OUR CONCLUSION, IN PART I,* WAS THAT THE ABANDONMENT OF THE expert/lay dichotomy as the basis for understanding risk perception, whilst essential, is not going to be easy. We argued that:

1) Objectivism (the idea that we can clearly distinguish between what the risks really are and what people variously and erroneously believe them to be) has to give way to constructivism (the idea that risk is inherently subjective: something that we project onto whatever it is that is ‘out there’).

2) To impose a single definition of what the problem is, which is what so much of policy analysis and science-for-public-policy does, is to exclude all those who happen not to share that particular way of framing things. Since people are unlikely to support a policy that is aimed at solving what they do not see to be the problem, approaches that insist on singularity (and on single metrics — cost: benefit analysis, for instance, probabilistic risk assessment, qualityadjusted life years and so on) will inevitably be low on consent, surprise-prone, unref lexive, brittle and undemocratic.

The Main Aim Of This Article Is To Understand Some Of The processes at work in the management of European policy formation by political parties in the UK. More specifically, it attempts to apply and extend the model proposed by Aspinwall of institutional constraints on that policy management. Whereas Aspinwall limits the application of his model to parliamentary coalitions and effective power, we push the model further by describing and analysing its interaction with other features of the political landscape, most notably the generally low level of interest in European affairs on the part of the British public.

This article examines electoral intimidation of voters at their workplace in contemporary new democracies. What is the relative importance of workplace intimidation in the broader portfolio of clientelistic strategies used by politicians at times of elections? What explains the subnational variation in the incidence of this electoral strategy? We answer these questions using empirical evidence from two East European countries – Romania and Bulgaria. We assess the prevalence of non-programmatic electoral mobilization in these countries by using list experiments, a survey methodology that elicits unbiased and truthful responses to sensitive political questions. We find that in both countries, workplace intimidation is an important component in the repertoire of non-programmatic mobilization used at election times. Workplace intimidation is especially pervasive in localities dominated by a small number of large employers. The importance of economic intimidation in the portfolio of clientelistic strategies declines as the economic heterogeneity of the locality increases.

Since the end of the bipolar era, the military activism of several Western powers has raised questions about parliamentary control, fostering growing research and analyses on the features, drivers and consequences of the different kinds of oversight exercised by legislative assemblies. Within this scholarly debate, this article focuses on the under-studied case of Italy. How did Italian parties vote on military operations abroad in the post-Cold War era? In order to answer this question, the article presents the first detailed and comprehensive set of data on parliamentary votes over the deployment of the Italian armed forces in the post-Cold War era (i.e. from the beginning of the 1990s to the recent operation against ISIL). Thanks to this extensive new empirical material, the article assesses selected arguments developed by the literature on political parties and foreign policy, paving the way for further research.

This article examines the domestic and international pressures since 11 September 2001 on the liberal democratic asylum regime practised within the European Union. It looks at three areas of confrontation. The pressures exerted upon national governments by anti-immigrant and anti-asylum seeker/refugee far right populist parties. It examines the attempts by the European Union and its member states to arrive at a Common European Asylum System in light of policy developments over the past 20 years, and places these long-standing processes within the events of 11 September 2001. It discusses whether or not the liberal democratic tradition of asylum embodied in the Geneva Convention of 1951 been sacrificed to the dual pressures of the electoral victories of the far right in Europe and a new form of terrorism that threatens European societies.

The term ‘Westminster model’, widely used in both the academic and practitioner literatures, is a familiar one. But detailed examination finds significant confusion about its meaning. This article follows Giovanni Sartori's advice for ‘reconstructing’ a social science term whose meaning may be unclear through review of its use in the recent literature. It finds that many authors in comparative politics use the term ‘Westminster model’ without definition, while those providing definitions associate it with a large (and sometimes conflicting) set of attributes, and a set of countries often not demonstrating those attributes. Some have sought to respect this diversity by proposing variants like ‘Washminster’ or ‘Eastminster’, while others suggest that the term should be seen as a loose ‘family resemblance’ concept. But on examination it no longer meets even the – relatively weak – requirements for family resemblance. To end the muddle, and the risk of flawed inferences and false generalization, comparative scholars should drop this term, and select cases based on more precise attributes instead.

