In recent years, the movement of personnel from the public sector to interest groups has garnered considerable attention throughout Europe. Consequently, there has been an increased focus on the phenomenon of revolving door lobbyists within academic literature. This research contributes to this scholarly discussion by examining how the employment of such lobbyists facilitates access. We argue that interest groups gain advantages by recruiting individuals from the public sector in policy domains with limited mobilization, but this benefit decreases as more interest groups mobilize. Our analysis of survey data from seven European political systems supports these expectations, indicating that recruiting professionals with experience in the public sector enhances access, especially in policy areas with minimal lobbying activity. This highlights the potential for interest mobilization to counterbalance the advantages of hiring revolving door lobbyists.

Lobbyists sometimes represent clients with seemingly adversarial policy interests. We seek to explain the occurrence of such ostensible conflicts of interest. In hiring lobbyists, interests encounter a tradeoff between access and agency. Although some lobbyists promise access to lawmakers, they may not lobby as contracted. Interests hire seemingly conflicted lobbyists more often when access is costlier and reputational risks are smaller. We examine the hiring of tobacco lobbyists by health interests, given the possibilities for shirking and reputational damage. We find that institutions such as hospitals hire tobacco lobbyists regularly and more often than membership-based health groups. Intergroup competition for access and lobby laws, especially anti-conflict laws, affect the use of tobacco lobbyists independent of rates of multi-client lobbying. Conflicts are more common today than ever but interests can protect themselves somewhat from opportunistic agents. Our findings also suggest that reforms can improve the representation of client interests.

Although transboundary crises have gained relevance in an increasingly interdependent world, our understanding of the relational dynamics governing these phenomena remains limited. This paper addresses this knowledge gap by identifying common characteristics across interorganizational transboundary crisis networks and drivers of tie formation in successful structures. For this purpose, it applies descriptive Social Network Analysis and Exponential Random Graph Models to an original dataset of three networks. Results show that these structures combine elements of issue networks and policy communities. Common features include moderately high centralization, reciprocated ties, core-periphery structures, and the popularity of international organizations. Additionally, successful networks display smooth communication between NGOs and international organizations, whereas unsuccessful networks have fewer heterophilous interactions. Transitivity seems to play a role in network success too. These findings suggest that crisis networks are robust structures that reconcile bridging and bonding dynamics, thereby highlighting how evidence from relational studies could guide transboundary crisis management.

The ways in which minority street-level bureaucrats construe their identities as state representatives and as representatives of minority clients are known to inform their discretionary behavior toward clients, thereby shaping policy outcomes. While existing studies have examined race and ethnicity as shared identities between minority bureaucrats and clients, the role of “migrant” identity has been overlooked. Focusing on the so-called European migration crisis of 2015–2017, this study addresses this gap. Drawing on qualitative interviews with migrant bureaucrats, it examines how being simultaneously a migrant and a migration policy implementer shapes bureaucratic discretion. This article introduces the notion of “migrant representative” and identifies four profiles of migrant bureaucrats, each corresponding to different degrees of identification with the local migration management system and the migrant clients. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on representative bureaucracy and the debate on the linkage between passive and active representation.

There is a populist narrative that authoritarian regimes were better able to respond to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic because of their strict enforcement powers, compliance of citizens, and speed of autocratic decision-making in a crisis. Research evidence to date on this assertion is however inconclusive or inconsistent. This paper analyses data from democratic and authoritarian countries with the aim of finding out whether autocratic regimes, using greater stringency measures (policy interventions to tackle COVID-19), had better public health outcomes than their counterparts. The results show that authoritarian regimes performed better in tackling the pandemic in terms of infection and death rates than their counterparts. However, we did not find any empirical evidence on the moderation effect of trust in government on the relationship between stringency measures against COVID-19 and policy outcomes. This result might be due to the lack of data transparency in authoritarian countries.

Policy with concentrated costs often faces intense localized opposition. Both private and governmental actors frequently use financial compensation to attempt to overcome this opposition. We measure how effective such compensation is for winning policy support in the arena of housing development. We build a novel survey platform that shows respondents images of their self-reported neighborhood with hypothetical renderings of new housing superimposed on existing structures. Using a sample of nearly 600 Bostonians, we find that compensating residents increases their support for nearby market-rate housing construction. However, compensation does not influence support for affordable housing. We theorize that the inclusion of affordable housing activates symbolic attitudes, decreasing the importance of financial self-interest and thus the effectiveness of compensation. Our findings suggest greater interaction between self-interest and symbolic politics within policy design than previously asserted. Together, this research signals opportunities for coalition building by policy entrepreneurs when facing opposition due to concentrated costs.

We propose a qualitative method of assessing a policy mix’s content, which can be utilized alongside currently common quantitative techniques such as counting the number of tools, policies, and levels of government involved. Focussing on whether or not the mix promotes flexibility or standardization and whether it is intended to be maintaining or innovating helps to better map existing policy mixes and inform design decisions than do more contentless quantitative methods. It has implications for theories of policy-making in improving on current depictions of the nature and dynamics of policy mixes, especially with respect to the impact of procedural tools, and also helps underscore the significance of what often appear in quantitative studies to be marginal or incremental shifts in instruments and goals. The utility of the model and its improvement on existing methods are illustrated through examination of two cases of banking regulation and pension policy in Canada.

How does the public form preferences on racialized policy issues that are both widely discussed and broadly misunderstood? This has been the question centering around the sudden attacks on academic terms like “critical race theory” (CRT). I argue that the politicization of, and opinion polarization around, critical race theory is evidence of what I call policy branding, where political parties or organizations brand an arbitrary concept that has national salience into a policy issue. Using a series of original survey experiments, this study shows that one of the primary sources of opposition to critical race theory is the literal use of the term. I juxtapose this with evidence that the education policy issue at the core, antiracist teaching, maintained strong public, bipartisan support. This study has implications for the consequences of political elite capture of academic concepts and ideas.

Social innovation has broadly been defined as citizen-led initiatives aimed at improving community welfare through collaborative relationships. However, numerous studies demonstrate that social innovation might actually create new inequalities. In this paper, we address the following questions: how might socially innovative projects influence public policy? How can we understand a policy shift leading to institutions not only giving support to social innovation projects but even promoting their own social innovation schemes? Is institution-led social innovation different from citizen-led efforts? If so, how? We provide evidence of local public policy change occurring in 0–3 education and care in Barcelona between 2015 and 2021. We explain how this happened, examining who redefined the issue and how, how the policy domain was reorganized, and how the policy subsystem was restructured. Our conclusions show how and why citizens and institutions define social innovation differently and how innovative 0–3 policy in Barcelona was adopted.