THE FIRST SECTION

Of the use of words

The character of words is an object worthy of the philosopher's consideration. Their right use is to signify a thought exactly.

A terminus inanis is one whose meaning we believe we understand but do not in fact understand. An expression is deceptive where we believe that something is possible and yet it is impossible.

A terminus familiaris is that expression whose sense has never been investigated because it has never been heeded. Every language has such terms. I say, e.g., addicted[.] On closer investigation such terms are often deceptive.

The phrase learned merchandising is a deceptive business, since one puts forth words as things[;] what is more common than this expression and deceit! An expression that can be understood is called understandable. Something can be understandable without being distinct. When 2 expressions have one meaning, or where their meanings are at least not very different, then they are called synonymous expressions. If an expression has more than one meaning then it is called terminus vagus ambiguus anceps.

THE SECOND SECTION

Of the learned style of writing

Style actually means a carver's tool. Here it means the character in which one expresses one's thoughts. Everyone has his own particular style, just as everyone writes his own particular hand. Style is to be considered (1.) insofar as it is adequate to its object. (2.) To the person (subject) and the person's social position.

To compare something as a characteristic mark with a thing is to judge. The thing itself is the subject; the characteristic mark is the predicate. The comparison is expressed by means of the copula is or are. When used absolutely, the copula designates the predicate as a characteristic mark of the subject. If, however, it is combined with the sign for negation, the copula then signifies that the predicate is a characteristic mark which is incompatible with the subject. In the former case, the judgement is affirmative, whereas in the latter case the judgement is negative. Obviously, in calling the predicate a characteristic mark, we are not saying that it is a characteristic mark of the subject, for that is only the case with affirmative judgements. What we are saying is that the predicate is regarded as a characteristic mark of some thing or other, though, in the case of a negative judgement, it contradicts the subject of the judgement. Thus, let it be a mind which I am thinking; and let compound be the characteristic mark of something or other. The judgement: A mind is not compound represents this characteristic mark as conflicting with the thing itself.

That which is a characteristic mark of a characteristic mark of a thing is called a mediate characteristic mark of that thing. Thus, necessary is an immediate characteristic mark of God, whereas immutable is a characteristic mark of what is necessary, and a mediate characteristic mark of God. Obviously, the immediate characteristic mark occupies the position of an intermediate characteristic mark (nota intermedia) between the remote characteristic mark and the thing itself, for it is only by its means that the remote characteristic mark is compared with the thing itself. But it is also possible to compare a characteristic mark with a thing negatively, by means of an intermediate characteristic mark, namely, by recognising that something conflicts with the immediate characteristic mark of the thing.

Concept of logic

Everything in nature, both in the lifeless and in the living world, takes place according to rules, although we are not always acquainted with these rules. – Water falls according to laws of gravity, and with animals locomotion also takes place according to rules. The fish in water, the bird in the air, move according to rules. The whole of nature in general is really nothing but a connection of appearances according to rules; and there is no absence of rules anywhere. If we believe we have found such a thing, then in this case we can only say that we are not acquainted with the rules.

The exercise of our powers also takes place according to certain rules that we follow, unconscious of them at first, until we gradually arrive at cognition of them through experiments and lengthy use of our powers, indeed, until we finally become so familiar with them that it costs us much effort to think them in abstracto. Thus universal grammar is the form of a language in general, for example. One speaks even without being acquainted with grammar, however; and he who speaks without being acquainted with it does actually have a grammar and speaks according to rules, but ones of which he is not himself conscious.

Everything in the world happens according to rules[;] as we perceive this in the corporeal world, so do we find it even in the employment of our own powers, although we are not immediately conscious of the rules at all. We attain this employment through mere attempts, and from these very attempts, e.g., teaching someone to speak or to walk, we can derive the multitude of rules. In this way we can learn many rules by ourselves. Grammar consists of endless rules. On this aaccount a few have held language to be a divine inspiration, too. This much is certain, however, that all languages, in accordance with their first principles, can be reduced to a grammar. Moreover, grammar is a doctrine of the understanding, of course. For as our soul combines concepts, so must words also be combined. It is too abstract to be taught in school. Let us take only the abstract rules of the genere substantivo, etc. Let us investigate more closely these rules according to which our powers work. The understanding is the faculty of rules itself, and only the understanding can test these rules. By what rule does it do so? This is hard to discover, because if it errs itself, the understanding cannot indicate the correctness of the rules according to which it proceeds.

Logic is the science that contains the formal rules and principles of thought. It is customarily divided into:

1. theoretical logic,

2. practical logic[;] but there is no such division, for in that case it would have to be applied to objects, which is not the case at all, however, for it contains only the formal rules of thought.

One can | divide | it rather into:

1. the doctrine of elements[; this] contains rules in general,

2. the doctrine of method[; this] contains the principles of science.