Governments around the world have crafted new laws to threaten, arrest, prosecute and incarcerate online political activists. While the primary effect of online repression is to silence criticism and forestall collective action, a secondary effect is to induce self-censorship among the masses. Yet scant research examines how self-censorship works, nor discusses its implications for entrenching authoritarianism and encouraging democratic backsliding. This article proposes a simple expected utility model of self-censorship, arguing that citizens will more likely self-censor when the expected costs of online political expression outweigh its benefits. Analysing the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer survey of 10,216 respondents across eight Southeast Asian countries, I find that higher income politically engaged social media users are indeed less likely to express their political opinions. Additionally, this correlation holds in states where online repression is most severe, but is non-existent in countries where online repression is moderate or low.

This article provides a critical examination of the contribution that statecraft theory, which has been subject to recent revision and development, makes to the literature on institutional change. It articulates an emergent neo-statecraft approach that offers an agent-led form of historical institutionalism. This overcomes the common criticism that historical institutionalists underplay the creative role of actors. The article also argues that the approach brings back into focus the imperatives of electoral politics as a source of institutional change and provides a macro theory of change which is also commonly missing from historical institutionalist work. It can therefore identify previously unnoticed sources of stability and change, especially in states with strong executives and top-down political cultures.

Many democracies are widely perceived to be suffering a serious crisis of representation, participation and legitimacy. As part of this ‘crisis’, the male domination of democracy – both in terms of its institutions and who participates – has been identified as problematic, even emblematic, of a more generalized democratic crisis. Increasing the participation of women is advocated as one solution. Using examples drawn from both long-standing and newer democracies (parliamentary and presidential), particularly from Europe and Latin America, this article explores the gender dynamics of the ‘crisis of democracy’. The ‘crisis’ has two gendered aspects. First, and paradoxically, although democracy still privileges predominantly white, elite, heterosexual, men, more women now participate in democratic institutions, leading to claims that the ‘male monopoly’ has ended (Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013). Second, the ‘crisis of democracy’ may provide opportunities to further enhance women’s participation, as the demands of those favouring greater gender equality and those looking for solutions to the ‘crisis’ appear to coincide.

This paper investigates the effects of the global economic crisis (GEC) on political change. A number of emerging European economies have experienced political turnover, but in other emerging and transition economies, government turnover and regime change have been comparatively rare. Two factors – incumbent governments' responsibility for the current crisis and their responsiveness to its domestic economic effects – shape the political effects of the GEC. Outside Europe, most emerging economies have experienced this crisis as an external shock to trade and investment rather than a domestic financial crisis. As a consequence, their governments have experienced less severe economic contractions, and have been able credibly to portray themselves as victims of, rather than causes of, the economic difficulties that they currently face. By placing political turnover in emerging Europe in comparative perspective, this argument provides a new perspective on the consequences of economic integration on national politics for emerging economies around the world.

This article assesses the articulation of vital ethno-national interests and the use and abuse of veto rights in deeply divided societies. In consociational theory, veto rights represent the primary means by which ethnic groups defend their ‘vital interests’, though they are often criticized for rewarding extremism and producing institutional instability. Situating a case study of Northern Ireland in a comparative perspective, I consider two lines of veto practice: liberal vs corporate (i.e. who has veto rights?) and permissive vs restrictive (i.e. to what issue areas do vetoes apply?), to assess what political incentives, if any, they offer for moderation and stability. Drawing from a review of the legislative debates when a veto was enacted and on semi-structured interviews with members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, I argue that a permissive approach, in which groups can determine their own vital interests, can contribute to moderation, peace and stability in divided societies.

THE LITERATURE ON CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO ETHNIC or peripheral demands suggests a continuum from meeting the challenge head on to conceding some or all of the demand. Strategies also have to be developed by parties in opposition. As the dominant party in Scotland, Labour found itself embroiled in the demand for constitutional change and having to respond in the 1980s. This created party management problems. The evolution of Labour's territorial strategy in opposition between 1979 and 1997 is important in understanding what it did after coming to power. The maintenance of support for Scottish home rule, the alterations in the policy and the method of implementing it can only be explained by understanding the evolution of the policy during the party's eighteen years out of office. During this time, there was a paradigm shift in Labour thinking which made devolution more likely when it came to power.

