This paper discusses the importance of incorporating personal assistance into interventions aimed at improving long-term education and labor market success. While existing research demonstrates the cost-effectiveness of low-touch behavioral nudges, this paper argues that the dynamic nature of human capital accumulation requires sustained habits over time. To foster better habits, social connections are critical for encouraging enduring effort and intrinsic motivation. The paper links the role of personal assistance to economic theories of human capital investment and decision-making, and showcases examples from various stages of skill accumulation, including early childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, in which interventions that incorporate personal assistance substantially out-perform less intensive nudges. We underscore the importance of interactive support, guidance, and motivation in facilitating significant progress and explore the challenges associated with implementing cost-effective policies to provide such assistance.

While individuals are expected to perceive similarly identical quantities, regardless of the used units (e.g., 1 ton or 1000 kg), several scholars suggest that consumers over-infer quantities when they are presented in bigger and phonetically longer numbers. In two experimental studies, we examine this numerosity bias in the context of household food waste. Unlike previous scholars, manipulating numerosity revealed no effect: perceptions of food waste volume and likelihood to reduce it are not influenced by the used numeric value (2500 g vs. 2.5 kg; Study 1) nor the number of syllables (two kilos eight hundred seventy-five grams vs. three kilograms; Study 2).

This paper is a single-project meta-analysis of four experiments that model charitable giving as individual contributions to a multiplicity of competing threshold public goods. We pool 17,136 observations at the individual level to summarize the project and investigate the role of learning, gender, and risk attitude, since the included studies are inconclusive in this regard. We find that equally effective coordination devices are the existence of a single contribution option that stands out on its merits, learning, and delegation as long as the intermediary is formally obliged to pass along a high enough percentage of the transferred resources. Women delegate less than men, and consequently prefer direct contributions. Risk tolerance increases overall donations but decreases individual earnings. We discuss possible implications of our findings.

Physical inactivity is a leading cause globally of noncommunicable diseases such as diabetes, heart attacks, and strokes. Here, we present the results from a 4-week-long experimental test of a nudge designed to promote physical activity among 206 seniors in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates—a population with one of the highest rates of physical inactivity in the world. We find that the “Forever Fit” nudge—a booklet containing a simple exercise program and information about the health benefits of physical activity—has a large positive effect on 93 previously inactive seniors. The nudge increases the time previously inactive participants spend being physically active from about 5 to about 15 minutes per day.

The money-burning game (MBG) is widely used to study anti-social or destructive behavior. We extend the design of the MBG to separate three motives that could lead subjects to burn their partner’s money – spite, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. We detect that reciprocity is the dominant reason: Most of our subjects would only burn their partner’s money if they believed that their partner would burn theirs. This finding has important implications for the interpretation of the behavior of the game.

Based on a representative sample of the French population (n = 1,154), we show that there is a positive association between risk tolerance and trust. We rely on, the World Value Survey WVS binary trust measure, and a ‘0 − 10’ scale that we decline in three domains: trust in general, family, and co-workers. We also vary the measure of risk tolerance, by considering an incentivized investment task, and a ‘0 − 10’ stated preference scale that we decline in three domains: risk tolerance in general, in finance, and health. These variations allow us to test 16 different relations, by crossing four dependent trust variables with four different risk tolerance covariates. After adjusting for multiple testing, we found nine combinations with a strong positive link between risk tolerance and trust in the general population, and that stated risk tolerance measures predict stated trust better than elicited risk measures.

We compare different forms of communication in the context of cheap talk sender-receiver games. While previous experiments find evidence supporting the comparative statics prediction that more preference divergence leads to less information transmission, there is also a consistent pattern of overcommunication and exaggeration, not predicted by theory, in which subjects convey more information than predicted in equilibrium. The latter of these findings may be due to the restricted nature of the message space in most experimental cheap talk games, encouraging subjects to engage in exaggeration artificially, rather than allowing it to emerge naturally. We tested this hypothesis with an incentivized lab experiment, and found evidence both phenomena persist with natural language (text-based) communication. Moreover, we probe the consequences of this expanded message space for outcomes, showing that senders benefit more than receivers, but that the most notable effect is that text messages improve efficiency.

