Competition laws and policies play an important role in developing countries. More than 130 countries have adopted either a competition law or a similar framework of anti-monopoly laws that aims to improve social welfare. Most African countries have already started developing their competition regimes, and regional trade organizations in Africa have provided competition sections in their free trade agreements to enhance enforcement cooperation. For fledgling competition regimes in Africa, the improvement of effective public enforcement and competition law culture has become an essential driver of competition law development. In particular, Egypt has demonstrated its efforts towards the modernization of competition law and the enhancement of fair and free competition, which is an example of the development of the competition regime in a developing African country. This article discusses the development of the Egyptian competition regime from a comparative perspective and suggests proposals for its further modernization.

Twenty-seven African countries are currently members of the World Trade Organisation. These are, with die date of acceptance:

Before President F. W. de Klerk's epoch-making address on 2 February, 1990, anyone who predicted that within less than two years virtually all the major political parties and groupings in South Africa would be sitting around a conference table negotiating a new constitution, would have been dismissed as naive at best. Even more amazing is the substantial degree of consensus which has been achieved in what is a relatively short time, given the long history of conflict which preceded the dawning of the “new” South Africa.

The focus of the negotiations is the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (commonly referred to by the acronym Codesa). A wide spectrum of political opinion is represented here (a total of 19 different organizations at the last count), although organizations and parties on both the extreme right, and the extreme left, have refused to participate. While the government, the National Party and the African National Congress (ANC) may be seen as the main players, the role played by even the most minor participants cannot be discounted, because of the emphasis that is placed on consensus by most of the parties involved.

Section 54 of Ghana's Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), gives the Attorney-General discretion to enter a nolle prosequi in the course of a criminal trial. According to the orthodox view, this discretionary power is not subject to judicial review. The orthodox view raises a number of very important questions. First, is it really the case that the power to enter a nolle prosequi is not subject to judicial review? Secondly, if this is the case, how is the Attorney-General accountable for the manner in which he exercises his discretion and how is it possible to ensure that he acts fairly when he enters a nolle prosequi? This article challenges the orthodox theory and advocates a theory based on legal accountability. The proposed theory is founded on the view that accountability and fairness—which are central constituents of good governance—will be enhanced if the discretion to enter a nolle prosequi is subject to legal control. The paper goes on to show that the legal accountability theory is supported by article 296 of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution and that it also conforms to practices found in other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as England, Canada, Fiji and Australia.

Many jurisdictions internationally have adopted some form of solvency-based threshold to protect creditors from opportunistic or abusive distributions being paid from corporate capital. When a legislative “test” for distributions involves an enquiry that is too heavily based on a company's balance sheet, and thus on the integrity of the financial reporting standards underpinning its preparation, the utility of such thresholds becomes questionable on a similar basis to that on which the effectiveness of the capital maintenance doctrine has been challenged. Even the addition of a “liquidity” threshold that shifts the emphasis away from a company's balance sheet appears to presume that a corporation's financial health can be accurately determined from its financial statements. This article explores the difficulties involved in so-called “solvency-based” thresholds for distributions and considers other sources of creditor protection that may be more reliable.

The importance of agriculture especially in a developing country cannot be over-emphasised. It had been the mainstay of the Nigerian economy since the colonial period. Apart from subsistence farming which catered for the food needs of the local population, Nigeria had exported cash crops in the past.

Unfortunately, the blessings of the oil boom have diverted our attention from agriculture in the past decade with the consequent neglect of it. But the dwindling fortunes of oil appear to have induced us to switch our attention once again to agriculture.

To this end, some practical steps have been taken by Government to encourage investment in agriculture. These include subsidising fertilisers and seeds for farmers, the establishment of various Agricultural Development Projects, the Communal Farm Programmes and the establishment of various River Basins Development Authorities. Other recent measures include tax relief for agro-allied projects; tax holidays for investors in combined agricultural productions and processing; capital allowances for capital expenditure on plant and equipment for, and equipment leasing to, agriculture; removal of import duties on tractors and other agricultural machinery and equipment and increased foreign equity participation within the framework of the Enterprises Promotion Decree.

Since Nigeria's return to democratic governance in 1999, violent conflicts around identities including religion, ethnicity, indigene / settler differentiation and resource control remain a challenge to peace. Thus far, government responses lack a normative framework to motivate consistent intervention and foster peace. While Nigeria's 1999 Constitution identifies peace as a common aspiration, there is a lack of a non-adversarial institutional mechanism to address violent conflicts related to identity. Despite its limited relevance, the visible institution for conflict management is the court. This article argues for the need to establish a panel of the wise, a conflict and peace intervention mechanism, as an “essential” element of the Nigerian Constitution. It then explores key considerations regarding the proposed panel, in terms of its composition, functions and legal status to intervene in the management of violent conflicts associated with identity and fostering peace in Nigeria.

