The aim of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the historical arguments that have been used to argue for industrial policy in its widest sense, that is, that what a nation (or region) specializes in producing may be of key importance to the wealth and welfare of its inhabitants. Historically it has been generally agreed that symmetrical trade – trade in similar goods between nations at similar levels of technological development – has tended to be beneficial to both trading partners. In these cases, employing Ricardian trade theory has not been detrimental to the trading partners. This chapter explains the situations when Ricardian trade theory is not beneficial to one of the trading partners, and – at the same time – the economic mechanisms which have been identified as making industrial policy desirable. That manufacturing matters has, in various forms, been presented as a main reason for industrial policy, at least since England's import-substitution policies during the 1400s: adding value to English wool by spinning it into woollen cloth and garments. This was mainly achieved by raising export duties on raw wool, making English wool cheaper for domestic manufacturers than for foreign ones. However, the reasons why manufacturing matters have varied. And that understanding has gone from intuitive inferences to scientific evidence. This chapter will historically present this process and the most common arguments for industrial policy over time.

New Perspectives on Cold War Economic Theory: Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Paul Samuelson Revisited

INITIALLY it is of some importance to gain a broader perspective of what has developed into ‘general truths’ of the neoclassical economics during the Cold War.

The fact that David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage in international trade dates back to 1817 conveys an impression that this principle has been ruling economic theory since then. It is also assumed that David Ricardo merely solidified the free-trade principles of Adam Smith. However, the following quote from the young Adam Smith shows how far away his principles were from the logic of comparative advantage and neo-liberalism:

Introduction

For a long time, economic development in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has been seen by most analysts in both academic and policy circles as a largely positive if not a very positive story. For example, at the end of 2005, Business Week ran a cover story titled ‘Central Europe – Rise of a Powerhouse’. It has become commonplace to argue that the success of CEE development is mainly due to neo-liberal economic policies (liberalized markets, balanced public budget, price stability, low tax burden and strongly market-oriented reforms in all socio-economic sectors) pursued by these countries since the early 1990s. In other words, CEE countries have been poster countries for Washington Consensus policies. Indeed, as we show below, during the entire decade of the 1990s, industrial restructuring and embryonic innovation policies in CEE were largely dominated by Washington Consensus thinking. We aim to show that, first, these policies have been a double-edged sword: on the one hand enabling fast and furious industrial restructuring while, on the other hand, locking CEE economies into economic activities with low value added/productivity growth and thus undermining future sustainable growth. However, the impact of accession into the European Union (EU) has been equally pivotal for industrial restructuring and innovation policy making in CEE countries in the 2000s and this process can be summed up as a strong Europeanization of innovation policy in CEE. We aim to show, second, that Europeanization has been largely a double-edged sword for CEE countries. Since joining the EU in 2004 or 2007, and already during the accession process, there is a strong change in innovation policies in many CEE countries towards a much more active role of the state. In this change there is a clear and strong role of EU's structural funding, particularly the negotiations and planning that comes with it. However, these changes come with specific problems: first, there is an over-emphasis in emerging CEE innovation policies on a linear under-standing of innovation (from lab to market) that is based on the assumption that there is a growing demand from industry for R&D (which is not the case because of the structural changes that took place in the 1990s via the Washington Consensus policies); and, second, increasing usage of independent implementation agencies in an already weak administrative capacity environment lacking policy skills for networking and long-term planning.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are noble goals for a world sorely in need of urgent action to solve pressing social problems. They rest, however, upon completely new principles whose long-term effects are neither well thought through nor well understood. In this chapter, I shall attempt to explain why the MDGs do not represent good social policy in the long run.

One novelty of the MDG approach lies in the emphasis on foreign financing of domestic social and redistribution policies rather than on domestic financing by the developing countries themselves. Disaster relief, which used to be of a temporary nature, now finds a more permanent form in the MDGs. In countries where more than 50 per cent of the government budget is financed by foreign aid, huge additional resource transfers are being planned. This raises the question of the extent to which this approach will put a large number of nations permanently ‘on the dole’, a system similar to ‘welfare colonialism’, which will be discussed at the end of the chapter.

