We compare Alfred Marshall, Vilfredo Pareto, and Knut Wicksell on the relation of family size to poverty, considering their (1) views on Thomas Robert Malthus, (2) contributions to statistical studies of population and standards of living, and (3) theories of poverty. While they shared the conclusion that to reduce poverty required decreasing the family sizes of the poor and working classes, they diverged on how this should be accomplished. Marshall rejected the use of contraceptives and argued that family limitation should arise from delayed marriage and restraint within marriage. Pareto thought such recommendations unscientific and unrealistic. Statistically, it was clear that people practiced preventative checks to varying degrees across countries and across classes; privately, Pareto supported the use of birth control as a responsible choice. Wicksell took the most radical position, publicly advocating for legal contraceptives and sex education for everyone regardless of class or marital status. We show how their working out of the problem of poverty subsumed additional questions of positive and normative science and the role and status of moral judgment in policy. Their discussion of the public interest in private reproductive choices reflects many of the same tensions that characterize contemporary discussions, indicating the continuing relevancy of the topic.

Although economic knowledge constitutes a central element of political governing, people have divergent opinions about its nature and whether it can or should be accessible to everyone. This paper examines the contested role of economic knowledge in Sweden during the Enlightenment, focusing on the philosophical and political contributions of Anders Chydenius (1729–1803). Chydenius published several works and pamphlets on economic matters in the 1760s, the last of which led to his dismissal from the Swedish Diet in 1766. What made this work so politically provocative? I argue that its notoriety stemmed from two key claims: he likened basic economic principles to natural laws, which because of their simplicity all politicians were able to understand, and he believed in making these principles widely available in society. He also acknowledged that different social classes had conflicting interests in monetary policy, contending that, from a national economic perspective, the interests of traders, manufacturers, and workers were more important than those of the aristocratic elite. This perspective not only challenged the established political order but also raised questions about the neutrality and the role of the public in discussions about economic knowledge.

The literature on internal commitment cites Adam Smith as a precursor because of his elaboration of diachronic control, and this has given rise to attempts to model his account. Some of these efforts stress the role he assigns to the “general rules of morality” by which the “bulk of mankind” ensure the constancy of their conduct, and interpret them as self-enforcing resolutions. But how could such internal tactics as adopted by weak agents be effective? How could the knowledge of general rules escape self-deception? We take a closer look at what Smith writes about beliefs and emotional dispositions regarding the important rules of morality.