The doctrine of method is the complex of cognitions, insofar as they are made into a system { – It contains directions for the way in which a system of cognition is to be attained}. It constitutes the so-called practical part.

In the history of logic the most outstanding phenomenon is where it battled with itself as to whether any cognition is certain. He who believed that it could be completely proved was called a dogmatist, but the doubters were called skeptics. {Skeptics wanted to prove that one cannot attain certainty about anything at all, and thus they fell into contradiction with themselves – a cathartic, which annuls itself. – Their acuity, with which they attacked the scholastics, is admirable.} They were in the end a valuable sect. {Pyrrho was the earliest of all the skeptics – later Arcesilaus, Carneades.}

We have no one who has exceeded Aristotle or enlarged his <pure> logic (which is in itself fundamentally impossible) just as no mathematician has exceeded Euclid.

THE FIRST SECTION

Of learned cognition universally in general

In this paragraphus the author wanted to give a definition of representation, but because he could not do it he helped himself out with a rhetorical flight, as commonly happens when one can say nothing certain. He says at the end that a representation acts like a picture that shows the pictorial skill of the soul in its interior. What representation is cannot really be explained. It is one of the simple concepts that we necessarily must have. Every man knows immediately what representation is. Cognitions and representations are of the same sort. Concepts are somewhat different from them, however, as we shall see in what follows. Cognition and representation are taken in logic to be of the same sort. Every representation is something in us, which, however, is related to something else, which is the object. Certain things represent something, but we represent things. Logic does not teach us how we ought to represent something by means of consciousness, but rather it presupposes the consciousness of something as a psychological matter.

In every cognition whatsoever we find something material. But also something formal.

The object as we represent [it] is the material, while the manner of the representation is called the formal. If, e.g., I represent virtue to someone, then I can look in part to what I represent, in part to how I represent it[;] the latter is the formal[,] the former the material in the representation.

All our cognitions are acquired

1. through experience

2. through our own practice and

3. through instruction.

From learning arises the spirit of imitation. This learning happens in childhood. There is of course a certain skill that one brings about for oneself through imitation; but he who imitates shows the least degree of capacity.

The first origin of our cognitions is empirical. Many things arise through imitation and many cognitions through imitation.

We see what others have shown us and we imitate.

The 2nd kind is the practice of our acquired skill. Through frequent employment of our insights and talents we attain a greater cognition and new insights, and these can be increased still further by means of our own experience.

The last thing is to attain a cognition through universal rules[;] these are derived from reason.

The first method of attaining cognitions must be abandoned just as soon as the capacities achieve a faculty of cultivating themselves. One must seek to think for oneself, to judge for oneself.

This kind of practice with our capacities demands the very same degree, even if one thinks in opposition to what others have thought.

The natural understanding has its own laws, according to which alone it can proceed. These are called natural laws.

The character of a learned man is of two kinds: the character of his head and of his heart. The first is concerned with cognition, the latter with inclination. The character of the heart has a strong connection with the character of the head, if learnedness is to be furthered. The character of the heart has a great influence on the direction of the understanding, and it is therefore not unimportant even in the case of speculative sciences.

The character of the head concerns understanding, reason, and taste. The faculty of imitation is exactly opposed to the faculty of genius. Those who possess the capacity of genius sometimes do not have the spirit of imitation, which, on the other hand, is common to the highest degree among those who show no genius. The Russians are supposed to have the flaw that they lack genius and just for this reason are not able to teach it. Hence science always dies out among them. Philosophy requires genius, likewise belles lettres[;] useful sciences, however, require the spirit of imitation. Mathematics only requires imitation. Learnedness and good taste are distinct from one another.

Native wit is the natural capacity of the healthy understanding and healthy reason. This cannot be learned[;] what is subsequently learned is called schooled wit. All instruction presupposes certain cognitions, or at least the capacity for them.

§1

In the case of a substantial compound, just as analysis does not come to an end until a part is reached which is not a whole, that is to say a SIMPLE, SO likewise synthesis does not come to an end until we reach a whole which is not a part, that is to say a WORLD.

In this exposition of the underlying concept, I have, in addition to the characteristic marks which belong to the distinct cognition of an object, also paid some little attention to the two-fold genesis of the concept out of the nature of the mind. For since this genesis, by serving as an example, can help us to secure a deeper insight into the method of metaphysics, it seems to me mat it should not be underestimated. Thus, it is one thing, given the parts, to conceive for oneself the composition of the whole, using an abstract concept of the understanding, and it is another thing to follow up this general concept, as one might do with some problem of reason, by the sensitive faculty of cognition, that is to say, to represent the same concept to oneself in the concrete by a distinct intuition. The former is done by means of the concept of composition in general, in so far as a number of things are contained under it (in reciprocal relations to each other), and thus by means of ideas of the understanding which are universal. The latter case rests upon the conditions of time, in so far as it is possible, by the successive addition of part to part, to arrive genetically, that is to say, by SYNTHESIS, at the concept of a compound; this case falls under the laws of intuition. In a similar way, when a substantial compound has been given, we arrive without difficulty at the idea of things which are simple by taking away generally the concept of composition, which derives from the understanding. For the things which remain when every element of conjunction has been removed are simple things.

