Patricia Smith provides an analysis of the concept of omission that builds upon the work of Joel Feinberg. Her account succeeds in bringing together more systematically than did Feinberg several key elements of his analysis. She also usefully extends the analysis to include unintentional omissions. Nonetheless, I argue that she mistakenly presupposes that there is a unique and logically fundamental concept of omission. Rather, I contend, there are multiple omission concepts, each mapping the conceptual terrain of inaction in a somewhat different way. These different concepts, each useful for a distinct purpose, will emerge from an examination of the flaws that Smith's account shares with Feinberg's analysis.

In the posthumously published Postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart claimed that the account he advanced in that book was meant to be “both general and descriptive.”H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPTOF LAW 239 (2nd ed. with Postscript; Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz, eds., 1994). Hereinafter “Hart.” The meaning, possibility, and desirability of such an account of legal institutions form the subject of much recent interpretative and critical debate.See, e.g., Stephen Guest, Two Strands in Hart’s Concept of Law: A Comment on the Postscript to Hart’s The Concept of Law, in POSITIVISM TODAY 29-44 (Stephen Guest, ed., 1996); Michael Moore, Hart’s Concluding Scientific Postscript, 4 LEGAL THEORY 301-327 (1998); Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, 4 LEGAL THEORY 249–282 (1998). Prominent among the disputants is Professor Stephen Perry, who, in several recent articles, offers both an interpretation of Hart’s distinctive methodological aims and a critical argument that counsels their rejection.Stephen Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, 4 LEGAL THEORY 427–467 (1998) (hereinafter “HMP”); The Varieties of Legal Positivism, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 361–381 (1996) (hereinafter “VLP”); Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory, in LAWAND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYSIN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 97, 118 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (hereinafter “IMLT”). Perry’s interpretation is worth examining, not only for his claims about Hart, but also for his more general claims and assumptions about what a descriptive theory of law would be expected to look like and what it could hope to accomplish.

Among Joel Feinberg's almost innumerable achievements are his development and defense of the sovereign-right conception of autonomy and its corresponding rejection of hard legal paternalism. According to Feinberg, a competent individual's voluntary, self-regarding conduct falls within the protected realm of sovereign self-rule and is therefore immune from coercive, paternalistic interference by the state. It does not matter whether the self-harm the state wants to prevent is big or the coercion needed to prevent it is small. The coercive interference would be illegitimate because “sovereignty is an all or nothing concept; one is entitled to absolute control of whatever is within one's domain however trivial it may be.”

The following two theses seem both plausible and consistent: in cases where it is indeterminate whether the relevant legal language applies to the relevant set of facts, officials are not bound to decide the case one way rather than the other, but may reason either way; all reasons for action are—in some relevant sense—knowable. In this paper, I point out what I take to be a robust but unacknowledged tension between these two claims. The tension requires some careful teasing out, but the basic idea is that given certain further plausible assumptions concerning law, language, and normativity, the two claims turn out to be inconsistent. In addition to examining the sources of the tension in some detail, I also address several possible objections to my argument and discuss which of the many theses should be rejected.

While legal scholars increasingly recognize that norms as well as law influence social behavior, the nature of these effects is not well understood. A key question concerns the content of norms. Specifically, do they reflect individual interest or do they enhance group welfare? In this paper I describe two general kinds of arguments that support these different views. I then develop predictions about the content of a particular type of norm—controller selection rules. These hypotheses are tested in an experimental setting in which individuals interact with each other over networked computers. The findings are consistent with group welfare explanations. That is, they suggest that norms constrain actions that create negative externalities, and that these norms are stronger in more cohesive groups. They also suggest, however, that such norms may not necessarily produce pro-social behavior.

Lawyers and philosophers have misunderstood the rights of bequest and inheritance within Locke's theory of property. While lawyers assume these are unqualified natural rights, philosophers find Locke's account of them so inadequate as to cast their existence into serious doubt. But on Locke's theory, the rights of bequest and inheritance are neither absolute nor incoherent. Locke treats inheritance as a form of imputed bequest, whereby natural law imputes to the intestate an intention to leave his goods to his closest family members. Both bequest and inheritance find their justification in the prerogatives of owners to dispose of their property. These prerogatives are not without limit, however. The needs of a decedent's dependents trump specific bequests, and both bequest and inheritance are subject to the duty of charity. Bequest and inheritance thus order the relative claims of owners and others so that they are consistent with Locke's more general theory of property.

This article develops a theory of just contractual relationships for a liberal society. As a liberal theory, our account is premised on liberalism's canonical commitments to self-determination and substantive equality. As a theory of contract law, it focuses on the parties’ interpersonal interactions rather than on the justice (or welfare) of the social order as a whole.

