Studies in political science have revealed that voters evaluate candidates’ policy platforms based on gendered views, where women are expected to handle issues such as education well, while men are perceived to be better at issues such as national security. However, the extent to which voters’ views are gendered on immigration policy is less known, as existing theories offer varying interpretations of whether this issue is more aligned with the feminine or masculine stereotype. This paper empirically examines gendered evaluations of immigration policy platforms by conducting a survey experiment in Japan. Our experimental vignette presents a hypothetical candidate who is affiliated with a traditionally anti-immigration party but supports expanding immigration. We manipulate the gender of the candidate and the gendered framing of the position, and examine their interaction effects on attitudes to the candidate. Our experimental results show that the respondents do not evaluate the candidate based on gender and its interaction with the framing of the policy, suggesting that gender bias in voter evaluations may not be as severe as the literature expects in the immigration policy area.

Allied states often seek to discourage other members from engaging in unnecessary conflicts, frequently working to mitigate and de-escalate tensions during crises involving their partners. This study investigates the de-escalatory influence of alliances − referred to as the restraint effect − on state behaviour during international crises. The central question addressed is: under what conditions does the restraint effect of alliances become more pronounced? The study hypothesizes that relatively weak states allied with major powers are more likely to experience a stronger restraint effect compared to others. This hypothesis is empirically tested using multiple regression models. The findings provide evidence of an additional restraint effect associated with the presence of a major ally within defence pacts. Furthermore, the temporal analysis reveals that this effect is particularly evident during the Cold War era.

This study investigates whether corruption among public officials undermines fundamental rights, analysing data from 142 countries using the Rule of Law Index, a widely recognised and respected tool for assessing the rule of law worldwide. The results show that corruption among judges and bureaucrats consistently erodes fundamental rights, including labour rights and freedom of association. In advanced democracies, police and military corruption significantly reduces freedom of association, while lawmakers’ corruption undermines labour rights. However, in the broader context, corruption among lawmakers, police, and military officers does not significantly affect these rights. This study emphasises the significant role of bureaucracy in protecting rights and the devastating consequences of bureaucratic corruption. The trend of executive power abuse further complicates this issue. To combat corruption and safeguard fundamental rights, this article recommends robust mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency, emphasising the importance of democratic oversight.

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a human rights mechanism under which all UN members are subject to human rights reviews by other states. Given that North Korea is among the worst human rights violators globally, human rights practitioners and academic research have paid much attention to North Korea as a State under Review (SUR). What is much less known and researched is that North Korea actively engages as a ‘reviewer’, regularly making human rights recommendations to other UN members. Using UPR data from 2008 to 2020, this study explores the political dynamics of North Korean human rights recommendations by identifying to whom North Korea makes recommendations and why. We theorize that North Korea utilizes the UPR as a political arena wherein it pats on the back of politically close states and tries to shame politically antagonistic states. Empirical analysis shows that political closeness with North Korea is the main driver influencing its back-patting and shaming efforts in the UPR. Specifically, politically distant states from North Korea, measured by the UN General Assembly voting affinity and presence of unilateral economic sanctions, receive more condemnations and fewer back-patting recommendations. We also demonstrate that North Korea has become much more active over time in their shaming efforts. These findings suggest that even an isolated country like North Korea can learn how to operate in an international institution and can utilize it strategically.

Despite ongoing affective polarization in the United States, support for Taiwan has somehow remained unscathed; Democrats and Republicans unanimously endorse US-Taiwan foreign policy. This is reflected both in public opinion surveys of American voters and support for Taiwan from elected officials. Theories of foreign policy and public opinion suggest that whether voters take top-down or bottom-up cues on foreign policy, we should expect some level of polarization on a salient issue like Taiwan. Utilizing two preregistered survey experiments in the United States, this study tests how robust bipartisan support for Taiwan persists when Taiwan is framed as either a Republican or Democratic issue. When presented as a partisan issue, do American voters still support Taiwan? Contrary to theoretical expectations, Taiwan presents a complex reality. Some foreign policy issues related to Taiwan can become partisan when framed along party lines while others remain bipartisan. Specifically, support for diplomatic and military policy may be affected by partisan framing, but support for economic policy remains bipartisan. This study contributes to theories of public opinion and foreign policy, particularly for scholars focused on US-Taiwan and US-China relations.

Since the initiation of its Belt and Road Initiative, China’s economic statecraft has drawn considerable attention in academic circles. Yet less attention has been given to why the Chinese leadership first chose to pursue its national interests through economic means in the post-Mao period. This underexplored part of China’s economic statecraft can serve as a useful starting point to understand China’s foreign economic policies on their own terms. Employing a neoclassical realist framework and surveying statements made by Chinese leaders throughout the reform era, this study argues that the country’s leaders have gradually modified the strategic importance of the country’s economic statecraft in response to changes in their perceptions of the world order. Meanwhile, China’s form of economic statecraft has largely been determined by reform of its state-owned enterprises in the domestic realm.

Why do democracy supporters abandon their pursuit of a democratic system? Existing scholarship highlights how materialist incentive strategies employed by elites contribute to regime resilience; however, the cultural norms that motivate popular response to incentives remain unclear. We argue that East Asian individuals influenced by Confucianism interpret democracy through instrumental rationality, resulting in pragmatic democratic support. Ordinary citizens recognise the abstract ideals of democracy but hesitate to prioritise the democratic system over material well-being in trade-offs. To identify genuine supporters of democracy, this paper develops two conceptual tools: ‘minimum support for democracy (MSFD)’, which acknowledges the fundamental value of democracy, and ‘priority support for democracy (PSFD)’, which prioritises democratic principles and institutions over competing values. Using data from the latest fifth Asian Barometer Survey (2018–2022), our results suggest that Confucian values are compatible with the MSFD but simultaneously undermine the PSFD. Through mediation analysis, we further find that the instrumental understanding of democracy embedded within Confucianism drives people to abandon the PSFD. These findings shed light on the cultural roots of pragmatic democratic support, offering major implications for the prospects of democratisation in East Asia.

