A complete conceptual framework for policy analysis requires a theory of government supply and government production failure to complement the well-developed theory of market failure provided by welfare economics. Charles Wolf has made an important start by attempting to draw parallels between market failures and the manifestations of government supply failures. This article provides a more useful analytical framework for government supply failure in two important ways. First, it draws on several perspectives from the economics of organization to sketch both normative and positive theories of government supply. Second, it uses the positive theory of government supply behavior to make direct comparisons with the traditional market failures. It concludes with some implications of the framework for assessing the potential gains from privatization.

This article considers attempts to incorporate lessons and transfer policies from Britain in the reconstruction of Higher Education in Kosovo after 1999. In doing so, it employs aspects of the lesson-drawing framework developed by Rose (1991 and 2001) and the related concepts of policy transfer and policy diffusion. Drawing on contributions from anthropology and democratization studies, we suggest development of the public policy frameworks for lesson drawing and policy transfer in circumstances characterised by asymmetric interdependence, in which the tactics and strategies of policy resistance by ‘subordinate’ recipient actors can be crucial. This article details the nature of policy resistance and sets out hypotheses for future research.

Governments pursue their goals by adopting various mixes of policy instruments. This article proposes a specific operationalisation of these mixes and applies it to the analysis of reforms that many Western European governments have pursued, as they have adopted a similar policy design in their higher education systems (HESs) over the last 20 years. In fact, although these policies have similar templates, performance indicators exhibit remarkable variation between countries. Thus, by applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis to a large data set containing all changes in policy instruments undertaken in the last 20 years in 12 HESs in Western Europe, this article explores the possibility that differences in performance across national HESs could be associated – ceteris paribus – with different policy mixes. This article finds not only that the common template has been applied through very different national policy mixes but also that only a few instruments are regularly linked to good teaching performance, regardless of the other components of the actual policy mix.

The grid-group cultural theory of Mary Douglas is used to produce a basic categorization of polar approaches to control over public administration and management and to illuminate the selfdisequilibrating dynamics of public administration control systems. The four polar types are based on contrived randomness, competition, mutuality and review. The self-disequilibrating processes work through a combination of mutual repulsion among the polar types and the inherent limitations of each type, which will tend to produce more serious side-effects and reverse effects the more emphasis is placed on any one type. Six hybrid types of control are discussed as simple pairwise combinations of the four polar types, but such hybrids are also likely to be unstable. The approach used here appears at least as good on three criteria as any other current available classification of controls over public administration and it offers a distinctive agenda for examining control design and outcomes.

When and why do individual companies lobby on environmental policies? Given the structural strength of business interests, the answer to this question is important for explaining policy. However, evidence on the strategic lobbying behaviour of individual companies remains scarce. We use data from lobbying disclosure reports on all major climate bills introduced during the 111th Congress (2009–2010). We then link the lobbying disclosure reports to detailed data on the fuel choices of all electric utilities in the United States along with socioeconomic, institutional and political data from the states where the utilities operate. The expected winners (renewable energy, natural gas users) from climate policy are much more likely to lobby individually on federal legislation than the expected losers (coal users). We find that expected winners lobby for specific provisions and rents as a private good, whereas expected losers concentrate their efforts on collective action through trade associations and committees to prevent climate legislation. The results suggest that the supporters of climate policy believed the probability of federal climate legislation to be nontrivial.

This study presents an empirical investigation of differences in health care expenditure between the 26 federal entities of Switzerland in the 1990s. So far, demand and supply-related factors have dominated the debate, while political determinants have largely been neglected. Here, they will be assessed together with the usual indicators on the basis of a cross-sectional analysis of both public and private health care spending. It will be shown that no approach represents the whole truth, but each one a grain of it. Demand for health care is clearly a function of socio-economic factors. On the supply side, it is mainly the number of practitioners and the overall level of provision that drive costs. Finally, from the political factors, general state interventionism is decisive – though only so far as public spending is concerned.

A new form of barter economy is emerging in many industrial nations. People are exchanging goods and services through Local Exchange and Trading Systems (LETS). These are local associations whose members list their offers of, and requests for, goods and services in a directory and then exchange them priced in a local unit of currency. Using a United Kingdom case study of Totnes LETS, this paper presents a preliminary appraisal of their economic, social equity and community-building objectives. It finds that although LETS are fulfilling these objectives, achievements could be substantially improved with some alterations in public policy towards LETS.