The use to which mathematics can be put in philosophy consists either in the imitation of its method or in the genuine application of its propositions to the objects of philosophy. With respect to the first of these two uses: it has not been noticed that it has had only one benefit, in spite of the great advantage expected of it to start with. Furthermore, the high-sounding titles, with which philosophers, jealous of geometry, were induced to decorate the propositions of philosophy, have now been gradually abandoned. The impropriety of provocative gestures made in lowly circumstances, and the stubborn refusal of the importunate non liquet to yield to all this pomp, have come to be modestly recognised.

By contrast, the second use to which mathematics has been put in philosophy has been all the more beneficial to the parts of philosophy affected. These parts of philosophy, by turning the doctrines of mathematics to their own advantage, have attained to heights, to which they would not otherwise have been able to aspire. But the parts of philosophy to which I am referring are only the insights of physics – unless, that is, one is obliged to include in philosophy the logic of probability. As for metaphysics, this science, instead of turning certain of the concepts or doctrines of mathematics to its own advantage, has, on the contrary, frequently armed itself against them. And where it might, perhaps, have been able to gain secure foundations on which to base its reflections, it is to be seen trying to turn mathematical concepts into subtle fictions, which have little truth to them outside the field of mathematics. It is not difficult to guess which side will have the advantage if two sciences enter into a dispute with each other, where the one excels all others in certainty and distinctness, while the other has only just started out on the path to these objectives.

1. Classification of all possible arguments in support of a demonstration of the existence of God

The conviction of the great truth, There is a God, if it is to have the highest degree of mathematical certainty, has this peculiarity: it can only be reached by a single path. It confers on this reflection an advantage: once one is convinced that there is no choice possible among a variety of arguments, philosophical efforts will have to be united in a single argument. These endeavours will aim to correct mistakes which may have crept into the argument in the course of its elaboration, not to reject it.

With a view to showing this, I would begin by reminding the reader that he must not lose sight of the requirement which must actually be satisfied. What has to be proved, namely, is the existence, not merely of a very great and very perfect first cause, but of the Supreme Being who is above all beings. Furthermore, what has to be proved is the existence, not of one or more such beings, but of one unique such Being. And, finally, these things must be proved with mathematical certainty and not by appealing to grounds which are merely probable.

All arguments for the existence of God must derive from one or other of two sources: either from the concepts of the understanding of the merely possible, or from the empirical concept of the existent. In the first case, the argument may proceed either from the possible as a ground to the existence of God as a consequence, or from the possible as a consequence to the divine existence as a ground. In the second case, the argument may proceed from that, the existence of which we experience, to the existence merely of a first and independent cause, and then, by subjecting that concept to analysis, proceed to the derivation of its divine characteristics; alternatively, the argument may proceed directly from that which experience teaches us to both the existence and the properties of the Divine Being.

NEW ELUCIDATION

Although Kant's New Elucidation (1755) was his first purely philosophical work, he had already published two major and three minor scientific works. Almost a decade earlier, the twenty-two-year-old Kant, having completed a six-year period of study at the University of Königsberg (devoted in part to the humanities and in part, under the influence of Martin Knutzen, to mathematics and natural science), crowned his studies with Living Forces (1747) (AK 1:1–181). Kant had addressed himself to the problem of calculating the magnitude of physical forces, attempting to mediate between and, indeed, reconcile the solution offered by Descartes, who construed force as the product of mass multiplied by velocity (mv), and that of Leibniz, who construed force as the product of mass multiplied by velocity squared (mv2), arguing that Leibniz's account related to ‘living’ force whereas that of Descartes related to ‘dead’ force. The correct account of the matter had been established by Boscovich in 1745, and the correct mathematical formula (mv2/2) was to be published by D'Alembert in the 1758 edition of his Traité de dynamique. In spite of its serious scientific shortcomings, the work displays extraordinary flashes of philosophical genius (the discussion of the structure of space and of the possibility of non-Euclidean spaces [AK 1:23–5] is an example). Living Forces also strikingly displays features characteristic of Kant's later thought: the predilection for a challenge posed by two cogently argued but incompatible positions; the wish to mediate between and, indeed, reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable by construing the two opposed positions as symptoms of a deeper ground of agreement; and the preoccupation with questions of method and epistemology and, in particular, with the issue of the limits of the applicability of mathematics to nature and physics.

In 1746, Kant was obliged temporarily to abandon his university career – the interruption was to last some eight years – by taking employment as a private tutor in the Königsberg area.

It is a year and a half now since Kant commissioned me to prepare his Logic for publication, as he expounded it to his listeners in public lectures, and to transmit it to the public in the form of a compendious manual. For this purpose I received from him his own manuscript, which he had used in his lectures, with the expression of special, honorable confidence in me, that, being acquainted with the principles of his system in general, I would easily enter into the course of his ideas, that I would not distort or falsify his thoughts, but rather would present them with the required clarity and distinctness and at the same time in the appropriate order. Now since, as I thus accepted the commission and have sought to carry it out as well as I was able, in conformity with the wish and the expectation of that praiseworthy wise man, my most honored teacher and friend, everything that concerns the exposition, the clothing and the execution, the presentation and the ordering of the thoughts, is in part to be reckoned to my account, I am naturally obliged to provide an account to the readers of this new Kantian work. On this matter, then, a few closer explanations here.

Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg on 22 April 1724 to Pietist parents of modest means. His precociousness attracted the attention of Franz Albert Schultz (1692–1763), who arranged for the eight-year-old boy to enter the Collegium Fridericianum, of which he was the rector. The young Kant was thus exposed to the powerful spiritual and intellectual influence of Schultz, who was both a Pietist and a follower of Wolff, under whom he had studied at Halle. Kant's eight years at the Fridericianum were devoted largely to the study of classical languages (especially Latin) and religion. His final years at school were overshadowed by the death of his mother in 1737.

In 1740, the sixteen-year-old Kant began his studies at the Herzog Albrecht University in Königsberg. He seems to have read mathematics, natural science, and philosophy. The crucial influence on Kant during this period was that of Martin Knutzen (1713–51). Only eleven years older than Kant, Knutzen likewise was both a Pietist and a follower of Wolff. He was also a Newtonian, and he introduced Kant to the new physics. Kant attended Knutzen's lectures on mathematics, astronomy, and natural science, and it was probably Knutzen who led Kant to the theme of his first work, Living Forces (1747).

The death of his father and the completion of Living Forces in 1746 marked the end of Kant's six years as a student at Königsberg. Straitened financial circumstances constrained the twenty-four-year-old Kant to interrupt his university career for some eight years to take employment as a tutor with a succession of families in the Königsberg area. He clearly contrived to combine his philosophical and scientific interests with his tutorial duties, for his return to Königsberg in 1754 was marked by the publication of two short works of considerable scientific originality and one major work of indisputable scientific genius, Universal Natural History (1755), in which Kant, with characteristic self-assurance, out-Newtoned Newton by offering a purely mechanical account of the structure and motions of the universe.

What follows is a table which summarizes the contents of Kant's handwritten notes on Meier's Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason and correlates them with the related pages of the Jäsche logic. These notes, or reflections, were inscribed in Kant's personal copy of the text, from which he lectured. They were edited by Erich Adickes and published in Volume 16 of the Academy edition.

The main headings (in bold-face and italics) are taken from Meier's text. The subsidiary headings were provided by Adickes for Volume 16, and they reflect the content of Kant's reflections rather than of Meier's text. Next to each heading are: the numbers of the corresponding paragraphs of Meier's text; the page numbers in Volume 16 where both Kant's reflections and the relevant sections of Meier's text are printed; and the page numbers in Volume 9 of the corresponding portion of the Jäsche logic.

§ 1. PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY IS ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT IN NATURE FROM MATHEMATICAL CERTAINTY

One is certain if one knows that it is impossible that a cognition should be false. The degree of this certainty, taken objectively, depends upon the sufficiency in the characteristic marks of the necessity of a truth. But taken subjectively, the degree of certainty increases with the degree of intuition to be found in the cognition of this necessity. In both respects, mathematical certainty is of a different kind to philosophical certainty. I shall demonstrate this with the greatest possible clarity.

The human understanding, like any other force of nature, is governed by certain rules. Mistakes are made, not because the understanding combines concepts without rule, but because the characteristic mark which is not perceived in a thing is actually denied of it. One judges that that of which one is not conscious in a thing does not exist. Now, firstly, mathematics arrives at its concepts synthetically; it can say with certainty that what it did not intend to represent in the object by means of the definition is not contained in that object. For the concept of what has been defined only comes into existence by means of the definition; the concept has no other significance at all apart from that which is given to it by the definition. Compared with this, philosophy and particularly metaphysics are a great deal more uncertain in their definitions, should they venture to offer any. For the concept of that which is to be defined is given. Now, if one should fail to notice some characteristic mark or other, which nonetheless belongs to the adequate distinguishing of the concept in question, and if one judges that no such characteristic mark belongs to the complete concept, then the definition will be wrong and misleading. Numberless examples of such errors could be adduced, and for that very reason I refer only to the above example of touching.