Almost two centuries after Immanuel Kant's death, one of his major works is still virtually unknown in the English-speaking world; this in itself is remarkable and calls for an explanation. It cannot be explained entirely by the fact that Kant did not live to prepare the text for publication, leaving a stack of several hundred pages on his desk at the time of his death. For though unedited, the manuscript is not unfinished in the sense that its argumentation breaks off midway; rather, the train of thought running through it is brought to what seems to be a logical, if not fully worked out, conclusion.

Kant's literary executor, however, thought the text unfit for publication, with the result that it soon disappeared among the possessions of Kant's heirs. When it resurfaced half a century later, influential philosophers such as Kuno Fischer thought they could dismiss it without inspection, as a product of senility – after all, had not Kant himself completed the critical philosophy with his Critique of Judgment?

But more sympathetic thinkers, too, found it difficult to make sense of Kant's text, for the various sheets and fascicles of the manuscript were not preserved in the order of their composition, making it seem impossible to determine the chronological (and logical) order of his reasoning.

Nevertheless, an edition of the Opus postumum was begun in 1882 by Rudolf Reicke – only to come to an abrupt end two years later, when the manuscript was sold by Kant's heir to an uncooperative buyer.

Within a few years of the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was recognized by his contemporaries as one of the seminal philosophers of modern times – indeed, as one of the great philosophers of all time. This renown soon spread beyond German-speaking lands, and translations of Kant's work into English were published even before 1800. Since then, interpretations of Kant's views have come and gone and loyalty to his positions has waxed and waned, but his importance has not diminished. Generations of scholars have devoted their efforts to producing reliable translations of Kant into English as well as into other languages.

There are four main reasons for the present edition of Kant's writings:

1. Completeness. Although most of the works published in Kant's lifetime have been translated before – the most important ones more than once – only fragments of Kant's many important unpublished works have ever been translated. These include the Opus postumum, Kant's unfinished magnum opus on the transition from philosophy to physics; transcriptions of his classroom lectures; his correspondence; and his marginalia and other notes. One aim of this edition is to make a comprehensive sampling of these materials available in English for the first time.

2. Availability. Many English translations of Kant's works, especially those that have not individually played a large role in the subsequent development of philosophy, have long been inaccessible or out of print.

Everybody knows that there are immediate inferences, where from one judgement the truth of another judgement is cognised immediately without an intermediate concept. For this reason, such inferences are not syllogisms. For example, from the proposition: All matter is changeable, there immediately follows the proposition: that which is not changeable is not matter. The logicians enumerate different types of such immediate inferences. Without doubt, the most important immediate inferences are those which are based upon logical conversion, and likewise those which are based upon contraposition.

Now, if a syllogism is the product of three propositions only, and if it is in accordance with the rules which have just been explained and which are valid of every syllogism, then I call it a pure syllogism (ratiocinium purum). If, however, it is only possible by combining more man three judgements, it is a mixed syllogism (ratiocinium hybridum). Suppose, namely, that between the three main propositions there has to be inserted an inference which has been derived immediately from them, and that, therefore, an extra proposition is added, over and above what is allowed in a pure syllogism, the syllogism is a ratiocinium hybridum. For example, suppose that someone were to argue as follows:

Nothing which is perishable is simple;

Consequently, nothing simple is perishable;

The soul of man is simple;

Therefore, the soul of man is not perishable.

Anyone who argued in this fashion would, it is true, not have a genuinely compound syllogism, for that would have to consist of a number of syllogisms. But this syllogism contains, in addition to what is required of a syllogism, an extra inference, arrived at immediately by contraposition; the syllogism thus contains four propositions.

But even if only three judgements were really expressed, the conclusion could only be drawn from these judgements by means of legitimate logical conversion, or by contraposition or some other logical transformation of one of these premises, so that the syllogism would, notwithstanding, still be a ratiocinium hybridum.

The arrogance of philosophy causes it to be exposed to all kinds of futile question. And philosophy often finds itself seriously embarrassed when it is confronted by certain stories: it is unable either to doubt some of them with impunity or to believe others without being mocked. In the case of the stories which circulate concerning spirits, the two problems to a certain extent arise together, the former in listening to someone solemnly recount such stories, the latter in recounting them to others. And it is, indeed, the case that there is no reproach more bitter to the philosopher than that of credulity and being duped by popular error. Those who know how to create the impression of cleverness at no great expense pour their scornful laughter on anything which, because it is unintelligible both to the ignorant and to the wise, reduces them both to more or less the same level. It is, therefore, not surprising that phenomena of this kind, which are so frequently alleged to occur, should find wide acceptance, though publicly they are either denied or, indeed, hushed up. One can be sure, therefore, that no academy of sciences will ever make this material the subject of a prize question, not because the members of such academies are wholly free from the tendency to subscribe to the opinion in question, but because the rule of prudence rightly excludes the questions which are indiscriminately thrown up both by prying inquisitiveness and by idle curiosity. And thus it is that stories of this kind are probably only ever believed secretly, whereas publicly they are dismissed with contempt by the incredulity which is currently in fashion.