Normatively, the article claims that the rules governing cases where one party experiences harsh circumstances or vulnerability during the bargaining process or operates under significant informational disadvantage must be guided by the commitment to relational justice, that is, to reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. Jurisprudentially, the article studies the systemic difficulties hindering the translation of these normative prescriptions into legal language and analyzes how they affect the form assumed by the law of precontractual justice and its institutional pedigree.

Michael Moore and I agree about the moral importance of how our actions turn out. We even agree about some of the arguments that establish that moral importance. In Causation and Responsibility, however, Moore foregrounds one argument that I do not find persuasive or even helpful. In fact I doubt whether it even qualifies as an argument. He calls it the “experiential argument.” In this comment I attempt to analyze Moore's “experiential argument” in some detail and thereby to bring out why it does not help. In the process I raise some problems about the rationality of the emotions, which may be where Moore and I part company. We both believe that emotions should be taken more seriously by moral philosophy. But apparently we have radically different views about what this means.

There are two distinct types of legal wrongdoing: civil and criminal. This article demonstrates in three ways that Immanuel Kant's Universal Principle of Right, properly interpreted, offers a plausible and resilient account of this important distinction. First, Kant's principle correctly identifies attempted crimes as crimes themselves even when they do not violate the rights of any individual. Second, it justifies our treatment of reckless endangerment as a crime by distinguishing it from ordinary negligence, traditionally thought to be only civilly wrong. Third, it explains and justifies differences between the features of traditional criminal punishments and the features of civil remedies. Moreover, the Universal Principle of Right yields a Kantian standard for criminal wrongdoing that is compelling enough to inform future philosophical inquiries into the nature and limits of the state's criminal lawmaking authority.

When I was invited to participate in this symposium, I welcomed what I thought would be the opportunity to apply my views about the semantics and logic of vague language to the real-life problems of vagueness legal theorists worry about. I confess to having formed my ambition without a very clear sense of what jurisprudential problems might be illuminated by general theories of vagueness. To be sure, I was able to guess that a symposium on Vagueness and Law must have something to do with the dilemmas courts face when it is indeterminate how a legal dispute should be resolved. What I had not thought through was how philosophers like myself might help to illuminate those dilemmas by bringing to bear on them their own logico-semantical theories of vagueness. This was unfortunate because, having done a bit of homework, I have reached the conclusion that philosophical theories of vagueness, even if true, have nothing to offer jurisprudential concerns about vagueness. Once she is reminded of certain platitudes about vagueness, the legal theorist needs no further help from philosophers of language and logic. Let’s see why this is so.

Despite the notion's prominence, scholarship has yet to offer a viable account of the view that crimes constitute public wrongs. Despite numerous attempts, some scholars are now doubting whether a viable account is forthcoming whereas others are reeling back expectations for what the concept itself can offer. This article vindicates crime's public character while asserting the relevance of political theory in doing so. After critiquing prior attempts and clarifying expectations, the article offers a novel account, relying on both key doctrinal features and a deliberative democratic framework through which to interpret their public significance. In doing so, it demonstrates how this framework explains the public nature of censure, and ultimately argues that crimes are public wrongs not because such actions themselves necessarily wrong or harm the public, but instead because they are the type of wrong that the public has a stake in addressing. This gives rise to an understanding of sentencing as public decision-making within which citizens and their representatives decide how best to use public power to manage public interests.

In this article I develop a Razian account of the authority of customary law. I then use this account to refute Matthew Kramer's claim that insofar as Raz endorses custom as a possible source of law, he ought to grant the same status to correctness as a moral principle. I contend that it is because customary norms can be authoritative, and not because they are what Kramer labels free-floating, that customary norms can be incorporated into law while moral norms cannot. In addition, I argue that nothing in Raz's conception of the nature of law entails that being free-floating is even a necessary condition for a norm's being eligible for incorporation as law. Reasons of political morality or political psychology, however, may weigh against incorporating norms that are not free-floating.

Like many of you, I have a neighbor with an excitable car alarm. It goes off if someone drives by at just the right speed, if the humidity is right, or if a large insect lands on the hood. Worse, it seems most sensitive at night. (Perhaps that’s just when he parks in front of my house.) I’d like to do something about it, to preempt it before it preempts another night of sleep. One possibility, which is beyond my competence, is repairing it myself. Another, which I have so far resisted, is to get out my tool box and remove the offending device. Private law has a kinder and gentler solution: I can get an injunction. Rather than trying to sue my neighbor for minuscule damages each time he wakes me, and waste a huge amount of both of our time in the process, I can enlist the state’s support, and have it act preemptively to prevent him from waking me.

