In the course of discussing his conception of community, Ronald Dworkin refers favorably, though in passing and rather elliptically, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his concept of the general will. Dworkin suggests important similarities exist between Rousseau's “general will” and Dworkin's own understanding of community and his related theory of “law as integrity.”

This paper questions the fairness of our current tort-law regime and the philosophical underpinnings advanced in its defense, a theory known as corrective justice. Fairness requires that the moral equality and responsibility of persons be respected in social interactions and institutions. The concept of luck has been used by many egalitarians as a way of giving content to fairness by differentiating between those benefits and burdens that result from informed choice and those that result from fate or fortune. We argue that the theory of corrective justice, along with its institutional embodiment of tort law, is at odds with an egalitarian commitment to fairness because it allows luck an unjustifiable role in determining dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and dissimilar compensation for similar losses to bodily integrity. Many egalitarian political theorists have also recognized, if not defended, the notion of distinct forms of justice, namely corrective, retributive, and distributive. Although theorists of these different forms of justice have been concerned with negating unfair luck inside the operations of each form of justice, there has been little attention to the way in which luck operates to sort cases into each form of justice. We claim that there is a significant way in which luck operates to subject different people to principles of corrective, retributive, and distributive justice—thereby assessing dissimilar liability for similar wrongs and disparate compensation for similar losses—which flies in the face of the egalitarian value of fairness. After surveying the arguments put forward by theorists defending a categorical distinction between corrective justice and retributive and distributive principles, we argue that although analytical distinctions can be made between different forms of justice (although, we also suggest that the distinctions are not as sharp as some commentators suggest), there is no good reason to defend an acoustic separation between these forms of justice when doing so creates unfair outcomes.

I. INTRODUCTION

Many judges and legal scholars are extremely hostile to class actions in which plaintiffs, despite the fact that they would be unlikely to prevail if the case were litigated to a conclusion, nevertheless obtain a large settlement of their claims. For example, Judge Richard Posner, in an opinion denying plaintiffs the opportunity to maintain a class action, cited with approval Judge Henry Friendly’s characterization of “settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action” as “blackmail settlements.”In re Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) Professor George Priest, himself intensely critical of the rules governing class actions because they permit plaintiffs in class actions to secure substantial settlements even though they have little chance of prevailing, believes that there are judicial decisions refusing to certify class actions, purportedly because the requirements of the controlling rule have not been met, which are really explained by the court’s desire to prevent plaintiffs with a small chance of winning from securing large settlements. George Priest; Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Torts Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 52 (1997)

Few criminal defenses have generated as much controversy among philosophers and jurists as has necessity, and few philosophers disagree so thoroughly in political and legal philosophy as do Bentham and Kant. But, in a surprising moment of consensus, Bentham and Kant both argue that an imperiled wrongdoer facing death merits an acquittal because the threat of even capital punishment is insufficient to compel her to obey the law.Jeremy Bentham, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 170 (1948). I will hereafter insert references to this work in the text, following the abbreviation “PML.” Immanuel Kant, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 28 [6:235] (Gregor ed., 1996). I will hereafter insert references to this work in the text, following the abbreviation “MdS,” to the Prussian Academy pagination. Kant makes the same claim in On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice, PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 299n [8:300n] (Gregor ed., 1996). I will work only with the former, as it is later and more developed. At a glance, we might take each therefore to hold that she merits an acquittal on the ground that those who could not conform their actions to the requirements of the law cannot fairly be held to answer for them.George Fletcher glosses Kant this way. Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 819 (1978). Michael D. Bayles represents this as the standard reading of both. Bayles, Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1194–1195 (1987). But this misrepresents both Bentham’s and Kant’s views. For each, the nondeterrability of the imperiled wrongdoer does not defeat her responsibility for her actions but rather defeats a condition under which the state enjoys the right to punish wrongdoers. In short, for both Bentham and Kant, the imperiled wrongdoer merits an acquittal because the state lacks standing to punish her. I will call this the ultra vires thesis.

Critical Legal Studies (CLS) writers argue that judicial decision making is not politically neutral; rather, it is only a stylized version of political discourse. More pointedly, these writers argue that the belief in legal neutrality legitimates an unrepresentative political process, thereby benefiting the powerful to the detriment of the weaker. Accordingly, CLS writers consider the belief in legal neutrality to be ideological. Also, CLS writers consider judicial decision making itself (as opposed to beliefs about legal decision making) to be ideological in the sense that the outcomes of legal decision making are informed and influenced by conservative ideology.I use two senses of the term “ideology” in this essay. The ideological belief in legal neutrality is ideological in a pejorative sense. That is, it is a false belief that works to the detriment of its holder. The conservative ideology that informs legal decision making is ideological in a descriptive but not necessarily a pejorative sense. For a discussion of these and other distinctions between the possible meanings of the term “ideology,” see Raymond Geuss, The Idea Of A Critical Theory (1981), esp. ch. 1. Thus, a central project of the CLS movement is to unmask the ideological nature of law.For discussion of the premises that the liberal belief about law is ideological and that the function of CLS writers is to unmask this ideological nature, see David Kairys,Introduction to The Politics Of Law: A Progressive Critique 5 (David Kairys ed., 1990); Alan Hutchinson, Introduction to Critical Legal Studies 3 (Alan Hutchinson ed., 2d ed. 1989); Richard M. Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 505, 524–25 (1987); and Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979).

In the movie Regarding Henry, the main character, Henry Turner, is a lawyer who suffers brain damage as a result of being shot during a robbery. Before being wounded, the Old Henry Turner had been a successful lawyer, admired as a fierce competitor and well-known for his killer instinct. As a result of the injury to his brain, the New Henry Turner loses the personality traits that had made the Old Henry such a formidable adversary.

Conversions occur in legal theory about as often as they do in religion, which is to say rarely—so rarely that they fascinate as much for the fact that they happen at all as for the reasons they happen. It should not surprise, then, that the Postscript to H.L.A. Hart's famous work on jurisprudence reveals “the outstanding English philosopher of law of the twentieth century” reaffirming, rather than revising in any significant way, the two central tenets that distinguish his theory from that of both classical natural law theorists and modern “new naturalists” like Ronald Dworkin: (1) There is no necessary connection between law and morality; and (2) judges inevitably confront cases where the decision is “not dictated by the law” and the judge “must act as a conscientious legislator would by deciding according to his own beliefs and values” (p. 273).

Global political organization in recent centuries has been dominated by the juridical model of the international states system. Originating in early modern Europe, this distinctive way of structuring political authority has progressively extended its reach to the point where, today, the inhabitable land surfaces of the world are entirely divided up among sovereign states. I will argue that we have both practical and moral reasons to move away from this form of political organization. While my immediate target will be the ideal states system that John Rawls proposes in The Law of Peoples,J. Rawls, THE LAWOF PEOPLES (1999); hereafter “LP.” the main conclusions defended here are applicable to a range of possible models that can be characterized as states-system models. Theories in this range may depart in various ways from current international law but all are marked by the claim that legal-political authority should be concentrated in exclusive or nearly exclusive territorial jurisdictions regarded as equal and independent political units.

There are only two species of justice: distributive justice and rectificatory justice. Distributive justice is primarily concerned with the distribution of rights and duties to members of society by way of society's institutions. Included in this concern for a just distribution of rights and duties is a concern for those members of society who are disadvantaged in their opportunities to participate in the benefits of social cooperation. When such disadvantages arise, distributive compensation is due to these members of society as a means of removing the disadvantage. To compensate for something is to counterbalance it; to give something equivalent in value to the thing. “The root of ‘compensate’ is “to weigh,” that is to weigh different things together in order to establish a balance between them…‘compensation’ carries the connotation of providing something equivalent in value to that which has been lost.” In the case of distributive compensation, this rendering of an equivalent in value is done in order to alleviate some disadvantage or natural loss that is thought to pose an undue hindrance on members of society.

This article focuses primarily on the emotion of guilt as providing a justification for retributive legal punishment. In particular, I challenge the claim according to which guilt can function as part of our epistemic justification of positive retributivism, that is, the view that wrongdoing is both necessary and sufficient to justify punishment. I show that the argument to this conclusion rests on two premises: (1) to feel guilty typically involves the judgment that one deserves punishment; and (2) those who feel guilty after wrongdoing are more virtuous (or less vicious) than those who do not. I shall argue that premise (1) is false on both empirical and conceptual grounds and that there are no particularly good grounds supporting this premise (2). Finally, I consider and reject the claim that anger, as opposed to guilt, can afford the type of epistemic justification needed by positive retributivism.

The wishes of the dead seem to have normative significance. We not only respect last wills and testaments, but we take seriously what the dead loved, what they valued, even after they have long escaped this mortal coil. But this presents a philosophical puzzle. Is this a normatively justified practice? Why should the fact that some dead person preferred state of affairs x to state of affairs y be a reason to bring about x rather than y—especially if there is otherwise reason to promote y rather than x? In this paper, I argue that extant solutions to this problem are inadequate and propose an alternative. I argue that the normative significance of the wishes of the dead is to be found not in the dead's well-being or interests, but instead in the relations of friendship we bear to the dead.

Sometimes it is morally permissible to prevent someone from performing a wrongful act by harming him before he has a chance to act. It is permissible, for example, to kill someone you reasonably fear is about to kill you. Under other circumstances, however, it may only be permissible to threaten to harm someone to discourage him from performing a wrongful act. It is not always permissible straightaway to harm him. A military commander, for example, may threaten an enemy with disproportionate retaliation, even though it would not ordinarily be permissible to carry it out.