The pursuit of the MDGs may appear as if the United Nations institutions have abandoned the effort to treat the causes of poverty and have instead concentrated on attacking its symptoms. In this chapter, I shall argue that palliative economics has, to a considerable extent, taken the place of development economics. Indeed, the balance between development economics (radically changing the productive structures of poor countries) and palliative economics (easing the pains of economic misery) is key to avoiding long-term negative effects.

How we used to deal with problems of development

In less than one generation, a stark contrast has emerged between the type of economic understanding underlying the Marshall Plan, on the one hand, and the type of economic theory behind today's multilateral development discourse and the Washington institutions, on the other. The Marshall Plan grew out of recognition of the flaws of its precursor, the Morgenthau Plan.

There are few works of world literature that may be unproblematically categorized as subaltern writing. As the voice of peoples marginalized by the grand narratives of world history, including that of colonization, they exist as ephemeral entries (often via translations) in critical discourses on subaltern theory and practice. As autonomous, self-defining texts representative of that voice the examples are few. This is true as well of plantation Indian history (the general backdrop of this study) where once again the texts, often orally transmitted, exist only as fragmentary narratives. A proper intertextual framing of subaltern works is therefore impossible. However, there are a few challenging and defiantly exclusive subaltern texts in the critical bibliography of the field, and these may be mentioned: poems and prose works by Trinidadian and Guyanese Indians such as David Dabydeen, Kumar Mahabir and Rooplall Monar, plays by the Mauritian Patois French writer Dev Virahsawmy and the poems of the Suriname Bhojpuri writer Jit Narain.1 This is an incomplete and partial list that needs correction. In these limited citations, the one work that stands out is Dev Virahsawmy’s dramatic re-rendering of Shakespeare’s The Tempest as Toufann (‘Tempest’). But even as one concedes the power and originality of Virahsawmy’s challenging work, there is nothing in the Indian plantation subaltern literary archive remotely comparable to Subramani’s monumental novels Ḍaukā Purān and Fījī Māṁ (hereafter the latter without diacritical marks and given as Fiji Maa). As already noted, they are works of such exceptional power and originality that they require not only critical analysis but also critical exposure. This chapter is aimed at filling that need with reference to the first of the two novels by Subramani written in the Fiji Hindi demotic.

Subramani’s Ḍaukā Purān (‘The Subaltern Tale’ as I have translated the title) is a rich, indeed seminal, text through which we can talk about subaltern voice and speech. Many books and essays have been written about plantation and post-plantation Fiji history, but there is no work that explores life worlds through which an alternative, subaltern, narrative could be theorized.

Based on the economics of Joseph Schumpeter, National Innovation Systems have since the early 1990s emerged as a holistic and socioculturally embedded alternative approach to explaining economic growth. The idea that systemic relationships exist between different sectors of the economy that influence the production and implemen-tation of new knowledge, and thus economic development is, however, much older than current research indicates. We will argue the Neapolitan mercantilist Antonio Serra coherently presented the kernel of a national innovation system already in his 1613 Breve trattato, including two of its key elements: increasing returns and synergies. The problems of establishing the institutions conducive to economic growth faced by mercantilists at the end of the Renaissance are shared today by policy-makers in the developing world, and it can therefore prove to be fruitful, if not necessary, to explore the historical roots of this early innovation system approach. Indeed, Serra's work has been brought back to light on several occasions in the past centuries, each time as a source of guidance in an era of economic turmoil: first on the eve of Italian unification, then at the dawn of German industrialization. Following the failure of the Cancun meetings in 2003 to reach a trade agreement between North and South, such turmoil is over us again as it becomes increasingly clear that the reigning economic dogma has failed to deliver on its political promises. We argue that, in the economic profession's inevitable search for new means and methods, Serra's message is again relevant.

Introduction—Mercantilism as a National System of Innovation

It has frequently been noted that static, barter-centered mainstream economics, as a collection of theoretical variants orbiting the neoclassical paradigm, is presently under siege by a wider, more dynamic and socially embedded alternative that focuses on production and innovation as mechanisms of economic growth (Broda 1996: 235; Magnusson and Ottosson 1997: 1–9; North 2001: 491). As a subset of the neo-Schumpeterian alter-native, the innovation system approach—broadly conceived as the existence of institutional synergies fuelling innovative activity and economic growth—has become widely diffused in the past few years, recently, with the Globelics network meeting in Rio de Janeiro late 2003, also entering seriously into the discourse on Third World development.

The aim of this chapter is to show that the dynamics of Schumpeterian economics, in addition to explain the creation of wealth, also implicitly contain the elements of a theory of relative poverty. It is argued that the German tradition of economics, of which Schumpeter is a part, has always encompassed the necessary elements of a theory of uneven growth. List, Marx, and Schumpeter have all emphasized different aspects of this uneven growth. This contrasts sharply with the Anglo-Saxon tradition which, particularly since the 1890s, has produced theories of growth and trade which imply an even, converging distribution of world activity and income.

The organization of the chapter is as follows: Section 1 contrasts Anglo-Saxon and German economic traditions from the point of view of theories of uneven growth vs. theories of even growth. Section 2 raises the question of the relationship between technical change and underdevelopment, and identifies two key mechanisms which create uneven distribution of the gains from technical change. The two are (I) the consequences of the extremely uneven advance of the ‘technological frontier’ and (II) Classical and Collusive spreads of technological gains. Section 3 shows how these mechanisms work to create three cases of ‘Schumpeterian underdevelopment’ in the Caribbean. In Section 4 it is claimed that the factors identified in Section 2 may create conflicting interests between the two parts that every individual plays in economic life, that of producer and that of consumer. It is claimed that these are identical only under the assumptions of neo-classical economics and in special cases of what is labelled symmetrical trade. Finally, in Section 5, the policy conclusions of these findings are discussed. It is showed how the conflicting interests of man-the-consumer and man-the-producer, produced by classical and collusive spreads of technical change, were central to the creation of US industrial policy in the early nineteenth century.

Anglo-Saxon vs. German economics: Theories of even vs. theories of uneven growth

Friedrich List, Karl Marx and Joseph Alois Schumpeter are the German economists who have had a major influence on economic policy outside the German-speaking area. The theories of Marx and Schumpeter are deeply rooted in the traditions of the German Historical School of Economics, and although Friedrich List antedates what is generally seen as the starting point of the older historical school, his approach is clearly that of a ‘proto-historical school’.

Introduction: Lost Theoretical Insights from US Secretary of State George Marshall

Seventy-five years ago, on 5 June 1947, US secretary of state George Marshall gave a speech at Harvard University announcing what was to be called the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was probably the most successful development plan in human history, re-industrializing and industrializing countries from Norway and Sweden in the North to Greece and Turkey in the South-East. At about the same time, a similar process based on the same principles re-industrialized and industrialized East Asia, spreading from Japan in the North-East towards the South-West. In this way a cordon sanitaire of wealthy countries was created around the communist world, stemming the communist tide that was rising at the time of Marshall's speech. One country to benefit from the Marshall-type ideology was South Korea, a country that in 1950 was poorer (GDP per capita estimated at $ 770) than Somalia (GDP per capita estimated at $ 1057; Maddison 2003), which today is an example of a failed state (see Figure 20.1 below).

Although sometimes it is misunderstood as a scheme for giving away huge sums of money rather than a re-industrialization scheme, the Marshall Plan is well known. What is less known is that the relatively short speech contained three key theoretical insights with strong relevance in today's situation.

The first insight is the link between a certain type of productive structure and what George Marshall calls ‘modern civilization’, what in a more politically correct and neutral language today could be called ‘development and democracy’ (italics added):

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. During the formation of the European nation-states, it was common knowledge that democracies and ‘civilization’ were both products of certain economic structures associated with ‘city activities’ (chapter 13).

This chapter attempts to flag the profound changes that underwent economic practice and economic theory during the Cold War—from 1947 to 1991—as being at the roots of the present inequality crisis. Two aspects are raised. As regards the worsening inequality between nations it is argued that a key distinction between economic activities—at the core of the 1947 Marshall Plan—was increasingly marginalized as the tools of neo-classical economics carried the profession toward higher levels of abstraction.

As regards the worsening inequality within nations it is argued that a) the system of wage-setting changed from a virtual ratchet wheel effect, making wages practically irreversible without a devaluation, to a system of ‘internal devaluations’ (whether or not recognized by that name) and b) the distinction between financial capital and production capital—which had been there since the Bible and the Quran via Medieval church fathers and persisted in Continental European economics from Marx to Schumpeter—gradually disappeared, leading to the present financialization of economic life.

