This article reports on a detailed comparison of productivity, machinery and skills in matched samples of food manufacturing (biscuit) plants in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and France. In comparing labour productivity levels, explicit account was taken of inter-country differences in the mix of product-qualities as well as differences in physical quantities produced per person-hour. Real (‘quality-adjusted’) productivity levels were highest in the German sample, an estimated 15 per cent on average above those in the Netherlands and France and about 40 per cent higher than in Britain. International differences in quality—as measured by value added per ton—were found to be at least as important as differences in crude tonnage produced per person-hour. The pattern of productivity advantage could not be attributed to inter-country variation in the age and sophistication of capital equipment. However, there were important differences in workforce skill levels which could be linked to both relative productivity performance and the predominant choice of product strategy in each country. For example, in the German industry the mix of initial and continuing training received by employees supports a successful strategy of rapid growth in small- and medium-batch production of elaborate, high value added biscuits which would be hard for the other three countries' industries—and particularly Britain—to emulate. In Britain the greatest success is achieved by large highly-automated plants engaged in the bulk production of relatively uncomplicated varieties of biscuit. Given the present structure of workforce skills in Britain, it is understandable that—as in many other branches of manufacturing—British biscuit producers tend to specialise in relatively low value added goods. However, the study suggests that some of the potential economies of large-scale production are lost due to excessive rates of emergency downtime and the limitations of narrowly-trained employees.

There is an enduring belief by UK policymakers that a large higher education sector is an important driver of long-run economic growth, which has been part of the narrative since the Robbins Report. Back then, there was plenty of conjecture and assumption, but strikingly little concrete evidence to support such a belief. This paper asks whether the evidence base has strengthened in the 50 years since it was published. It looks at a number of different growth equation specifications and, using international education data, attempts to draw out the contribution of both the number of, and the growth in, graduates since the 1960s. There are three main findings. Firstly, many growth relationships, including those estimated elsewhere in the literature, are quite sensitive to the countries included – which often depends on the variables used – and time period of analysis. I argue that, given these issues, growth equations should always be treated with caution. Secondly, and remembering this caveat, neither the increase nor the initial level of higher education is found to have a statistically significant relationship with growth rates both in the OECD and worldwide. This result is robust to numerous different specifications. Thirdly, there is some evidence, consistent with the existing literature, that levels of technical skills at the end of compulsory education matter. The employment of higher level technical skills (proxied by the number of employed researchers in an economy) is also a strong predictor of growth. This gives a possible mechanism linking the output of (some) of the higher education sector with economic growth. However, it does not imply that mass higher education necessarily leads to higher growth. This depends on the skills produced by an expanding tertiary sector and their utilisation (or underutilisation) in the jobs available to increasing numbers of graduates.

The recent change of government brings to an end a sustained attempt to transform British industrial relations by legislative action. This article explores the consequences. It explains the cumulative effect of the legal changes since 1979, including the growing influence of the European Community, and examines the economic and social results. While legal intervention has had an impact on the institutions of industrial relations, most notably in reducing the power of organised labour, this cannot be isolated from wider structural changes in labour and product markets. A review of research on economic outcomes suggests an uneven and tenuous link between institutional change and economic performance.

The financial crisis that started in August 2008 has reached a climax in the autumn of 2008 with a wave of bank nationalisations across North America and Europe. Although banking crises are not uncommon, this is the largest since 1929–33. This paper discusses the build-up to the crisis, looking at the role of low real interest rates in stimulating an asset price bubble. That bubble was stocked by financial innovation and increases in lending. New financial products were not stress tested and have failed in the downturn. After discussing the bubbles we look at the collapse of the complex asset structure, and then put the crisis in the context of the literature. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications of the crisis, and advocates a significant improvement in the regulatory structure.

This article considers the empirical determination of top directors' pay during the 1980s. In a sample of approximately 170 companies between 1985 and 1990 we find that director pay is significantly related to shareholder returns, but the estimated elasticity is small. In line with other research, sales growth is an inaportant predictor o f top pay. The current article is novel in that we study whether limits to managerial discretion and organisational restructuring are important in influencing top pay. Importantly, we find that company sales growth through acquiring other firms and increasing indebtedness significantly raise top directors' remuneration above that which can be achieved by internal or organic growth, Also relative performance evaluation in terms of sales growth, reducing union presence and whether or not the company is a subsidiary are all important influences on top pay. However, yardstick conzparisons appear not to apply to shareholder returns, yet under-performance post-acquisition is not punished in line with under-performance for other reasons. Overall though the after allowing for performance and such changes to the firms' operating environment top directors' remuneration the going rate still rose at a rate of 12 to 16 per cent per year between 1985 and 1990, In real terms this was approximately four times that of the average worker in the same sample of firms.