The Ugandan Supreme Court's decision in Attorney General v Susan Kigula & 417 Others ended a ten year constitutional challenge against capital punishment. The attorney general was appealing the Constitutional Court's declarations that a mandatory death penalty and a delay on death row of more than three years violate Uganda's Constitution. The respondents cross-appealed the Constitutional Court's declarations that the death penalty is constitutional and that hanging is an appropriate and therefore constitutional method of execution. The Supreme Court dismissed both the appeals and cross-appeals. This article summarises the Supreme Court's findings and analyses the court's reasoning. It demonstrates that, while the court's reasoning is generally in line with the interpretations offered by international courts and human rights bodies, the court arguably missed an opportunity to take a bolder approach regarding the relationship between the death penalty and the prohibition on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, particularly in light of recent international trends.

The common law doctrine of uberrimae fidei is pivotal to all contracts of insurance. It imposes a duty on the parties to act towards each other with utmost good faith by disclosing all material facts and not misrepresenting any fact, either before the contract is formed or while the contract subsists. This article examines the doctrine and its statutory reforms in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. It argues that, before the statutory interventions, the iniquitous doctrine was a potent weapon, most often used by insurers to defeat just and legitimate claims by an insured. Although the legislation has brought some measure of relief to the insured in these jurisdictions, the article concludes that there are still some grey areas in the Nigerian law that need to be addressed to further the cause of justice between the contracting parties.

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was established in 1958 by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations ECOSOC) by virtue of its powers contained in Article 68 of the United Nations Charter and in pursuance of resolution 1155(XII) adopted on November 26th, 1957 by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In exercise of its power aforesaid, the ECOSOC by its resolution 671A(XXV) of April 29th, 1958, not only established the ECA but also prescribed the legal framework in relation to the functions, membership, etc. of the ECA. The geographical scope of the work of the ECA is the whole continent of Africa, Madagascar and other African islands. This legal framework, which is referred to in resolution 671A(XXV) above as “the Terms of Reference of the Economic Commission for Africa”, provides that the ECA shall be subject to the general supervision of the ECOSOC in the performance of its functions which shall be within the framework of the United Nations, and that the ECA shall take no action with respect to any country without the agreement of that country. In particular, the functions of the ECA are to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic and social development of Africa with a view to raising the level of economic activity and levels of living in Africa, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the countries and territories of Africa both among themselves and with other countries of the world.

Legislation in Lesotho concerning marriage has proceeded along unusually haphazard lines. Confusion and difficulty appear to have arisen in the territory as a result of the absence of any legislative foresight, with the result that statute law remains silent on many essential points, and there has been constant failure to consider the position as a whole.

In East Africa the traditional division of “native justice” on the one side and “English law” on the other is gradually disappearing. Within the foreseeable future it is possible to visualize a single system of law administered by one judiciary. The fusion of customary law and modified English law has been, or is being, achieved with a remarkable lack of friction. Generally speaking, however, customary law has had to make greater sacrifices in achieving the fusion than its more powerful brother, the common and statutory law of the three states. The latter has made a few minor concessions; for example, when customary criminal law disappeared in Uganda in 1964, the Penal Code was amended to admit adultery as a statutory offence. Adultery had been an offence among all the different tribes in Uganda. But it is usually customary law which has had to change to achieve a single system of law.

This article attempts to reflect upon the present state of indigenous customary law in South Africa, more particularly as codified in Natal, and to assess the suitability of the system today, as well as its place in the South African legal order. Verloren van Themaat has argued for the retention of indigenous law as follows:

Legitimacy constitutes an important aspect of Nigerian law. It has the strongest link with the allied question of succession. Most disputes as to legitimacy arise in relation to the right to succeed to property either testate or intestate. Consequently, although this paper does not deal with the detailed rules of succession we shall make several references to those rules.

Swaziland's Constitution of 2005 promised that every Swazi child would have the right to free primary school education, within three years of the constitution coming into operation. That date having passed, a civil society group took the matter to court. The case initially fared well, but in a subsequent application for performance on the original order, the court balked at making an immediately enforceable order, citing lack of resources as an obstacle. That approach was upheld by the Supreme Court. This article examines the courts’ pronouncements within the Swazi constitutional context. It discusses judicial deference, avoidance and pragmatism. Swaziland's free primary education judgments are compared with those of courts in South Africa. The remedial orders of those courts demonstrate that, although educational goods and services cannot be delivered overnight, creativity and oversight by the courts can ensure that an immediate start is made towards delivering on the constitutional promise.