This article examines how authoritarian regimes combine various strategies of repression, co-optation and legitimation to remain in power. The contribution of the article is two-fold. First, I conceptualize the hexagon of authoritarian persistence as a framework to explain how authoritarian regimes manage to survive. The hexagon is based on Gerschewski’s (2013) three pillars of stability but proposes some crucial modifications. In contrast to the model of the three pillars, the hexagon can grasp the causal complexity of autocratic survival because it is rooted in set theory and accounts for asymmetric causal relations, conjunctural causation and equifinality. Based on this, it illuminates how authoritarian regimes use multiple, mutually non-exclusive survival strategies. The second contribution is an empirical exploration which applies the hexagon and provides a case-oriented analysis of 62 persistent and non-persistent authoritarian regimes (1991–2010). By using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, the findings of this assessment illustrate five configurations of the hexagon – called hegemonic, performance-dependent, rigid, overcompensating and adaptive authoritarianism – as those combinations of strategies which facilitate authoritarian survival.

SECURING ORDERLY TRANSITION OF POWER FROM ONE RULER TO another is a classic problem for polities of any kind. Historically, ruler succession episodes were often marred by fierce competition and infighting among members of the ruling elite. Even in stable democratic systems with effective electoral and other procedures for replacing heads of government, leadership rotation within political parties retains some of these brutal qualities. Party leadership successions are mostly ad hoc affairs, frequently rooted in either the incumbent's state of mind, dissatisfaction with the incumbent's performance within the party, or internal power struggles. Comparative studies find that party leadership successions often generate widespread uncertainty, agony and even trauma within parties and thus they weaken rather than consolidate or strengthen a party's public support base.

The EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) represents a bold integrationist step in European economic governance. Besides the size of the fiscal envelope, the novelty also lies in the new governance. Member states prepare integrated investment and reform plans and need to fulfil milestones and targets to access funding. This article assesses the balance of power in negotiating the plans and the effect on domestic policymaking. Based on five case studies, we show that the RRF has enhanced the steering capacity of the European Commission on reforms and investments, while member states remain ultimately in charge of the plans. Second, we argue that, while the RRF enhances the efficiency of the policymaking process and allows the fast-forwarding of reforms, it has also led to a contractualization of the relationship with the EU and a centralization of decision-making processes within member states. This latter aspect may hamper ownership and legitimacy in policy implementation.

To what extent is a drive to appropriate the world's oil a driving force behind American foreign policy? This paper argues that rather than viewing US foreign policy as driven by the expansionary forces of US oil companies seeking new reserves and markets, or by rising concern about levels of import dependence, it is more illuminating to ask how the broader nature of American geopolitics shapes policies towards international oil. The United States does seek to exercise a degree of influence over world oil second to none, but the form of that influence is very ambiguous and very different from the kinds of control over raw materials traditionally associated with imperial powers.

While previous research has generally shown that economic performance is an important predictor of satisfaction with democracy, differences between political systems on the majoritarian-consensual dimension have not been as marked as expected. What has been neglected in previous studies is how the interaction between economic performance and type of power-sharing arrangement co-produce democratic satisfaction. This study uses multiple rounds of data from the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2013 involving 31 countries. The results show that short-term changes in economic performance and government fractionalization interactively increase or decrease levels of political support. The effect of economic performance on satisfaction with democracy becomes weaker the more fractionalized a government is. Satisfaction with how democracy works in a country remains relatively high in systems with fractionalized coalition governments when the economy is performing poorly. But when the economy performs extraordinarily well, satisfaction with democracy is even higher in countries with a dominant party in charge of government power.

By adopting a longue durée approach this paper aims to move the debate on Italy's foreign policy under the leadership of Silvio Berlusconi beyond the presentism and personalization currently dominating it. It argues firstly that the equation of Italian foreign policy with Berlusconi – irresistible as it may be – does not ultimately hold, and secondly that Berlusconi's ‘new course’ in foreign policy has to be put in a broader context. A more historically informed reading of the subject can on the one hand confer meaning and substance to what otherwise could appear to be a supremely ephemeral foreign policy, and on the other help illuminate its current trajectory and future implications. Far from being the product of ‘one man alone’ and his surreal quirks, the recent change in Italy's foreign policy results from a particular dialectic interplay between structural and contingent developments, which have come to intersect at this particular time.

EU influence in encouraging and promoting democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe has been extensive, though in a wide rather than deep sense. But, as shown by the enlargement process up to 2004, accession dynamics are the crucial force driving governments in the region to meet the EU's political conditionality. Despite the latter's deficiencies, it has by and large contributed towards democratic consolidation in the new member states notwithstanding some negative aspects of accession. The clear lesson for further enlargement in post-Communist Europe is that EU pressure and promise over integration will be decisive in new candidate states, even though their capacity to achieve the political conditions is more problematic. It follows too that any lessening of EU commitment is likely to undermine democratization efforts there.