During the Cold War we find that a very successful economic practice—starting with the 1947 Marshall Plan—dominated economic policy up until and including the theoretical foundation for the Maastricht Treaty and the European Single Market: Paulo Cecchini's 1988 book The European Challenge 1992. The Benefits of a Single Market.

This period from the 1947 Marshall Plan to the Cecchini report 41 years later represents an important continuity. The insights from the Marshall Plan about the importance of a manufacturing industry were built into the original foundations of the European Union, and—in that same spirit—Cecchini argued in 1988 that almost all of the benefits from the Single Market would be the result of the increasing returns to scale mostly found in the manufacturing sector. However, the practice of the European Union after Maastricht slowly changed to represent almost the opposite of Cecchini's vision.

Simultaneously—but completely separately from what happened in economic policy—at the start of the Cold War Paul Samuelson brought David Ricardo's trade theory into the core of economics with two articles in The Economic Journal in 1948 and 1949.

At the end of 2005 the process of European integration seems to have reached a serious crisis. The rejection of the European Constitution by the French and Dutch voters indicates a strong distrust of the way the integration is proceeding. A survey conducted for the Polish Rzeczpospolita newspaper found widespread admiration for the achievements of winning freedom of speech and leading the country into NATO and the EU, but 85 per cent of those polled blamed the Solidarity movement for setting in motion the liberalization that has put many Poles out of work. What went wrong? Why do workers not only in the old EU but also in the new member states (NMS) feel betrayed? The fact that this change of mood surfaces after merely a year has passed since the euphoric celebrations of the enlargement of the Union makes it even more surprising. The aim of this chapter is a preliminary exploration of factors rather than a complete analysis.

As a starting point I would argue that the EU Lisbon Strategy – the European Union economic strategy launched in 2000 – represents a healthy theoretical shift towards a dual emphasis on innovations as the basic engine of economic growth and on social cohesion in order to mitigate the uneven economic growth that necessarily follows in a dynamically innovative society. Europe left behind the neoclassically based standard textbook economics (STE) in favour of Schumpeterian evolutionary economics (Rodrigues 2003). As I see it, this shift, however, carried with it several problems; of theoretical, contextual and didactical nature.

First of all a problem of theoretical mismatch occurred. Jacques Delors's 1993 white paper on ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’ envisioning an innovation-based Europe had been critically received by mainstream economists. Learning from this experience, the Lisbon process was carried through cautiously, avoiding the ministries of finance that had sunk the Delors paper, and this saved it from falling into the same trap. A victory of these tactics, however, may have backlashed, creating problems for the long-run strategy. Coupling innovation and social cohesion makes eminent sense: In an STE framework, however, both these concepts are exogenous elements, and above all, they do not belong together. In STE the market is supposed to create economic harmony, and the losers in the game are an object of concern for social workers, not for economists.

This chapter argues that the crisis in the Baltic countries can be properly understood only in the context of the dramatic de-industrialization and structural change that took place in these countries, and other Eastern European economies, following the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is argued that with the Eastern enlargement, climaxing in 2004 with formally admitting Eastern European economies into the Union, the European Union gradually abandoned its previous strategy of symmetrical integration – based on principles surviving from the post–World War II era, inspired by Friedrich List – integrating the region's economies into a structurally asymmetrical relationship that has common elements with colonialism. Once the real-estate bubbles collapsed, this underlying structural weakness became evident, causing wage collapse and outward migration. We show that the Eastern enlargement – along with financial architecture of the euro zone – also undermined the success of previous waves of enlargements, particularly that of Spain. In the Baltic countries the effect of the crisis was, as could be expected, a massive redistribution of income: wages as a percentage of GDP (the share of ‘the 99 per cent’) plummeted by some 6 percentage points while profits and rents (the share of ‘the one per cent’) rose correspondingly. We also discuss whether the Estonian case actually deserves to be called an ‘internal devaluation’, and indicate that what apparently dampened the crisis were not local policy initiatives but forces external to the region. The chapter also presents two different scenarios from the crisis in the 1930s – the US and the German ones – and asks if this crisis is likely to follow the US or the German pattern of income distribution. It is argued that the pattern likely to be followed is the German rather than the US one, which in the present context is likely to produce a long crisis and at worst make EU wage reductions permanent.

