The Methodenstreit dominated economic discourse in the late nineteenth-century Germany. In this context, one author stood out amongst the rest: Heinrich Dietzel. Dietzel proposed a theory and method, his Sozialökonomik (social economics), as a solution for the Methodenstreit. This reformulation was based in correcting what he perceived as mistakes of classical political economy that created confusion by not explaining what they saw as self-evident. His intention was to detach from the latest developments (both in British and German political economy) as well as from what he saw as erroneous criticism that, at the time, existed in German-speaking countries. This paper presents Dietzel’s perspective on the reformulation of classical political economy, focusing on the definition of an economic science, the proper method for theoretical statements, and the theory of value.

Although economic knowledge constitutes a central element of political governing, people have divergent opinions about its nature and whether it can or should be accessible to everyone. This paper examines the contested role of economic knowledge in Sweden during the Enlightenment, focusing on the philosophical and political contributions of Anders Chydenius (1729–1803). Chydenius published several works and pamphlets on economic matters in the 1760s, the last of which led to his dismissal from the Swedish Diet in 1766. What made this work so politically provocative? I argue that its notoriety stemmed from two key claims: he likened basic economic principles to natural laws, which because of their simplicity all politicians were able to understand, and he believed in making these principles widely available in society. He also acknowledged that different social classes had conflicting interests in monetary policy, contending that, from a national economic perspective, the interests of traders, manufacturers, and workers were more important than those of the aristocratic elite. This perspective not only challenged the established political order but also raised questions about the neutrality and the role of the public in discussions about economic knowledge.

The literature on internal commitment cites Adam Smith as a precursor because of his elaboration of diachronic control, and this has given rise to attempts to model his account. Some of these efforts stress the role he assigns to the “general rules of morality” by which the “bulk of mankind” ensure the constancy of their conduct, and interpret them as self-enforcing resolutions. But how could such internal tactics as adopted by weak agents be effective? How could the knowledge of general rules escape self-deception? We take a closer look at what Smith writes about beliefs and emotional dispositions regarding the important rules of morality.

This paper examines Douglass North’s evolving recommendations for economic development policy. Using archival material, it traces how North’s historical analysis of economic growth shaped his policy prescriptions from the start of his career through the 1990s. In the 1950s and 1960s, North attributed US economic growth primarily to trade and productivity gains driven by the United States’s competitive market system and international trade, leading him to advocate market-oriented reforms. But from the 1970s onward, recognizing the critical role of institutions through his study of institutional history, he emphasized reducing transaction costs through extensive reforms in property rights and political systems. His archives reveal how his historical understanding of development made him increasingly skeptical of simplistic, market-oriented reforms, and underscore the originality of his policy proposals for Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.