way of the party that provides them with immediate gains.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
• In Malaysia's last general election, urban voters tended to support the opposition coalition — 72 of the 97 urban parliamentary seats were in fact won by it. However, most of these seats have a mixed demography, with a high percentage of ethnic Chinese voters.
• In the upcoming general election, Pakatan has a good chance of winning the federal government if Malay voters join their Chinese counterparts in supporting the opposition coalition. A subsequent so-called “Malay tsunami” could lead to a Pakatan victory.
• This present study, which is based on a series of focus group discussions held in the Malaysian states of Kedah and Johor, finds that urban Malay voters are very unhappy with the economic condition of the country and are also worried about corruption.
• But despite their grouses, they are still uncertain about supporting the opposition coalition due to the fear of losing the race-based privileges they enjoy as ethnic Malays.
In the last Malaysian general election, it was said that a Chinese tsunami swung the popular vote in favour of the opposition. This year, in the 14th General Elections (GE14), the group that will make the biggest difference are the rural Malay voters. For the first time ever, there seems to be a possibility that the rural Malay voter in Peninsular Malaysia might move away from UMNO. While urban centres in West Malaysia are already largely in support of the opposition, it is a “rural Malay tsunami” that is needed to break the ruling party's hold on government.
According to Politweet, voter categories can be divided according to the following criteria:
• Rural — villages (kampungs), small towns, farmland distributed within a parliamentary or state seat. Rural seats tend to be physically large but have a low population.
• Semi-urban — larger towns or numerous small towns; may include villages as well.
• Urban — cities where a majority of the seat area is covered by some form of urban development.
Tindak Malaysia4 has shown that most rural seats are over-represented, meaning that only a few votes (in the thousands), carry the power to elect a representative. On the other hand, an urban seat can have tens of thousands of votes counting towards the election of a single representative. This means that the weight of a rural vote is far heavier and more influential than that of an urban vote.
Figure 1 illustrates the spread of rural, urban and semi-urban votes and the winning party during the 13th General Elections. The map clearly demonstrates how many of the large rural seats were won by the ruling party.
The year 2018 could be the first year that Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) competes in the general elections, if it is allowed to contest.5 It would be a historic entry. Helmed by Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's longest serving former Prime Minister and now ex-UMNO member, this avowedly Malay nationalist party could be the only opportunity for the Pakatan Harapan (PH) opposition coalition to wrest rural Malay votes from the current government.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
Many studies have found that voting trends in urban areas are different from that of rural ones. City-dwellers tend to be less loyal to a party compared to their rural counterparts. Hence, change from the incumbent tends to happen in urban areas first.
This essay focuses on urban voters in Malaysia, and their likely voting intentions in the upcoming 14th General Election (GE14) due to be held in mid-2018. It documents the findings from sixteen focus group discussions (FGDs) that were conducted in the northern state of Kedah and the southern state of Johor, in Peninsular Malaysia in January 2018. These two states were selected because they are both high on the list of states targeted by the opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan (Pakatan).
Following this introduction, the essay will describe the importance of the urban votes in the Malaysian political landscape, followed by the methodology of the study. Subsequently, the findings are presented and discussed. The essay concludes with comments on how the findings may impact the upcoming general election in the country.
BACKGROUND TO URBAN VOTES
Overall, Malaysia seems to follow the global trend wherein urban voters are usually more susceptible to voting for opposition parties. One of the studies that captured this trend was published in an ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute study of the 1986 general election. In that general election, rural voters continued to vote for the incumbent, in this case the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). The opposition won 29 out of the 177 parliamentary seats, with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) being the biggest opposition party with 24 seats. The study did not specify how many of the UMNO seats were urban or rural, but they categorized all the 24 seats won by the DAP as urban. The same study also implied that the 1986 general election was a continuation of the urban–rural divide that has been recorded in Malaysian politics since the 1960s.
Before going further, it is important to define the terms urban and rural as used in this essay. Following the definition provided by Politweet, a social media socio-political research firm, urban constituencies are defined as densely populated places, usually having within their boundaries a city or larger towns. On the other hand, rural constituencies tend to be physically large but with a smaller population found scattered in small villages.
• Over the past two decades, trade union activity in Batam has been heavily influenced by regional demographics, employment conditions and the prevalent political scenario.
• Following the end of the New Order in 1998, the single state-authorized union was fragmented, giving rise to a number of new enterprise unions. Batam's young and diverse immigrant population, with no pre-existing loyalties to particular trade unions, made it a hotspot for industrial relations activities.
• Low and stagnant workers’ wages throughout Indonesia and outbreak of social unrest resulted in the formation of three strong national-level unions: FSPMI, KSPSI and the KSBSI. By the mid-2000s, these unions were also active in Batam.
• Unsettled ethnic relations resulted in escalation of labour mobilizations from 2011 to 2013. The Garda Metal (union member formation) spearheaded a number of intense demonstrations throughout Indonesia, including Batam, during this time.
• The 2012 mobilization was particularly effective, and the union bodies were able to successfully negotiate for significantly higher minimum wages for all workers in Indonesia.
• After intervention by the Widodo government, and the signing of a harmony declaration, there has been a change in the unions’ approach in demanding wages and conditions improvement. Instead of addressing employment concerns through national-level campaigns, matters are now to be resolved at the enterprise level.
• While there are no visible signs of a confrontational mobilization in the near future, a number of worker welfare issues remain unsettled.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
In providing an overview summary of trade union activity in Batam, this essay analyses the region's political history over the last several years. This approach is employed because there appears to have been a strong surge in national trade union reorganization activity since the end of the New Order in 1998. Explaining the evolution of that history, and how it has manifested in Batam, has determined the framework for this essay. The essay is divided as follows: The first section provides a basic outline of historical and social context, both of the trade union sector as well as of some other aspects of Batam; the following section describes the history of the emergence of industrial militancy nationally and in Batam; the third elaborates on the process that has led to a decline of that hostility, and; the conclusion sketches out the implications of this history of the rise and decline of such combat.
HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
Batam is a unique site of development, consciously created to take advantage of its proximity to Singapore. It is therefore to some extent “artificial” in a sense that its sociology and economy have evolved as an enclave offshoot of Indonesia's economic connectivity with Southeast Asia. This is particularly reflected in its demography, both in terms of originating ethnicity, as well as political demography. It should be noted that in contemporary Indonesia, ethnic and political demography overlap with each other as most political parties represented in the national parliament have specific geographic areas where their support is strongest.
Before delving deep into the trade union situation in Batam, it is pertinent to briefly discuss its demography. The central and salient feature here is the major immigrant population, which has come into being over an approximate fifteen-year period. The original indigenous population of Batam Malays now exists alongside Javanese, Batak, Minangkabau and other Malay Sumatran immigrants, which gives the Batam population and society the character of a frontier, or new society. By 2010, across the whole province of Riau, “Malays” — presumably local Malays — formed only 30 per cent of the population. This phenomenon is even more pronounced in the town of Batam itself.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 to coordinate its members’ security policy during the Cold War as part of the anti-communist containment strategy led by the United States of America. At the same time, historically and geopolitically, China has always viewed ASEAN as an integral part of its security environment.
Over the last two decades, a changing global context has however provided opportunities for China and ASEAN countries to forge closer ties with each other. The constructive role played by the government of China in dealing with the Asian Financial Crisis coupled with changing U.S. priorities in Asia during the late 1990s led to a marked improvement in relations between ASEAN and her northern neighbour. The considerable distrust that once defined their relationship has thus been replaced by a more positive and intimate economic and political connectivity.
However, China's territorial claims in the South China Sea reveal its increasing naval capabilities and its willingness to deploy these for politico-economic purposes; and hence the contemporary relationship between China and ASEAN is marked by a combination of cooperation and tension.
China's rise exerts a powerful gravitational pull on ASEAN economies. Since the full enactment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) in 2010, ASEAN's trade with China has gone from a surplus to a deficit that reached US$45 billion in 2013. More significantly, poorer ASEAN members depend heavily on China. For example, Vietnam's share of Chinese export and import flows with ASEAN has increased substantially while Singapore's share has dropped (Liu 2016, pp. 314–16).
ASEAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND CHINESE CAPITALISM
The establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) at the end of 2015 is an attempt to strengthen ASEAN's bargaining power. It is aimed at the transformation of ASEAN into a single market, a single production base, a highly competitive economic region of equitable economic development, and a region that is fully integrated into the global economy. As of 2017 many indicators show that such a level of economic integration will not be accomplished anytime soon. A single market and a single production base require that all members have common interests and a high degree of cooperation. In reality, however, the primacy of the domestic political economy overshadows regional integration and cooperation.
• China's rise exerts a powerful pull on ASEAN economies and constitutes an impetus for a resinicization of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.
• China has become a skilled practitioner of “commercial diplomacy”, and as long as it continues to lead the way in regional integration, China's state-led capitalism will seek to integrate itself into the ASEAN Economic Community. This in effect becomes China's essential strategy of desecuritization for the region.
• With increasing trade and investment between China and ASEAN countries, the ethnic Chinese economic elites have managed to serve as “connectors and bridges” between the two sides, and benefited in the process from joint ventures and business investments. The impact of new Chinese Capitalism on SMEs, however, has not been equally positive.
• As China rises, Southeast Asia has witnessed increased complexity and variations of “hybrid capitalism”, including alliances between state-led capitalism, transnational entrepreneurs emanating from China's “going out” policy and ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.
• Three main forms of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia are neoliberal capitalism, flexible capitalism and Confucian capitalism. These intermingle into a range of local varieties under different socio-economic conditions.