We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of three players and test two major comparative statics of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: The positive effect of the number of stages on aggregate investment and earlier-mover advantage. The former prediction is decidedly rejected, as we observe a reduction in aggregate investment when more sequential information disclosure stages are added to the contest. The evidence on earlier mover advantage is mixed but mostly does not support theory as well. Both predictions rely critically on large preemptive investment by first movers and accommodation by later movers, which does not materialize. Instead, later movers respond aggressively, and reciprocally, to first movers’ investments, while first movers learn to invest less to accommodate those responses.

College students gain a considerable amount of weight by consuming unhealthy food. Many universities adopt costly programs to alleviate this problem. We study the effect of a simple, inexpensive option: moving unhealthy items out of sight. The opportunity to investigate this intervention comes from the decision of a dining hall in the University of New Hampshire that relocated cookies from a main section in plain sight to an out-of-the way corner. The cost of cookies did not change, since the dining hall operates as an “all that you can eat” restaurant. Relative to pizza, a product that did not change location, the consumption of cookies dropped by up to 22% relative to their predicted level had the relocation not taken place. We see this as evidence that simple changes in design can nudge students towards healthy eating.

Bayesian estimates from experimental data can be influenced by highly diffuse or “uninformative” priors. This paper gives examples of how diffuse priors can affect estimates, and discusses how practitioners can use their expertise to critique and select a prior.1

Economic policy and research rely on the accurate measurement of welfare. In nearly all instances, measuring welfare requires collecting data via long household surveys. If survey response patterns change over the course of a survey to introduce measurement error, this measurement error can be either classical (i.e., changing distributions, leading to noise) or non-classical (i.e., changing expectations, leading to bias). We embed an experiment in a survey by randomly assigning a questionnaire with either the assets module near the beginning of the survey or the assets module at the end of the survey, delaying enumeration of assets by about 60 minutes. We find no evidence in the full sample that survey ordering introduces differential response patterns, either in the number of reported assets or the reported value of those assets. In exploratory analysis of heterogeneity, we find evidence of non-classical measurement error due to survey ordering within sub-samples of respondents who (i) are from larger households or (ii) have low levels of education. Our experimental design can be generalized to serve as an ex-post test of data quality with respect to questionnaire length.

We report the results of an experiment on selective exposure to information. A decision maker interested in learning about an uncertain state of the world can acquire information from one of two sources that have opposite biases: when informed on the state, they report it truthfully; when uninformed, they report their favorite state. A Bayesian decision-maker is better off seeking confirmatory information unless the source biased against the prior is sufficiently more reliable. In line with the theory, subjects are more likely to seek confirmatory information when sources are symmetrically reliable. On the other hand, when sources are asymmetrically reliable, subjects are more likely to consult the more reliable source even when prior beliefs are strongly unbalanced and this source is less informative. Our experiment suggests that base rate neglect and simple heuristics (e.g., listen to the most reliable source) are important drivers of the endogenous acquisition of information.

Although evidence suggests men are more generous to women than to men, it may stem from paternalism and could reverse when women excel in important skills for one’s career success, such as cognitive skills. Using a dictator game, this paper studies whether male dictators allocate less to female receivers than to male receivers when these receivers have higher intelligence quotients (IQs) than dictators. By exogenously varying the receivers’ IQ relative to the dictators’, I do not find evidence consistent with this hypothesis; if anything, male dictators allocate slightly more to female receivers with higher IQs than to male receivers with equivalent IQs. The results hold both in mean and distribution and are robust to the so-called “beauty premium.” Also, female dictators’ allocations are qualitatively similar to male dictators. These findings suggest that women who excel in cognitive skills may not receive less favorable treatment than equally intelligent men in the labor market.

Incorrect estimation of own absolute and relative abilities is common and can have detrimental effects on a person’s educational, social, employment, and financial outcomes. It is not yet fully understood from where interpersonal differences in overconfidence emerge. In this paper, we estimate the heritability of two types of overconfidence, overestimation, and overplacement, in a sample of 1120 twins. We find that the genetic heritability of overestimation (overplacement) is about 19% (17%) and that most of the interindividual variation in overconfidence is due to individual-specific environmental factors.