In this paper I argue that economic theories have never been able to provide a coherent explanation of the causation requirement in tort law. The economic characterization of this requirement faces insurmountable difficulties, because discourse on tort liability cannot be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis without a loss of meaning. More seriously, I try to show that by describing causation in economic terms, economic theories offer an image of the practice in which the participants incur in logical contradictions and develop patterns of inference that are far from intuitive. For this reason, efficiency cannot be the fundamental principle underlying tort law. Finally, I suggest that economic analysis of law can provide a genuine explanation of certain aspects of legal practice if it relinquishes its reductionist claims.

The idea of “church autonomy” has risen to prominence in law and religion discourse in recent years. Defenders argue that church autonomy is essential to protecting religious freedom, while critics argue that it permits great harm. This heated dispute often obscures the fact that religious group autonomy is not all-or-nothing. Religious organizations can enjoy some autonomy without being free from all legal oversight. This article thus seeks to make progress in the debate by providing a taxonomy of kinds of judicial examination of religious organizations’ decisions—focusing on employment decisions—and normatively assessing each kind. I argue that religious groups should enjoy protection from certain kinds of examination, but other kinds are justifiable, and even required. My argument supports an approach similar to that seen in some recent European Court of Human Rights decisions, rather than the less discriminating approach of U.S. courts.

John Finnis's powerfully and deservedly influential modern classic, Natural Law and Natural Rights, expounds a theory of law and morality that is based on a picture of “persons” using practical reason to pursue certain “basic goods.” While devoting much attention to practical reason and to the goods, however, Finnis says little about the nature of personhood. This relative inattention to what “persons” are creates a risk—one that Finnis himself notices—of assuming or importing an inadequate anthropology. This essay suggests that the “new natural law” developed by Finnis suffers in places from the inadvertent adoption of (or, more likely, acquiescence in) a flawed anthropology—an anthropology under the thrall of modern individualistic commitments. To explain this suspicion, this article discusses three difficulties (or so they seem to me) in his natural law theory: difficulties in accounting for the basic good of friendship, for obligations we owe to others, and for legal authority. These difficulties may seem disconnected, but this article suggests that they may all reflect an inadequate anthropology—one that Finnis does not exactly embrace (in fact, I suspect that he would reject it) but that is pervasive today and that in places may affect his theorizing.

This article argues that the disjunctive obligation in contract law can be justified on moral grounds. It argues that from a perspective that regards human beings as free agents capable of choice and therefore independent of material objects, the contracting parties must be understood as agreeing to mutually guarantee one another's ownership of a certain value. This guarantee can be fulfilled either by handing over what was promised or by making up the difference between the market value and the contract value of what was promised. The plaintiff's contractual right is therefore a right that the defendant perform or pay. This makes expectation damages intelligible as a vindication of the plaintiff's contractual right. Moreover, the disjunctive obligation can be reconciled with all the doctrines that others take to be decisive arguments against it—with the doctrines of specific performance, inducing breach, impossibility, preexisting duty consideration, and nominal damages.

This is the second of two closely related articlesThe first is Warren F. Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of Legal Uncertainty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 297 (2002). challenging the widely held belief that plaintiffs, through the settlement process, are realizing “too much” from “unmeritorious” claims. No one has offered a systematic justification for this belief. It appears, however, to be based upon the effects produced by three characteristics of the settlement process: (1) the outcome of litigation is uncertain; (2) when, as in a class action, the stakes are very high for a defendant, the defendant will be very risk-averse and will consequently be prepared to pay in settlement much more than the expected value of its liability; and (3) litigation is costly.

One of the most difficult challenges of mature legal systems is the need to balance the conflicting demands of stability and flexibility. The demand for flexibility is at odds with the principle of impartiality, which is considered a cornerstone of the rule of law. In the present article, I explore the way in which the law copes with this dilemma by developing the idea of tolerance of incoherence. I argue that tolerance of incoherence emerges from the interplay between the inferential and lexical-semantic rules that determine the meaning of legal speech acts. I base this argument on an inferential model of speech acts, which I develop through a discussion of graded speech acts, and on the idea that the use of speech acts is governed by multiple and potentially conflicting conventions. I show how this tolerance allows the law to resolve the tension between dynamism and traditionality, and discuss its sociological and moral implications.

Legal reasoning is commonly thought of as being based on either rules or analogies. More specifically, there is ongoing debate regarding whether precedential reasoning is best characterized as rule-based or analogical. This article continues that work by comparing recent and representative approaches from each camp, namely, Stevens's analogical model and the “rule-based” model of Horty and Rigoni. In the course of the comparison improvements on each approach are suggested and the improved models serve as the basis for the ultimate evaluation. The evaluation demonstrates that the “best” approach depends on the goals one has in theorizing legal reasoning as well as the jurisprudential assumptions one is willing to make.

Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. “There is no such point,” is a natural thought: One color just shades gradually into the next.