Political control is pervasive in authoritarian contexts; however, the use of economic instruments as a means of political repression has been underexplored. Embedded in Hong Kong’s political upheavals triggered by the 2019 extradition bill, this paper underpins the erosion of Hong Kong’s political environment by analysing economic pressure exerted on businesses, or ‘economic repression’, to eliminate, convert, and/or silence their dissenting behaviour. Drawing on Earl’s repression typology, it distinguishes between two forms of repression: economic channelling and economic duress. The former involves covert actions that increase the operational costs of targeted businesses, including administrative inspections and the severance of economic ties, while the latter embodies overt actions that disrupt their operations, such as asset freezes and vandalism of shop premises. Although both businesses and individuals may be subject to economic repression, this paper pays special attention to businesses, as their responses have far-reaching implications for the political and economic landscape. Employing the cases of Cathay Pacific, Taipan Bakery, Apple Daily, and Chickeeduck, which were well-known players in their respective industries in 2019–2021, it is observed that economic channelling was usually deployed at a defiant company first, followed by economic duress if the target did not conform to the new political norms. Economic repression not only stifles political resistance in the marketplace but also hampers the competitiveness of the international financial city.

While it is widely accepted that watching televised presidential debates helps voters stay informed about candidates and campaign issues, voters are increasingly turning to the media to learn about televised debates rather than watching them directly. Coupled with this trend is growing criticisms over presidential debates’ focus on negative attacks on opponents at the expense of policy discussions. We examine whether media outlets systematically bias the content of presidential debates, potentially amplifying their perceived negativity in presidential debates. Specifically, we theorize that the media outlets overemphasize non-policy aspects of presidential debates, because such coverage can help them draw viewer attention and is perceived to have greater news value. We further expect the continued exposure to media coverage of debates to weaken policy-related considerations in voters’ decision-making. We test these theoretical expectations using the case of the 2022 presidential election in South Korea. Using keyword-assisted topic model (keyATM), we first compare candidates’ speeches during the presidential debates with newspaper coverage of the debates. We find that non-policy topics, including personal attacks on the opponent and scandals, appeared more frequently in the newspaper coverage than in the actual debates. Next, we show that the continued exposure to media’s election coverage can reinforce voters’ tendency to base their voting decisions on non-policy issues through post-election survey data. Our findings offer significant insights into understanding media campaign coverage and its electoral significance in today’s media environment.

This article explores the institutional conditions behind the electoral rise of regional parties in Indian states. I argue that in regions where national parties are less organized, voters are more likely to support regional parties. This organizational weakness is initially affected by regionally based social cleavages, which undermine the internal cohesion of national parties. A nationalized party platform requiring all regional branches to coordinate under a shared agenda struggles to address these cleavages. Finally, regional-level politicians may defect from national parties and align with regional parties that better represent their constituents. Using path analysis, I test these claims, and the results support my hypotheses.

The COVID-19 pandemic profoundly disrupted societies worldwide, creating not only a global health emergency but also a severe test of governance. Governments were required to mobilise resources with unprecedented urgency, under conditions of uncertainty and limited oversight. In this setting, politicians and bureaucrats exercised unusually broad discretion over resource allocation. We argue that these conditions created opportunities for corruption – what we term crisis-induced corruption – the misuse of public resources that emerges in crisis contexts where urgent spending collides with fragile oversight. Drawing on Afrobarometer Round 9 surveys from 39 African countries, we examine how perception of crisis-induced corruption (COVID-19 corruption) shaped citizens’ evaluations of government mismanagement and whether these effects varied with institutional quality (control of corruption). Results from multilevel models show that citizens who perceive higher levels of COVID-19 corruption are more likely to judge their governments as mismanaging the pandemic. However, contrary to expectations, we do not find evidence that stronger corruption control buffers governments from these negative perceptions. Instead, in countries with higher corruption control, corruption perceptions are linked to a sharper increase in perceived government mismanagement of the pandemic. Robustness checks – including disaggregating government mismanagement into pandemic management and relief distribution, and employing alternative outcomes such as trust in vaccine safety and satisfaction with relief provision – confirm the stability of these results. The findings highlight not only the damaging impact of corruption during global emergencies but also the critical importance of effective crisis management for sustaining public trust.

The Cabinet customarily appoints Supreme Court Justices based on recommendations from the legal professional bodies in Japan. Previous studies have debated whether and to what extent the Cabinet has respected these recommendations or whether it has made political appointments based on its own preferences. This study examines all appointment cases to identify the extent to which the Cabinet followed or rejected these recommendations. It reveals that the Cabinet disregarded them in 25 out of 192 cases. Accordingly, the author argues that appointing Justices in Japan can be political and that the Cabinet has occasionally exercised its discretion to reject candidates.

China’s growing development finance gives rise to the speculation that Beijing is creating a new model of foreign aid. There are also efforts to socialise China and change Chinese-led development finance institutions (DFIs) from within. Are Chinese DFIs convergent with/divergent from traditional DFIs? What are the mechanisms that drive their convergence/divergence? This article answers the questions with the three mechanisms of isomorphism, namely the coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. We focus on the prominent Chinese DFIs of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and the two policy banks (the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), examine their isomorphic pressures, and compare their resemblance to the traditional donors. We find that the AIIB, subject to high pressures from all of the three mechanisms, displays a strong resemblance to its Western counterparts; the NDB, subject to medium pressures, shows a less significant resemblance; the two Chinese policy banks, not subject to significant pressures, demonstrates a faint resemblance.