This paper looks at the implications of offshoring for industry employment whilst explicitly accounting for the scale and technology effects of offshoring. The effects of offshoring on employment are analysed using industry-level data for 17 high income OECD countries. Our findings indicate that offshoring has no effect or a slight-positive effect on sectoral employment. Offshoring within the same industry (intra-industry offshoring) reduces the labour-intensity of production, but does not affect overall industry employment. Inter-industry offshoring does not affect labour-intensity, but may have a positive effect on overall industry employment. These finding suggest that the productivity gains from offshoring are sufficiently large that the jobs created by higher sales completely offset the jobs lost by relocating certain production stages to foreign production sites.

Following the Institute's previous studies of the training and qualifications of craftsmen in Britain and Germany, this article compares foremen in the two countries. It draws attention to the greater numbers qualifying in Germany, the higher standard of qualification required there, and differences in economic incentives.

The article describes some evaluation findings from a longitudinal study of young people receiving business start-up assistance, through the Prince's Trust (with financial support from the Government). Unusually for evaluations of self-employment schemes, it focuses not solely on issues of deadweight and business survival, but also looks at the impact of programme participation on the subsequent labour market outcomes of participants. It uses a matched comparison group methodology to model programme impact, and finds no statistical evidence that supported entry to self-employment has an impact on participants' subsequent ‘employability’. After controlling for other factors, those who leave the programme are no more likely than those in the comparison group to be in employment, and if in employment their earnings are no higher than those in the comparison group.

This paper studies local economic impacts of the increases in trade barriers associated with Brexit. Predictions of the local impact of Brexit are presented under two different scenarios, soft and hard Brexit, which are developed from a structural trade model. Average effects are predicted to be negative under both scenarios, and to be more negative under hard Brexit. The spatial variation in negative shocks across areas is higher in the latter case as some local areas are particularly specialised in sectors that are predicted to be badly hit by hard Brexit. Areas in the South of England, and urban areas, are harder hit by Brexit under both scenarios. Again, this pattern is explained by sector specialisation. Finally, the areas that were most likely to vote remain are those that are predicted to be most negatively impacted by Brexit

In the present study we investigate the relationship between foreign ownership and innovation activities using the firmlevel data of the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS) covering twelve European countries. Probit estimates based on 28,000 firms' observations show that foreign-owned firms are more innovative than domestic firms, particularly in the New EU Member States. However, results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the differences in the percentage of innovating firms between foreign-owned and domestic firms reveals that the differences are mainly due to the different firm characteristics rather than the differences in coefficients. In particular, the dominance of foreign-owned firms in the largest firm size group is the main factor contributing to the gap in the percentage of innovators between foreign-owned firms and domestic firms. Furthermore, using the fractional logit model, we find that in the New EU Member states, foreign ownership has a positive and significant impact on the share of market novelties as well as on the share of new products in turnover. In this case, the results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis indicate that the ownership difference in the share of innovative sales is not due to the differences in the observed firms' characteristics.

As the UK economy recovers from the recent recession, there is again widespread concern at the re-emergence of the spectre of inflation. Recent increases in base rates were primarily aimed at reassuring markets that inflation will be controlled. It is therefore of use to be able to calculate whether or not inflationary pressures are liable to re-emerge in the near future. Our macroeconomic, model based, forecast on page 8 of this Review is one way that this could be done. This note investigates a number of other approaches.

This article addresses the question: what impact do trade unions have on employee trust in management? Using nationally representative data on employees in the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) 1998, we assess associations between measures of unionisation and employee perceptions that managers usually keep their promises to employees. The article provides broad support for the three hypotheses explored here. First, employee trust in managers is higher where there is a balance of power between unions and management at the workplace. Secondly, employees' trust in managers is higher where management supports union membership, and is lowest where management actively discourages membership. This is equally true among employees in unionised and non-unionised workplaces. Thirdly, employees' perceptions of union effectiveness are positively associated with higher trust in management.

The positive association between managerial support for union membership and employee trust in management can be interpreted in various ways. But the finding suggests that management can influence employee perceptions of them for better or for worse through their engagement with unions.