However, it seems to me that this whole question is neither sufficiently important nor sufficiently prepared for us to be able to arrive at any decision in the matter.

There are many rules of movement, and of the understanding[;] every ship, every fish, follows the rules of movement. We ourselves are subject to these laws. We observe them in walking and in other movements. Nature has implanted these laws in men and animals. But in the case of these laws we do nothing more than fulfill them unknowingly, like the animals.

It would be needless to seek to scout out these laws and not to take a single step without reflection. As the fish in its swimming observes these rules most exactly by means of practice, so can we too, just by means of practice only, acquire a skill in observation of them[.] How quickly do we know how to help ourselves when we are about to fall? But we would lack this capacity if we sought first to reflect on what position we should take.

Borellus has written a book on rule-governed movement.

Besides the laws and rules of movement, however, there are also rules and laws of the understanding. We arrange all our judgments in accordance with these laws. As a child in walking learns to observe the laws of movement, so too, in judging, does it seek to form itself according to those laws of the understanding. All this it does unknowingly, and it acquires the skill merely through practice.

[The composition of these three reflections was doubtless occasioned by the announcement (published in the Hamburger freyen Urtheilen und Nachrichten for 27 July 1753) of the theme proposed by the Prussian Royal Academy of Sciences for its 1755 prize-essay competition. The theme was to be Pope's optimism as it was expressed in the dictum ‘Everything is good.’ The competition attracted entries from, among others, Mendelssohn, Lessing, Wieland, and Reinhard, to which last the prize was awarded. Kant may himself have considered competing for the prize, but he did not in the end submit an entry. These three reflections were probably composed in 1753 or 1754. They are of philosophical interest for a number of reasons: They contain an anticipation of Kant's proof of the existence of God from the possibility of things – an argument attributed rather implausibly to Pope himself; they also contain a criticism of an aspect of Leibnizian optimism (the 1759 Optimism itself containing a defence of a different aspect of Leibnizian optimism). Reflection 3703 contains an outline of an argument in Pope's Essay on Man (1733–4), Episde IV; Reflection 3704 presents a statement of Leibnizian optimism (based on the Théodicée [1714]) and a comparison of the positions of Leibniz and Pope; Reflection 3705 contains a criticism of the Leibnizian version of optimism. A French translation by François Marty was published in 1980 under the tide Premières réflexions sur I'optimisme (in Alquié, 1980, vol. I, pp. 25–34). The text of the three manuscript reflections is fragmentary; breaks in the manuscript are indicated by four dots enclosed in square brackets.]

REFLECTION 3703

You ask: who is happier in the world, the virtuous person or the vicious? If the matter is investigated, it will be found that there is always something intermingled with the advantages enjoyed by the wrong-doer which the virtuous person does not desire and on account of which he would not wish to change his state with that of the other.

{It treats the concepts of the understanding in general. The division of all thought – which has various forms that may be exhausted and brought into a system. The general thing that lies at the basis of all cognition is representation – a fundamental concept that cannot be explained. Cognition is relation of representation to an object – combined with an actio in the mind – consciousness (representation of our representation), which is lacking in obscure representations.}

The ancients divided it into (1.) apprehensio simplex, (2.) judicium, and (3.) ratiocinium. Our cognition involves two things, intuition and concept. Representations can also be related to something other than cognition, namely, to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure (the way in which we are affected by things). All our intuition belongs to sensibility, every concept to the understanding. Sensibility contains two faculties, sense and imagination {this is the magical power of the human spirit}, or the faculty for intuition of an object insofar as it is not present[;] but sense is that faculty insofar as the object is present.

{All our representation is (1.) sensation – its relation to the subject, (2.) cognition – relation to the object. (1.) e.g., pleasure – lies merely in me – not in the object.}

Within a few years of the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was recognized by his contemporaries as one of the seminal philosophers of modern times – indeed, as one of the great philosophers of all time. This renown soon spread beyond German-speaking lands, and translations of Kant's work into English were published even before 1800. Since then, interpretations of Kant's views have come and gone and loyalty to his positions has waxed and waned, but his importance has not diminished. Generations of scholars have devoted their efforts to producing reliable translations of Kant into English as well as into other languages.