Recent studies suggest that young individuals living in consolidated democracies are growing increasingly disillusioned with liberal democratic institutions and becoming more receptive to alternative forms of governance. This study investigates the democratic orientations of young individuals by examining support for different forms of leadership in South Korea. It argues that some young Koreans are following the global trend and are increasingly showing less faith in democracy. Specifically, they are showing more support for strongman leaders due to the way in which these leaders appeal to these voters. An original survey with an embedded experiment suggests that, while the general Korean public tends to support democratic leaders, young Koreans increasingly express a greater preference for strongman leaders due to their growing public anxieties and societal grievances along with the leaders’ painted image to resolve problems. These findings empirically challenge the long-held belief that young people inherently and undoubtedly prefer democracy and suggest that more needs to be done to overcome their diminishing faith in democratic leadership. The study thus prompts a reconsideration of how generational value changes may influence democracies in the future.

A growing number of studies focus on how governments can manage audience costs when they want to back down from international crises. In line with previous studies, especially Kohama et al. (2024), this paper argues that the Japanese government can use a variety of reasons to justify its decisions to de-escalate while minimizing domestic audience costs. I found that governments can reduce audience costs using several rhetorical devices, reinforcing the current understanding of audience costs. However, my design, which presented a fait accompli scenario by China against Japan, yielded significantly different results regarding audience costs compared to previous studies on the subject. Specifically, the results of this study indicate that the public might not value economic development following a fait accompli as highly as in less severe scenarios. The results also suggest that leaders might have a harder time backing down after a loss of territory compared to other forms of provocation.

Diplomatic events are frequently cited as key determinants of public opinion on foreign countries. However, the process of political socialisation also plays a critical role in shaping such views over time. In this study, we examine trends in Japanese perceptions of China, Russia, and, as a comparative background, the U.S., focusing on the influences of age, period, and cohort effects. Utilising data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude & Trends Survey (2007–2022), we apply the hierarchical age–period–cohort model to disentangle these three effects. Our findings indicate that while the older tend to hold more negative views of these three countries, the influence of age appears weaker than initially hypothesised. While major international crises tend to worsen perceptions across the board, regional disputes exert additional fluctuations (period effect). In comparison to the age and the period effects, cohort effects reveal a generational divide: First, contrasting with the U.S. case, different cohorts exhibit different perceptions toward China and Russia. Second, those born before or after the Cold War generally have more positive attitudes towards the two countries than those born during it. Notably, regional events appear to have little impact on these cohort-based attitudes. We also find that the age effect is more pronounced in the case of Russia, while period and cohort effects are more significant in the case of China. Our conclusions remain robust when controlling for other demographic factors. This study provides a temporal dynamics of Japanese foreign perceptions, utilising sociological methods to explore issues within international relations.

Unlike many other industrial societies, the partisan fights on the vaccination against COVID-19 in Taiwan centred on its brand choice rather than acceptance. Did the incumbent DPP supporters adhere to their party line of Medigen to vaccinate against COVID-19 during the pandemic? We argue that individual COVID-19 vaccine brand choices as gradually updated judgements during the pandemic were not solely determined by the party line, but jointly shaped by the strength of party affiliation and the level of government trust to facilitate decision-making in the highly uncertain information environment at the early stage of the pandemic. More specifically, when choosing COVID-19 vaccine brand, the incumbent DPP supporters, particularly weak ones, were more likely to adhere to their party line of Medigen as they trusted government more; however, this was only for the highly uncertain first shot, due to the absence of reliable information for making informed judgements about COVID vaccine brand choice at the early stage of the pandemic, not for the informationally rich booster shot. We report empirical findings consistent with our argument from statistical analyses of original data from a survey of 1642 Taiwanese adult respondents conducted in the fall of 2022.

Why do some autocrats establish a ruling party, whereas others do not? The existing literature argues that weak leaders facing a commitment problem have an incentive to create highly institutionalised parties in order to stabilise their ruling coalition. However, empirical research points out that stronger leaders also create ruling parties, which tend to lack institutional strength and be short-lived.

Through a simple formal model and a case study, this paper explains strong leaders’ motivation to create less-institutionalised, short-lived parties. My model introduces two variables to classical leader-elite bargaining model. (1) indivisible benefit from incumbency, which the leaders can exclusively consume and cannot share with ruling elites. This makes the bargaining more difficult while it also increases the leaders’ merit to maintain his post. Thus, the leaders found ruling parties to temporarily deter the elites’ defection, even if the leaders are sure that their ruling coalition will inevitably collapse in the near future. (2) loser’s share, which the elites consume even after the failed rebellion. Many existing models assume that losers in rebellions lose everything, but some leaders lack the willingness or capability to punish defectors. The low loser’s share decreases the elites’ future share, which encourages weak elites to rebel before their bargaining power furthermore goes down. Thus, even strong leaders can face the commitment problem. Through the case study of Georgia, this paper also shows that even less-institutionalised ruling parties can prevent elites from rebelling by empowering potential defectors.