Inspired by the New Institutionalism in political science, the article examines the impact of political institutions on welfare state development in Switzerland. This article suggests that the strength of federalism and direct democracy have proved to be stumbling blocks for the expansion of the Swiss welfare state. Direct democracy and federalism have not only geared the path of welfare state evolution in a more liberal direction, but have also dampened social expenditures.

The rapid development of the Peoples' Republic of China has put increasing strains on an overwhelmed administrative and bureaucratic structure that was already hobbled by persistent inefficiency and corruption. In addition to anti-corruption and professionalization campaigns, the government has devised a system of e-governance with the goal of adding stability and order to a chaotic governing process. This includes re-establishing the control of the governing authorities, including improving the quality of surveillance and data gathering and hence policy-making; the elimination of corruption; and ultimately, the re-legitimation of the Communist Party of China. This paper discusses the critical administrative and political problems facing the government, demonstrates ways in which e-government has been designed to meet these, and discusses the problems presented by a reliance on e-government in a developing country.

The international political economy literature often expects that states end up in regulatory races to the bottom while competing for the most mobile segments of capital. While multilateralism argues that states are able to overcome prisoner dilemma situations by converging on international standards of regulation, comparative historical institutionalists assume ongoing diversity of regulatory frameworks. The paper shows that reforms of banking regulation in the U.S., Britain and Germany exemplify a pattern of ‘convergence within national diversity’. It is argued that a combination of comparative institutionalism with a multilateral perspective captures the causes and patterns of regulatory reform in finance. While convergence on a certain ‘hegemonic regulatory model’ is due to intergovernmental coordination on the regime level, national diversity with respect to timing and the extent of regulatory change depends to a large extent on the existence or absence of institutional veto points in the domestic political system.

This article utilizes a quantitative network approach to analyze complex interaction patterns of public and private actors in EU multi-level governance, concerning the common agricultural policy. It demonstrates, in particular, that the theoretically founded policy network approach provides a powerful tool for comparative politics allowing a quantitative analysis of complex governmental systems. At the micro level, lobbying strategies of different groups can be identified and compared, while at the macro level the classical Corporatism-Pluralism typology could be generalized using this network approach. Further, due to its explicit integration with a legislative decision-making model the suggested approach is a valuable tool in comparative politics as it allows testing to what extent observed lobbying structures are systematically related with specific policy outcomes. In this article the policy network approach is applied to the lobbying system of the Common European Agricultural policy of the EU-15 and EU-27.

Fiscally pressured local governments face the same basic choices in both the United States and the United Kingdom: whether to increase locally raised revenues in order to maintain existing services or to reduce local services. The article first posits a model of local government decision-making in response to fiscal pressure drawn primarily from organizational and systems theory. Local governments are viewed as organizations concerned with maintaining their equilibrium relationships with their external environment (public employees and their unions). The model suggests a series of hypotheses about how local government will respond to fiscal pressure. Case studies of fiscally pressured local governments in both the United States and the United Kingdom are then utilized to describe actual local responses and to assess the usefulness of the model. The article concludes by setting forth a rough hierarchy of preferred local responses.

Although new institutionalism has long been criticised for presenting overly static accounts of social reality, that critique is becoming increasingly unwarranted. In recent years, historical, ideational and rational choice institutionalists have produced a rich body of literature on mechanisms and processes of institutional change. This article reviews this emerging literature and concludes that the most promising avenue for future research is to further explore the potential for combining insights from the three subtypes of institutionalism. In the hopes of encouraging future studies of institutional change to engage more explicitly in theoretical integration, this article proposes a sequential approach to combining insights from different traditions and providing comprehensive accounts of exogenous and endogenous processes of institutional change.

In spite of a recently growing interest in corporatism as a political explanation of cross-national variations of economic performance and as a device for successful crisis management, there is little evidence that corporatism matters as a determinant of economic outcomes. Two kinds of corporatism – as a pattern of interest intermediation or industrial relations, and as a system of concerted public policy-making – are distinguished and tested with OECD data from the 1973 – 85 crisis. Little or no support for either corporatist explanation was found. Alternative perspectives of industrial relations, labour organisations, public policy concertation, state administration, and politico-economic institutions are discussed as offering more promising explanations of differences in governments’ responses to economic crisis.

