While much has been written about urban-educated women’s veiling in recent decades, the proliferation of veiling, or wearing a burqa, among ordinary rural women has received little attention. This paper is an attempt at such an inquiry in the context of Bangladesh. It juxtaposes historical, literary, and theological resources with recently collected ethnographic and interview data to show how the landscape of veiling has radically transformed in rural Bangladesh and suggests that ordinary rural women’s veiling cannot be interpreted as either their choice or an imposition on them. It illustrates how women choose to don a veil in compliance with the community’s expectations while simultaneously resisting its prescription of putting on a specific pattern of burqa. In other words, the paper shows how veiling has become a site for women’s complex negotiations with community norms, liberal women’s rights discourse, and legal regimes. This negotiation process, it argues, constructs women as distinct subjects who are neither liberal nor Islamic but are constantly in the process of self-constitution.

Using data from the 2018–2019 National Congregations Study, I explore the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation in American religious congregations. In particular, I examine the relationship between the presence of clergywomen or gender inclusive leadership policies (i.e., congregational policies allowing women to serve as the head pastor or priest) and a congregation’s participation in “women’s issues” political activism. Statistical analysis reveals partial support for my hypotheses. Collective gender representation, as demonstrated through the presence of gender inclusive leadership policies within a congregation, predicts pro-LGBT activism and the number of “women’s issues” a congregation pursues. This project serves to extend understanding of 1) how descriptive gender representation relates to the substantive representation of women’s interests in religious congregations and 2) the comparability of women’s leadership across political and religious contexts.

Is Christian nationalism a threat to democracy in Africa, and to what extent are its adherents “anti-democratic” as is often claimed? Using the Afrobarometer Round 7 (2016-18), I examine how extensive these attitudes are held among Africans. Although I find that the proportion of the population on the continent that holds Christian nationalist views is somewhat limited, I find support for the argument that Christian nationalists tend to be less supportive of democracy than others, and more receptive to authoritarian alternatives to democracy. However, they are not more likely to hold intolerant attitudes with regard to other religions and LGBTQ individuals. In addition, I do not find, contrary to the existing literature on Christian nationalism in Africa, that Pentecostals are more intolerant of out groups than other Africans.

How do secular and religious national role conceptions (NRCs) influence interstate rivalry? To explore this, we examine the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, two theocratic states. Drawing on scholarship that integrates power politics and religion, we examine how instrumental motivations shape religion-based policymaking. Using semantic network and regression analyses on data from eight official Twitter/X accounts of Iranian and Saudi foreign policy officials (2015–2021), we find that both states’ officials strategically use secular and religious NRCs in response to foreign policy roles adopted by their rival. Our findings underscore the coexistence of these NRCs and their selective application in managing rivalry. Methodologically, the study contributes to foreign policy analysis research by employing quantitative semantic analysis of social media data. It also offers a novel lens for understanding Iran-Saudi competition and the broader intersection of religion and foreign policy.

It is often assumed that the rural identity is linked to the Republican Party and the urban identity to the Democratic Party, but little scholarship has investigated how voters connect thiese identities to the parties in an electoral context and how that perception may influence their electoral preferences. Furthermore, recent elections have seen various political elites employ rural and Evangelical Christian identity labels in virtually synonymous ways in their association with the Republican Party. But are these partisan stereotypes really how Americans perceive these candidate identities? Utilizing a novel survey experiment, we find important distinctions between religious and place-based candidate cues. Our results show the enduring power of religion in partisan politics and suggest America’s urban-rural divide may be asymmetric in the minds of voters. These findings are subsequently meaningful for the study of religion’s place in America’s growing array of politicized social identities.

Houses of worship are often shelters after the storm. Yet, as climate change fuels natural disasters and communities increasingly rely on congregations during disaster recovery, are houses of worship ready to be houses of refuge? Examining clergy influence, does a higher concern about climate change by clergy result in improved congregational disaster readiness? Data for the study come from a 2019 nationwide survey of clergy. The survey includes measures of congregational disaster preparedness along with one of the first applications of the SASSY climate concern measure to clergy. Results show that clergy have mixed opinions about climate change and that congregations led by high climate-concern clergy are no more prepared for disasters than those led by unconcerned clergy. While seemingly a null result, understanding the relationship between leaders, climate change, and disaster preparedness benefits the study of leader influence on organizations, religion and climate change, and the politics of disaster resilience.