Management can also foster a high trust relationship with employees by ensuring that unions have sufficient power to make a positive contribution to the running of the workplace, since unions with the ‘right amount of power’ are associated with higher trust in management. Weak unions are particularly bad for employee perceptions of management, raising the question why employers often recognise unions for pay bargaining, but preside over a decline in union strength at the workplace.

Unions are best able to create a climate in which employees trust management where they are perceived to be doing their job well, where they have regard to union members' problems and complaints, and where they contribute to the smooth running of the workplace. In these circumstances, trust in management is generally no different from that found among employees in non-unionised workplaces. However, where unions are viewed as ineffective, trust in management is lower than in comparable non-unionised workplaces.

Immigration and free movement are central issues in the UK's referendum on EU membership. Although free movement was a founding principle of the EU, it only became of central economic and political importance after the expansion of the EU eastward in 2004. For the UK, the economic impacts of recent EU migration appear to have been relatively benign, even for the low paid and low skilled. The UK's recent ‘renegotiation’, which focused on the largely irrelevant issue of ‘benefit tourism’, will make little difference. A vote to Leave, however, will potentially take us into new territory for UK immigration policy,

The recent growth in higher education participation rates in Britain has been so sudden and so rapid that there is now intense public interest in its effects on graduate employment and salary prospects. Particular concern has been expressed about the development of certain phenomena associated with US-style ‘mass higher education‘, for example, an increase in the numbers of graduates who appear to be ‘under-utilised’ in jobs which have not traditionally been filled by degree-holders, and reports of apparent growth in variation in ‘quality’ of the graduates emerging from different kinds of degree course.

This paper reviews the various elements that enter into the relation between higher education expansion and income distribution. Contrary to the prevailing ideology, the paper suggests that under certain conditions the mass expansion of higher education can contribute to greater income inequality. These conditions are related to three important variables not usually considered in the education-income distribution model: rising returns to university education relative to secondary and primary education, decreasing public spending differences between higher and lower levels of education, and increasing spending differences between elite and mass universities. All three appear to be increasingly common features of educational expansion in developing countries, including large ones such as China, Russia, Brazil, and India, although researchers are just beginning to observe such changing patterns of spending within higher education systems. The paper discusses the role that such payoffs and government education spending patterns can play in contributing to changes in income distribution using suggestive data from the developing countries.

Recent events have highlighted the importance of asset prices to central bank decisions. We argue that, in response to asset price bubbles, central banks should ‘lean against the wind’ (LATW hereafter). Even if the bubbles themselves are not significantly affected by LATW, macroeconomic performance can be improved if monetary policy reacts to asset price misalignments over and above the reaction to fixed horizon inflation forecasts. In addition, it might reduce the probability of bubbles arising at all. This article restates the case for LATW, and reviews the debate. In particular I respond to various criticisms that have been made against LATW and briefly consider alternative policies designed to make the financial system less cyclical.

Using data from a large-scale survey of employees in Ireland, we estimate the extent to which people who have emigrated from Ireland and returned earn more relative to comparable people who have never lived abroad. In so doing, we test the hypothesis that migration can be part of a process of human capital formation. We find through OLS estimation that returners earn 7 per cent more than comparable stayers. We test for the presence of self-selection bias in this estimate but the tests suggest that the premium is related to returner status. The premium holds for both genders, is higher for people with postgraduate degrees and for people who migrated beyond the EU to the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The results show how emigration can be positive for a source country when viewed in a longer-term context.

With the advent of EMU, monetary policy can no longer be used to prevent housing market bubbles in regional economies such as Ireland or Spain. However, fiscal policy can and should be used to achieve the same effect. This paper shows that the advent of EMU relaxed existing financial constraints in Ireland and Spain, allowing a more rapid expansion of the housing stock in those countries to meet their specific demographic circumstances. However, the failure to prevent these booms turning into bubbles did lasting damage to the two economies, damage that could have been avoided by more appropriate fiscal policy action.

Capital regulation is critical to address distortions and externalities from intense conflicts of interest in banking and from the failure of markets to counter incentives for recklessness. The approaches to capital regulation in Basel III and related proposals are based on flawed analyses of the relevant tradeoffs. The flaws in the regulations include dangerously low equity levels, a complex and problematic system of risk weights that exacerbates systemic risk and adds distortions, and unnecessary reliance on poor equity substitutes. The underlying problem is a breakdown of governance and lack of accountability to the public throughout the system, including policymakers and economists.