This paper examines the capacity of governments to implement fiscal reforms in times of austerity. Unlike existing studies, which mostly focus on gradual policy changes like government spending, this analysis distinguishes between consolidation events and consolidation size to examine fiscal reforms. This strategy clarifies contradictory results in previous research and yields new insights into the underlying mechanism of fiscal reform. Based on an action-based data set that includes information about discretionary changes in taxation and government spending policies from 1978 until 2009 for 16 advanced (OECD) countries, the study shows that left and right governments are equally likely to implement cuts. Strategic considerations play a major role for the timing of fiscal consolidation, as the probability of fiscal cuts is highest at the beginning of the legislative term. When governments reform, the left cut as much as necessary, whereas right governments take the opportunity to reduce spending more.

Using Kingdon's agenda setting model and broadening it to the entire policy formation process, I offer an explanation of why the British privatised their telecommunications authority but the French did not. Privatisation is brought about by coupling three streams or factors in critical moments in time: available alternatives generated in policy communities, high government borrowing needs, and party politics. The findings illuminate the usefulness of Kingdon's model beyond its original application in the United States, and have implications for broader theoretical debates in comparative policy research.

This article focuses attention on the distinctive characteristics of economic and social policy in West Germany during the last four decades. It will be argued, that the distinctiveness of state intervention in West Germany resides in a combination of policies of conversative-reformist, liberal and social democratic complexion. The policy of the middle way which results from this combination differs from the extreme poles that are marked by the model of Social-Democratic welfare capitalism on the one hand and market capitalism on the other, but it also comprises elements of both types of political economies. The emergence and the maintenance of the policy of the middle way can largely be attributed to distinctive characteristics of the policy process, and of processes of learning from historical catastrophes.

The main question raised in this article is how educational reforms reflect convergence or divergence between the English, the Norwegian and the Swedish educational systems. We claim that the answer depends on how convergence is conceptualised. At the level of decisions on tools, the countries seem more similar than two decades ago. However, to explain policy changes our analytical perspective must be broadened. We demonstrate how values based on different welfare state models, political economies and different types of institutional evolution can explain processes of change in education over the last decades. In paying attention to broader processes of change, a certain degree of variation occurs. The countries seem to develop according to nationally specific trajectories: England has strengthened the liberal and elitist values of education while social democratic values of comprehensiveness and equality have impact on the aims and effects of policy tools in Norway and Sweden.

Although policy entrepreneurs are assigned an important role in crossing policy boundaries and addressing complex problems, our understanding of the process is limited. This article systematically reviews 51 studies on conditions, strategies and implications of crossboundary entrepreneurship. Findings show that (1) the literature predominantly mentions issue promotion and coalition-building as crossboundary strategies; (2) vertical boundary-crossing is discussed more frequently than horizontal boundary-crossing; (3) the most reported boundary-crossing function is to expand issue arenas; (4) conditions that enable crossboundary strategies include institutional overlap, issue interpretation, power vacuum, overruling policies and lacking resources; and (5) implications of entrepreneurship include raised opposition, increased competition over leadership, augmented complexity hindering collective action, raised costs and resources, and issues regarding trust, legitimacy and authority. Policy entrepreneurship allows for micro-level insights in the emergence of crossboundary processes. We suggest future research to focus on causal processes between conditions, strategies and implications to better understand their interplay.

Many studies of privatisation and liberalisation in utility industries stress the importance of national institutions for reform. However, powerful transnational forces and cross-national policy convergence in telecommunications have led to a questioning of the role of institutions. Single sector studies are limited in their ability to assess the relative influence of sector-specific technical and economic forces in the policy process. This article presents a cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis of privatisation and liberalisation in telecommunications and electricity in Germany, France and Britain in terms of national institutions, techno-economic forces and ideas. Although institutions shape shorter-term policy responses and the emerging regulatory regimes, in the longer term their role is limited to the pace and timing of policy change rather than its impetus and direction. To understand the latter it is necessary to investigate sources of the key ideas which led to reform. The ideas were not embedded within institutions but originated from outside as a response of interests to techno-economic forces and from groups ideologically predisposed to favouring neo-liberal ideas.