Many scholars now contend that the wall separating church and state has been effectively dismantled. One of the strongest pieces of evidence used to make this argument is the transfer of over five million taxpayer dollars to churches during Covid-19. But who exactly received this money? When the wall separating church and state came crashing down, as some assert, was there an ambush of religious actors seeking to collect federal funds? Or did we see many religious actors maintain their distance? What distinguishes one group from the other? This research note examines the behavior of religious congregations during Covid-19 with regard to the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). We compare a sample of 2020 and 2021 PPP congregation recipients with the 2020 US Religious Census to note which denominations are over- and under-represented and then test the hypotheses suggested by the existing literature on faith-based organizations and government funding.

As Catholic churches played a tremendous role in the third wave of democratization, it is crucial to examine their role in the current trends of autocratization. Given the potential for democratic backsliding resulting from elections, I study the official stances of national Catholic churches toward electoral manipulation in 59 cases across different regions, post-Third Wave. I find that 32% of the Catholic churches resisted electoral manipulation, while 34% called for peace, and 34% took no stance. I argue that beyond religious market dynamics, historical context also shapes Catholic churches’ cost-benefit calculations. Using logistic and multinomial regression models, I contend that Catholic churches resist electoral manipulation when government favoritism toward Catholicism is too low, even when they control a considerable proportion of the population. Additionally, the historical pro-democratizing role of Catholic churches positively influences their decision to resist electoral manipulation, particularly for those facing high competition in the religious market.

Religious language plays a pivotal role in shaping political behavior and attitudes. This study investigates how representatives utilize religious rhetoric when addressing the House floor and their constituents, and how this language is influenced by congressional leadership. The inauguration of openly religious Mike Johnson as House Speaker in 2023 provides a unique case to explore these dynamics. Using difference-in-differences and triple difference models, we analyze House speeches and newsletters from before and after Johnson became House Speaker to assess changes in religious speech between Republican and Democratic representatives. Our findings reveal a significant increase in newsletters using religious language sent out by Republicans after Johnson became Speaker, while religious speech on the House floor remains unchanged. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between religion, partisanship, and Congressional leadership, highlighting the potential influence of the Speaker of the House on religious communication to constituents.

How do military chaplains perceive the legitimacy of US drone strikes? Though chaplains are entrusted to shape the moral use of force, scholars have not studied what accounts for their perceptions of legitimate drone warfare, and whether these relate to legal-rational or moral considerations. To understand these dynamics, we field a survey experiment among a rare sample of US Army chaplains. We find that while chaplains’ perceptions of legally and morally legitimate strikes largely covary, they can also deviate. Chaplains discount the legality of strikes in undeclared theaters of operations, even when they are tightly constrained to minimize civilian casualties. Though chaplains may perceive strikes as legitimate, they can also support them less. Finally, other factors shape chaplains’ perceptions, with combat experiences exercising the greatest effect on perceptions of legal versus moral legitimacy. This first evidence for chaplains’ attitudes toward drone warfare has implications for policy, research, and military readiness.

About a decade after the Arab Uprisings, the Tunisian Ennahda party experienced the exodus of several high-profile leaders. Motivated by the party’s growing factionalism and shrinking support, this article investigates the organizational factors that account for the low system-ness of an Islamist-born party following major organizational changes. It does so by drawing on interview data and organizational developments that unfolded inside Ennahda (2016–2021). In a framework that intersects the field of party politics and organization studies, this article argues that the major factors that account for Ennahda’s low system-ness include (i) an inefficient and inadequate theorization of the need for the party’s specialization in political activities, (ii) a problematic identification with the subsequently refashioned organizational identity, and (iii) an uneasy coexistence of distinct group identities involved in separate processes of organizational identity recrafting. This article concludes by challenging the way scholars traditionally conceive coherence, cohesion, and “change” in religious parties.