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11919 results in Cambridge Handbooks

Page 563 of 596

  • Chapter 4 - How to Situate Cognition

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 55-77

  • Summary

    The situated cognition movement in the cognitive sciences, like those sciences themselves, is a loose-knit family of approaches to understanding the mind and cognition. Cognition both stems from and generates the activities of physical individuals located in particular kinds of environments. Cognitive extensions, like house extensions, come in a surprising variety of forms. Some are truly, massively, staggeringly transformative, and others are content to project a previously existing theme. The first dimension concerns the nature of the non-neural resources that are incorporated into extended cognitive behaviors, dispositions, and activities. Such resources may be natural, technological, or sociocultural in nature. The second dimension concerns the durability and reliability of the larger (extended) system. Human agents exhibit both a metabolic and a cognitive organization. But whereas the former depends heavily on expensively maintained and policed organismic boundaries, the latter looks prone to repeated bouts of seepage.

  • Chapter 14 - Situating Concepts

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 236-263

  • Summary

    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. Coupling arguments are far and away the primary sort of argument given in support of transcranialism. What is common to these arguments is a tacit move from the observation that process X is in some way causally connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to the conclusion that X is part of the cognitive process Y. Transcranialism is regularly backed by some form of coupling-constitution fallacy and that it does not have an adequate account of the difference between the cognitive and the noncognitive. A more nagging worry is the motivation for transcranialism. The difference explains why even transcranialists maintain that cognition extends from brains into the extraorganismal world rather than from the extraorganismal world into brains.

  • Chapter 1 - A Short Primer on Situated Cognition

  • from Part I - Backdrop
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 3-10

  • Summary

    Our sensory and motor capacities depend on more than just the workings of the brain and spinal cord; they also depend on the workings of other parts of the body, such as the sensory organs, the musculoskeletal system, and relevant parts of the peripheral nervous system (e.g., sensory and motor nerves). It seems natural to think of cognition as an interaction effect: the result, at least in part, of causal processes that span the boundary separating the individual organism from the natural, social, and cultural environment. One thing to say that cognitive activity involves systematic causal interaction with things outside the head, and it is quite another to say that those things instantiate cognitive properties or undergo cognitive processes. Bridging this conceptual gap remains a major challenge for defenders of the extended mind. Situated cognition is a many-splendored enterprise.

  • Chapter 20 - Language Processing Embodied and Embedded

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 382-400

  • Summary

    This chapter presents evidence that the external world is involved in a wide range of linguistic processes, from parsing syntax to encoding facts and understanding figurative phrases. Embedded language processing involves complex situational variables imposing immediate influences on word recognition, syntactic parsing, and discourse comprehension. Language processes rely heavily on situational variables at a very fine time scale, and therefore exhibit the kind of interaction-dominant dynamics that are more consistent with the developing situated cognition approach to psychology than with the traditional information-processing approach. Speech input alone does not determine spoken-word recognition. The situational context, constrained by what relevant objects are visible and actionable, plays an immediate role in driving the processes that map phonemes onto lexical representations and lexical representations onto referential operations. In many circumstances, the proper analysis of language processing is at the level of the organisms and the environment in which they are situated.

  • Chapter 13 - Remembering

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 217-235

  • Summary

    The situated cognition movement in the cognitive sciences, like those sciences themselves, is a loose-knit family of approaches to understanding the mind and cognition. Cognition both stems from and generates the activities of physical individuals located in particular kinds of environments. Cognitive extensions, like house extensions, come in a surprising variety of forms. Some are truly, massively, staggeringly transformative, and others are content to project a previously existing theme. The first dimension concerns the nature of the non-neural resources that are incorporated into extended cognitive behaviors, dispositions, and activities. Such resources may be natural, technological, or sociocultural in nature. The second dimension concerns the durability and reliability of the larger (extended) system. Human agents exhibit both a metabolic and a cognitive organization. But whereas the former depends heavily on expensively maintained and policed organismic boundaries, the latter looks prone to repeated bouts of seepage.

  • Chapter 16 - The Dynamic Interactions between Situations and Decisions

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 307-321

  • Summary

    It is often claimed that for any item to count as representational, it must form part of a general representational scheme or framework. Many people, though by no means all, claim that the idea of representation can be captured, in part, in terms of the concept of information. Many suppose that models of representation are subject to a teleological constraint. It is common to hold that, to be regarded as genuinely representational, a representation must be decouplable from the environment. In connection with the informational constraint, the possibility of representation is closely tied to the possibility of misrepresentation. Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This chapter discusses the representation and the extended mind, the first horn and the second horn.

  • Chapter 7 - Situated Representation

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 117-133

  • Summary

    It is often claimed that for any item to count as representational, it must form part of a general representational scheme or framework. Many people, though by no means all, claim that the idea of representation can be captured, in part, in terms of the concept of information. Many suppose that models of representation are subject to a teleological constraint. It is common to hold that, to be regarded as genuinely representational, a representation must be decouplable from the environment. In connection with the informational constraint, the possibility of representation is closely tied to the possibility of misrepresentation. Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This chapter discusses the representation and the extended mind, the first horn and the second horn.

  • Chapter 12 - Spatial Cognition

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 201-216

  • Summary

    Spatial thinking is essential for survival. Elementary to survival is knowing where to go to find food, water, and shelter and knowing how to return, as well as how to gather the food and water when they are located. Space for the mind is not like space for the physicist or surveyor, where the dimensions of space are primary and things in space are located with respect to those dimensions. The body is the first space encountered, even before birth. Experience of other spaces is channeled through the body, through perception and action. The space immediately surrounding the body is the space of actual or potential perception and action. The space we experience as we hike in the mountains or go from home to work or wander through a museum is the space of navigation. Gestures have benefits both for those making the gestures and for those watching them.