Introduction

This chapter is a third incarnation of our discussion of the European enlargement processes.1 In 2004 we published a paper titled ‘The Qualitative Shift in European Integration: Towards Permanent Wage Pressures and a “Latin-Americanization” of Europe?’.

After Ireland, Norway was the country that lost the largest part of its population through migration to America, and one of the Norwegian areas that lost the most was the inland region of Valdres, where the family of US economist Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) came from. Most Norwegians have some family or relation who left for America, and I am no exception. I grew up with stories about the United States and what to me seemed like an exotic tribe: the Norwegian-Americans (norskamerikanerne).

I later found it fascinating that one of these Norwegian-Americans was an important economist, but I found reading Veblen challenging. Eventually, however, I was able to make the words of a 1920 reviewer of Veblen my own:

Reading Veblen in the 1970s, the capitalism he described was as unfamiliar as Marx's ‘army of the unemployed’. Veblen's idea that business could represent some modern version of piracy sounded just as strange as when he proposed that one of the tools of business was sabotage. But in today's context, when money is made in a financial casino which feeds on shrinking national economies, as Greece has experienced, when Enron had its regulated electricity prices increased in California after having created an artificial blackout, and when close to half of Spanish youth is unemployed, these concepts again make eminent sense. Veblen's is a type of economics which comes alive in times of crisis. Contexts are therefore indispensable in order to understand him and his work.

Context 1: Valdres, Norway and European Idealism at the Time of Veblen

‘Veblen the Norwegian’ is well covered in the next three chapters of the book from where this chapter is taken. This chapter provides some additional comments relating specifically to Veblen's Valdres and to his ideals from a Norwegian and European perspective.

Appendix: Glossary of Fiji Hindi and Fijian Words

This chapter argues for important similarities between today's economic situation and the picture painted above by Milford Howard, a member of the US Senate at the time he wrote The American Plutocracy. This was the time, the 1880s and 1890s, when a combination of Manchester Liberalism—a logical extension of Ricardian economics—and Social Darwinism—promoted by the exceedingly influential UK philosopher Herbert Spencer—threatened completely to take over economic thought and policy on both sides of the Atlantic.

At the same time, the latter half of the nineteenth century was marred by financial crises and social unrest. The national cycles of boom and bust were not as globally synchronized as they later became, but they were frequent both in Europe and in the United States. Activist reformer Ida Tarbell probably exaggerated when she recalled that in the United States “the eighties dripped with blood,” but a growing gulf between a small and opulent group of bankers and industrialists produced social unrest and bloody labor struggles. The panic on 5 May 1893 triggered the worst financial crisis in the United States until then.

In economic theory, this increasing concentration of wealth and power that resulted from ostensibly “free market” activities caused a massive upheaval against classical economics in the late nineteenth century. In his three-volume Main Currents in Modern Economics (1971) Ben Seligman expressively entitles the first volume, dedicated to this period, “The Revolt against Formalism.” This revolt was spearheaded under different labels—historicism, institutionalism, empiricism, social policy, religion, socialism, ethics—but all these movements were in practice directed against the two-pronged movement of Manchester Liberalism (similar to today's neoliberalism) and Spencerian Darwinism. Ricardian formalism and social Darwinism decidedly lost this battle.

Chapter 1: An Idea for This Book

Men are governed by different kinds of laws, by natural law; by divine law, which is that of religion; by ecclesiastical law, otherwise called canonical, which is that of the regime of religion, by the law of nations, which one may consider as the civil law of the universe in the sense that each people is one of its citizens; by general political law, which aims at that human wisdom which has founded all societies; by the law of conquest, based on the fact that one people has wished, has been able, or has been obliged to do violence to another; by the civil law of each society, through which one citizen is able to defend his goods and his life against every other citizen, and finally by the domestic law, which derives from the fact that a society is divided into different families, which need particular governing.

Therefore, there are different arrangements of laws, and the sublimits of human reason consists in knowing well to which of these arrangements the matters over which one must legislate mainly relate, and not to introduce confusion in the principles that ought to govern men.