There are four main reasons for the present edition of Kant's writings:

1. Completeness. Although most of the works published in Kant's life-time have been translated before – the most important ones more than once – only fragments of Kant's many important unpublished works have ever been translated. These include the Opus postumum, Kant's unfinished magnum opus on the transition from philosophy to physics; transcriptions of his classroom lectures; his correspondence; and his marginalia and other notes. One aim of this edition is to make a comprehensive sampling of these materials available in English for the first time.

2. Availability. Many English translations of Kant's works, especially those that have not individually played a large role in the subsequent development of philosophy, have long been inaccessible or out of print. Many of them, however, are crucial for the understanding of Kant's philosophical development, and the absence of some from English-language bibliographies may be responsible for erroneous or blinkered traditional interpretations of his doctrines by English-speaking philosophers.

3. Organization. Another aim of the present edition is to make all Kant's published work, both major and minor, available in comprehensive volumes organized both chronologically and topically, so as to facilitate the serious study of his philosophy by English-speaking readers.

[Translator's Note: As noted in the Translator's Introduction, the latter half of the Hechsel Logic appears to have been identical with the latter half of the Vienna Logic. I translate a portion of the Hechsel Logic here to replace what is missing from the Vienna Logic. The translation begins on p. 86 of the Hechsel manuscript, three sentences before the point at which the translation of the Vienna Logic ends.]

… A judgment that does not produce a distinct concept is empty, however. It is not empty of sense, but logically empty. Through them nothing useful is attained because they do not yield a distinct concept, and do not fulfill the understanding's ends. Battology (which has similarity with tautology) is the vain use of many words, where the concept is said with many words, without these many words making the concept distinct. It gets its name from a certain Batto, who observed the opposite of laconism, and who exerted himself to combine many words with few thoughts. Tautology consists in identitas explicita.

We are speaking of mediately and immediately certain judgments. An unprovable judgment that is not capable of further proof is immediately certain. One that it is still possible to prove in speculation is mediate. Proof is mediate certainty of cognition by means of another cognition. That every body is extended no man can prove. This is an elementary proposition of a cognition, from which all other proofs are derived.

There is always a certain difficulty involved in the instruction of young people, and it is this: the knowledge one imparts to them is such that one finds oneself constrained to outstrip their years. Without waiting for their understanding to mature, one is obliged to impart knowledge to them, which, in the natural order of things, can only be understood by minds which are more practised and experienced. It is this which is the source of the endless prejudices of the schools – prejudices which are more intractable and frequently more absurd than ordinary prejudices. And it is this, too, which is the source of that precocious prating of young thinkers, which is blinder than any other self-conceit and more incurable than ignorance. This difficulty, however, is one which cannot be entirely avoided, and the reason is this. In an epoch which is characterised by an elaborately complex social organisation, a knowledge of higher things is regarded as a means to advancement and comes to be thought of as a necessity of life. Such knowledge ought by nature, however, really to be regarded merely as one of life's adornments – one of life's inessential beauties, so to speak. Nonetheless, even in this branch of instruction, it is possible to make public education more adapted to nature, even though it will not be possible to bring it into perfect harmony with it. The natural progress of human knowledge is as follows: first of all, the understanding develops by using experience to arrive at intuitive judgements, and by their means to attain to concepts. After that, and employing reason, these concepts come to be known in relation to their grounds and consequences. Finally, by means of science, these concepts come to be known as parts of a well-ordered whole. This being the case, teaching must follow exactly the same path. The teacher is, therefore, expected to develop in his pupil firstly the man of understanding, then the man of reason, and finally the man of learning. Such a procedure has this advantage: even if, as usually happens, the pupil should never reach the final phase, he will still have benefitted from his instruction.

Manner and method

All cognition, and a whole of cognition, must be in conformity with a rule. (Absence of rules is at the same time unreason.) But this rule is either that of manner (free) or that of method (compulsion).

Form of science – Method

Cognition, as science, must be arranged in accordance with a method. For science is a whole of cognition as a system, and not merely as an aggregate. It therefore requires a systematic cognition, hence one composed in accordance with rules on which we have reflected.

Doctrine of method – Its object and end

As the doctrine of elements in logic has for its content the elements and conditions of the perfection of a cognition, so the universal doctrine of method, as the other part of logic, has to deal with the form of a science in general, or with the ways of acting so as to connect the manifold of cognition in a science.

Means for furthering the logical perfection of cognition

The doctrine of method is supposed to expound the way for us to attain the perfection of cognition. Now one of the most essential logical perfections of cognition consists in its distinctness, thoroughness, and systematic ordering into the whole of a science. Accordingly, the doctrine of method will have principally to provide the means through which these perfections of cognition are furthered.