Despite the attention equality before the law has received, both laudatory and critical, peculiarly little has been done to precisely define it. The first ambition of this paper is to remedy this, by exploring the various ways in which a principle of equality before the law can be understood and suggest a concise definition. With a clearer understanding of the principle in hand we are better equipped to assess traditional critique of the principle. Doing so is the second ambition of this paper. I will argue that traditional criticisms are unpersuasive, but that there is a different, powerful argument against equality before the law. The third ambition of the paper is to argue that there is a sense, overlooked by both proponents and critics, in which the principle still captures something important, albeit at the cost of shifting from intrinsic to instrumental value.

The fair use doctrine is at once the most significant and the most problematic qualification of the copyright owner's right to exclusivity. An affirmative defense against copyright liability, the fair use doctrine legitimates certain unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted materials that would otherwise be regarded as copyright infringements. Notwithstanding its importance, “fair use” continues to be “the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright.” Throughout its long history, neither courts nor legislatures have provided a useful definition of “fair use” nor have they adumbrated its objectjves. Since the doctrine's inception over two and a half centuries ago, courts and legislatures have attempted to formulate, explicate, refine, and revamp the fair use doctrine. Generally, these efforts have proven unfruitful. At best, they have resulted in various formulations of how to approach fair use questions that offer courts and users of copyrighted works scant guidance on how fair use should be recognized. All this would not have been of grave concern had judges shared a common understanding of fair use or of the principles that should guide them in deciding fair use cases. The problem is that they do not. Rather, the case law reflects wdely divergent notions of the concept of fair use. The lack of consensus is best witnessed in the multiple reversals and divided courts that have become the hallmark of fair use litigation.

Inclusive Legal Positivism, as understood throughout this article, consists in the following thesis: It can be the case, though it need not be the case, that a norm’s consistency with some or all of the requirements of morality is a precondition for the norm’s status as a law in this or that jurisdiction. While such a precondition for legal validity is not inherent in the concept of law, it can be imposed as a threshold test under the Rule of Recognition in any particular legal regime. That test, which can be applied by the officials in such a regime to all of the legal norms therein or to only some subset of those norms, is one of the criteria that the officials use for ascertaining the law. Insofar as a criterion of that sort does prevail in any particular legal system, then, some degree of moral worthiness is a necessary condition for the legally authoritative force of each norm that is validated thereunder. Inclusive Legal Positivism, which readily accepts the possibility of such a state of affairs, is inclusive because it allows that moral precepts can figure among the criteria that guide officials’ ascertainment of the law. Inclusivist theorists reject the view that every criterion of law-ascertainment in every possible legal system is focused on nonnormative matters of provenance. At the same time, the Inclusivists are positivists because they also reject the view that every possible legal system includes moral tests among its law-ascertaining criteria. An Inclusive Legal Positivist insists that such tests are contingent features, rather than essential features, of the systems of law wherein they are applied.

How do legal texts determine legal content? A standard answer to this question—sometimes called “the standard picture”—is that legal texts communicate something and what they communicate is identical to legal content. Mark Greenberg criticizes the standard picture and offers in its place his own “moral impact theory.” My goal here is to respond to Greenberg by showing how the standard picture better explains legal practice than the moral impact theory does. To that end, I first clarify certain aspects of the moral impact theory. I then critique the theory, focusing on its inability to explain (i) why practitioners reason about legal content as they do and (ii) why they agree on legal content as often as they do. Finally, I refine the standard picture and demonstrate how it explains what the moral impact theory cannot.

Much legal and philosophical work has been devoted to discussing the importance of protecting freedom of expression from legislative curtailment by the state. That state-centric focus has meant that the ways that wider social phenomena can stifle freedom of expression have, with a notable exception, escaped sustained philosophical attention. The paper reflects on the nature of socially coercive restrictions on free expression and offers an account of how it is appropriate to respond to such forms of social coercion. First, it considers a range of social costs pertaining to expression and argues that such costs can constitute meaningful restrictions on the freedom to express. Second, it reflects on the normative implications concerning that threat to free expression and defends two related moral duties citizens have to refrain from being complicit in unjustified social coercion—a duty of expressive toleration and a duty of respect for expressive agency.

I. INTRODUCTION: LEGAL RIGHTS AND MORAL RIGHTS

Having outlined two different ways of articulating the tort of negligence, John Gardner explains that: “the way we render the ingredients of the tort matters for the defensibility of the regime of liability that it brings in its wake. The reason is that to defend the incidence of the liability one must first defend the assertion of the duty.” And defending the assertion of the duty—given that the law “stands or falls in its own moral legitimacy depending on whether it has the very moral authority that it claims”—involves the following: