This chapter introduces the central puzzle of this study: why, in contrast to other states in Southern Africa, have Zimbabwean democratic institutions stagnated or even declined since independence in 1980? To begin to answer this question, an overview of the resource sector in Zimbabwe, particularly the large diamond found in 2006, and the development of institutions since Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, is given. Furthermore, an institutional analysis, a brief overview of past studies, and a research design are outlined. In terms of case selection, Zimbabwe is placed in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource curse dynamics, and the concept of the “opaque” state is defined. Furthermore, Zimbabwe is defined in terms of democratization and state capacity, concepts that will be used throughout the study.

This chapter draws on past theories of ownership structure in the oil sector and applies them to the alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe. The alluvial diamond sector in Zimbabwe presents a natural experiment for understanding ownership structure in that the state and ruling party have been the same since 2006. Still, at least six different ownership regimes have been attempted. This chapter traces each of these and examines how the unpredictability of ownership in the diamond sector has often led to large-scale diamond smuggling and a regulatory framework reflective of political dynamics. The unpredictability of ownership has, in and of itself, caused difficulty in the Zimbabwean diamond sector and has reflected the unpredictability of state institutions. Thus, this chapter argues that past approaches that have been developed to examine the oil sector of states have some relevance for states that have a large amount of alluvial diamond wealth. However, the unique ability for a large amount of diamond wealth to be smuggled into a small space has made the significant increase in diamond wealth since 2006 a challenge for the formal economy and state capacity.

This chapter focuses on past literature on resource-wealthy countries and examines how alluvial diamond wealth may present unique challenges for states. State theory is discussed, and the “opaque” state concept is compared and contrasted with these. Then, an overview of different arguments that have been made to explain the relative decline of Zimbabwean institutions is given. Most of these can fall into three central categories: the psychology of leaders in ZANU-PF, the failure of economic policy, and external sanctions. The large diamond find in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006 is presented as a “critical juncture” for Zimbabwean institutions. Thus, this chapter places Zimbabwe in the overall population of cases when it comes to resource wealth and compares and contrasts how past approaches to resource politics, which have heavily focused on the oil sector, provide a roadmap for examining alluvial diamond wealth. However, this research must also be built upon as different resources, particularly a rapid increase in alluvial diamond wealth in the case of Zimbabwe, bring various challenges to state capacity and democratization.

The final chapter generalizes the theoretical development from other chapters of this book to states in different regions. Venezuela, similar to Zimbabwe, has also experienced many similar dynamics: hyperinflation, decline of the formal sector, and while at one time having a similar if not better level of development to other countries in its region, has now fallen distinctly behind. However, similar to ZANU-PF and the large diamond production after 2006, the PSUV in Venezuela also had a source of funding to perpetuate its rule after 2012: alluvial gold. Eritrea also has some similarities to Venezuela and Zimbabwe, as they have produced and continued to discover a large amount of resource wealth in a single-party dominant political system. Nonetheless, Eritrea may have avoided some of the extreme pitfalls of Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The rapid increase in Zimbabwean diamond wealth and the resulting “opaque” institutions provide lessons for states with a large amount of resource wealth. This study illustrates that different types of resources offer some commonalities but also distinctly different challenges for the institutional trajectory of states and overall capacity.

This chapter examines attempts by the political opposition to ZANU-PF to modify politics in the diamond sector, particularly during the GNU government from 2009 to 2013. Many studies have focused on the failures of the main opposition, the MDC party, now CCC, to provide an effective alternative to ZANU-PF. Common arguments have been that the party has been undermined by infighting, has often been viewed as being backed by foreign governments, and has had some issues with corruption. This chapter argues that a major reason why the political opposition in Zimbabwe has been unable to make inroads politically is that the diamond sector has been wholly out of its control, even during the GNU government. Thus, this has allowed factions within ZANU-PF to gain the upper hand and has increased an already tilted playing field. Other attempts to provide critical oversight for the diamond sector from NGOs, the Kimberley Process, and foreign governments have also had difficulty. While these groups have shaped some of the policies readily available to factions within ZANU-PF and have sometimes changed their behavior, the diamond sector has remained mainly in ZANU-PF control.