  • Chapter 15 - Problem Solving and Situated Cognition

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 264-306

  • Summary

    Situated theorists have reached something approximating an antinativist consensus. The advocate of extended cognition urges us to focus on the traits of extended systems, and it is difficult to see how genes could encode such traits, for genes would seem to affect directly only the organism itself. Humans categorize, perceive, remember, use language, reason, and make sense of the actions of others; these and more are abilities of persisting systems. In contrast, most actual extended systems are short-lived. The embedded approach minimizes the amount of internal representation used to model the human performance of cognitive tasks. Theories of cognition must make some allowance for persisting, internal representations. Children employ amodal representations from early on, and concepts are used in abstract thought, when one is, for example, alone in the study. The wide range of theoretical possibilities opens with respect to nativism and the situated modeling of cognition.

  • Chapter 6 - Innateness and the Situated Mind

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 96-116

  • Summary

    Situated theorists have reached something approximating an antinativist consensus. The advocate of extended cognition urges us to focus on the traits of extended systems, and it is difficult to see how genes could encode such traits, for genes would seem to affect directly only the organism itself. Humans categorize, perceive, remember, use language, reason, and make sense of the actions of others; these and more are abilities of persisting systems. In contrast, most actual extended systems are short-lived. The embedded approach minimizes the amount of internal representation used to model the human performance of cognitive tasks. Theories of cognition must make some allowance for persisting, internal representations. Children employ amodal representations from early on, and concepts are used in abstract thought, when one is, for example, alone in the study. The wide range of theoretical possibilities opens with respect to nativism and the situated modeling of cognition.

  • Chapter 18 - Situativity and Learning

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 347-367

  • Summary

    The tension in rejecting modularity and yet treating the mind/brain as the locus of control for cognitive activity should be apparent. Modularity is rejected as failing to recognize the diverse components involved in performing a cognitive task, and advocates of situated cognition likewise maintain that many cognitive activities involve components outside the agent itself. Dividing the mind/brain into component systems or modules has been a common strategy in both philosophical and psychological theorizing. Turning to the whole organism, the traditional view, which treats the skin as the boundary of the organism and the mind as coterminous with the brain and central nervous system, is well motivated. The mind/brain itself and the organism as a whole are open systems and dependent on the environment; hence, the quest to understand how a cognitive agent together with its various cognitive mechanisms is situated in its environment is also well motivated.

  • Chapter 17 - Situating Rationality

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 322-346

  • Summary

    This chapter discusses the importance of dynamics to understanding cognition. The author turns to the issue of how dynamics have been integrated into various theories of cognition. The author describes strengths and weaknesses of three main contenders in cognitive science, in relation to their incorporation of time into their methods of model construction. The neural engineering framework (NEF) is a general theory of neurobiological systems. Neural dynamics are characterized by considering neural representations as control theoretic state variables. Thus, the dynamics of neurobiological systems can be analyzed using control theory. The model employs biologically realistic neurons to learn the relevant structural transformations appropriate for a given context, and it generalizes such transformations to novel contents with the same syntactic structure. The intent of the NEF is to provide a suggestion as to how we might take seriously many of the important insights generated from cognitive science.

  • Chapter 26 - Neuroethology

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 480-504

  • Summary

    Decision analysis is concerned with the development of prescriptive methods for improving difficult real-life decisions. The basic principle is to divide and conquer, a complex decision is broken down into small manageable parts, judgments are made with respect to each part, and small parts are recombined to form an overall evaluation. Sequential-sampling models such as decision-field theory can be viewed as dynamic extensions of the traditional decision theories. Therefore, sequential sampling models provide a theoretical bridge between traditional decision theories and naturalistic decisions. Three related programs of research have examined judgment or decision making through what could be called a situated cognition perspective. Dynamic theories of decision making have the power to explain the basic findings from laboratory experiments, such as context-dependent preferences, as well as new phenomena that arise in the study of naturalistic decisions.

  • Chapter 23 - Emotions in the Wild

  • from Part III - Empirical Developments
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 437-453

  • Summary

    This chapter presents an overview of situated work on memory and remembering. It covers relevant movements in cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, the social sciences and social philosophy, and distributed cognition. One respect in which a thoroughly situated approach to memory can push the existing ecological focus on real-life or everyday memory phenomena further is in presenting constructive processes in remembering, and, more generally, memory's openness to various forms of influence as more mundane or natural than inevitably dangerous. The chapter merges these ideas about interpersonal memory dynamics with the postconnectionist picture of human beings as essentially incomplete machines, apt to incorporate what has become apt for incorporation. Some of the liveliest recent applications of situated cognition to the case of memory show that systems of exograms are not necessarily meant to be permanent or limitlessly transmissible, or turn out to be less stable in practice than in intention.

  • Chapter 10 - Embedded Rationality

  • from Part II - Conceptual Foundations
  • Edited by Philip Robbins, Washington University, St Louis, Murat Aydede, University of Florida
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 November 2008, pp 171-182

  • Summary

    This chapter provides an introduction to systems thinking and its application in systems theory. This is followed by a review of the historical context in which a non-systems-thinking perspective developed in the study of intelligence, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) research. Then, the chapter reviews how systems thinking relates to and is manifested in the study of cognition. Next, it summarizes crosscutting themes that constitute the scientific antecedents of situated cognition. Finally, the chapter focuses on recent and continuing dilemmas that foreshadowed the acceptance of situated cognition in the fields of AI and psychology, and suggests prospects for the next scientific advances. The study of animal navigation and social behavior is especially profound for AI and cognitive science because it reveals what simpler mechanisms, that is, fixed programs with perhaps limited learning during maturation, can accomplish.

Page 563 of 596