Chapter 2: About Divine Laws and About Human Laws

One ought not to legislate by divine laws what ought to be by human laws, nor regulate by human laws what ought to be by divine laws.

Those two kinds of laws differ by their origin, by their aim, and by their nature.

Everyone well agrees that human laws are of a nature other than the laws of religion, and that is a great principle. But this principle is itself subject to others that it is necessary to search for.

• 1. The nature of human laws is to be subject to all the accidents that occur, and to vary to the degree the wills of men change. To the contrary, the nature of the laws of religion is never to vary. The human laws legislate about the good; religion about the best. The good may have another aim, since there are several goods. But the best is only one; therefore it cannot change. One can indeed change the laws, because they are not regarded as being good. But the institutions of religion are always assumed to be the best.

Chapter 1: A General Idea

I distinguish laws which form political liberty in its relation to the constitution from those which form political liberty in relation to the citizen. The former will be the subject of the present book. I will deal with the second in the following book.

Chapter 2: Different Meanings Assigned to the Word Liberty

There is no word which has received more different meanings, and which has struck minds in so many ways, than that of liberty. Some have taken it as the facility of disposing of him to whom they had awarded tyrannical power; other as the capacity to elect those whom they owe to obey. Others have taken it as the right to be armed and to be able to practice violence. These have taken it as the privilege of only being governed by a man of their own nation, or by their own laws (aa). A certain people for a long time took liberty as the habit of wearing a long beard (bb).

These have assigned the name to one form of government and excluded all other forms from it. They who had tasted republican government assigned it to this government. They who had enjoyed monarchical government placed it under the monarchy (cc). In sum, each has called liberty the government which was conformed to his customs or his inclinations. And since, in a republic, they do not always have before their eyes, and in so striking a manner, the instruments of the ills about which they complain; and since even the laws appear to speak more while the enforcers of the laws speak less there, one usually places liberty under republics and has excluded it from monarchies. Finally, since in democracies the people seem to do almost what they wish, some have assigned liberty to these kinds of governments, and have confused the people's power with the people's liberty.

Chapter 3: That Which Is Liberty

It is true that, in democracies, the people appear to do whatever they wish, but political liberty does not consist of doing whatever one wishes. In a state—that is, in a society in which there are laws—liberty can only consist in being able to do that which one ought to wish and in not being coerced to do that which one ought not to wish.

How we regard the birth of liberty in North America greatly influences our appreciation of its value today. Scholarship has long and rightly portrayed its origins in traditions antedating the American Revolution. They derive it from the English Common Law and see in the American founding a confirmation of that tradition of English law and custom. The colonists are regarded as having gradually acquired the arts of independent self-government from the historic practices of English indulgence. In that light, they have seen the Revolution as a break from English administration of the colonies, rather than as a decisive advance in theory and principles of self-government. Accordingly, they have systematically discounted the influences of thinkers—English, Scottish, and continental—in originating the Revolution. Rather, they insist, Whiggish activists borrowed the rhetoric of their English cousins to defend their unparalleled exertions on behalf of independence, but with little idea whatsoever of a way of life other than that for which colonial experience had prepared them.

There is considerable truth in this account, inasmuch as the Americans treasured most highly the rights and liberties of Englishmen. They began to defend and articulate their rights to life, liberty, and estates from the earliest date. The 1646 case of Robert Childs et al. testifies powerfully to this history, and not alone. We would be neglectful, however, if we failed to note that these early challenges were generally directed toward colonial exercises of power—as was the rhetoric of Patrick Henry in the Parson's fee case of the late 1750s. In short, it was in the context of seeking out limitations on the colonial exercise of power that Americans so frequently and habitually invoked their ancient rights under the British constitution. This process reached its peak in the use made of the work English Liberties, by Henry Care. It was no accident, to be sure, that Care was probably the most radical of post-settlement Whigs. Yet he did not go far enough for the Americans. In the case of men like Sam Adams, his virulent anti-popery survived far better than his scholarly reliance on English law.

Accordingly, contemporary scholarship is wrong in its central claim—that prior to the Revolution Americans did not meaningfully divide over questions of rights and liberties. They are also wrong to minimize the influence of modern political philosophy in the direction that debate ultimately took.