1 WOULD DEFINE TOLERANCE AS THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE ACCEPT things of which we disapprove. Such a definition is only to define roughly, for the moment, what we are talking about, it does not settle any argument and it will require elaboration before it can be shown, as I hope to, that it is an important subject for historical and social research, hitherto neglected or often treated most superficially, that is either shallowly or purely on the level of ideas. ‘Tolerance’ I will use as a specific term-we are tolerant of this and that. ‘Toleration’ I will use for explicit theories or doctrines which state that we should be tolerant (or as tolerant as possible) of wide classes of actions or types of belief and behaviour. All societies accept to some degree, however small, some things of which government, public opinion or tradition disapprove. Many of these latter are trivial, both in contemporary and subsequent perspectives; but there are plainly many cases of significant and important degrees of tolerance existing in societies long before theories or doctrines of toleration emerge – which fundamentally are no older than the 16th century and do not become commonplace until the I 8th. Indeed, in many ways, as I will argue later, degrees of tolerance in autocracies are more interesting to study (and have been less studied) than intolerance in politicaldemocracies, or whatever term one chooses to use for modern polity.

This article examines how authoritarian regimes combine various strategies of repression, co-optation and legitimation to remain in power. The contribution of the article is two-fold. First, I conceptualize the hexagon of authoritarian persistence as a framework to explain how authoritarian regimes manage to survive. The hexagon is based on Gerschewski’s (2013) three pillars of stability but proposes some crucial modifications. In contrast to the model of the three pillars, the hexagon can grasp the causal complexity of autocratic survival because it is rooted in set theory and accounts for asymmetric causal relations, conjunctural causation and equifinality. Based on this, it illuminates how authoritarian regimes use multiple, mutually non-exclusive survival strategies. The second contribution is an empirical exploration which applies the hexagon and provides a case-oriented analysis of 62 persistent and non-persistent authoritarian regimes (1991–2010). By using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, the findings of this assessment illustrate five configurations of the hexagon – called hegemonic, performance-dependent, rigid, overcompensating and adaptive authoritarianism – as those combinations of strategies which facilitate authoritarian survival.

In Continental Europe a New Debate Has Emerged Over the interpretation of the major changes that have taken place in political parties during the 1990s. A ‘fourth wave’ of democratic party-building originating in Eastern Europe has highlighted a number of new developments. Parties have emerged which are built around leaders, which have few members, are subsidized by the state and which direct their activities towards the media and the electorate rather than towards partyidentifiers. Recent contributions to this debate have sought to transform a picture of the decline of political parties by offering a new image of the party. The future of the party is to be found in what have been variously dubbed ‘professional framework parties‘, ‘media parties’ or ‘cartel parties’.

This article extends a recent line of research arguing that the power and capacity of political actors (including states) is not just the product of particular fixed attributes but is also the outcome of political relations between key interlocutors, including ideational relations. State elites, especially government leaders, have persisted with a mindset that still values the economic centrality of a large and complex banking sector. This way of thinking has conditioned the relationship between, on the one hand, the US and UK governments and, on the other, Wall Street and the City of London and has led to a form of ‘dysfunctional embeddedness’. Government leaders may have been able to win high-profile policy victories over the banking sector in the post-crisis period, but in accepting a large, complex and constantly evolving financial system with high levels of systemic risk, they have unwittingly placed themselves at a continuing disadvantage in the regulatory arena.

Adopting Ionescu's qualitative approach to political science, and building on Sartori's definition of party system, this article examines the degree to which European (both East and West) party systems have developed since the collapse of communism in 1990 in all three major areas of partisan competition: parliamentary, governmental and electoral. In this context, this article constitutes, paraphrasing Sartori (1969), an attempt to go ‘from political sociology to the sociology of politics and back’. The main conclusion is that, although two decades have passed, East European party politics continues to be generally characterized by instability and unpredictability at all levels.

About two decades after the introduction of party quotas, in the mid-2000s both Portugal and Spain enacted legislative gender quotas. The simultaneous implementation of party and legislative quotas raises questions about the potential interactions between two types of candidate quotas sharing the same goal – granting gender equality in political representation. Following a feminist institutionalist approach, this article aims at disentangling under what circumstances compliance with legislative quotas is greater. By looking at the different party institutional contexts in which candidates are selected, a double comparative framework is set. Firstly, we examine within country how legislative quotas affect political parties with dissimilar strategies to pursue equal gender representation. Secondly, we analyse across countries how they impact on political parties with differently institutionalized voluntary quotas. The article shows that legislative quotas are nested in political parties’ candidate selection process and that existing gendered practices and norms limit the effective compliance with such measures.

OWING TO THE GROWTH OF THE GREEN MOVEMENT IN THE 1980S MANY feel that Britain has experienced a cultural revolution on environmental issues. According to conventional wisdom, public opinion has come to reflect a deep-rooted and widespread sense of environmental awareness, with long-term consequences for British politics. Yearley suggests that there has been a significant ‘greening’ of British public opinion in recent years.’ In a series of articles reviewing attitudes towards environmental values, Young concludes that evidence for a culture shift ‘is almost beyond dispute’. Environmentalists commonly make three distinct claims, namely: there has been a growth of public concern about environmental issues; as a result public support for green policies and ideas has increased; in turn this has led to greater environmental activism, including support for the Green Party, involvement in environmental groups and green consumerism.

This article engages with Meg Russell and Ruxandra Serban's (2021) argument that the Westminster model is ‘a concept stretched beyond repair’ that deserves ‘to be retired’. We examine the logic, theory and methods that led to such a powerful, potent and provocative argument. We suggest their approach may have inadvertently ‘muddied’ an already muddled concept. We assess the implications of ‘muddying’ for their conclusion that the Westminster model is, in essence, a dead concept in need of a decent funeral. We suggest the concept is ‘stretched but not snapped’ by developing a simple four-perspective broadening of the analytical lens. This approach aids understanding about what the concept covers, how it is operationalized and why it remains useful in comparative research.

Recent theoretical discussion and Empirical Evidence have shown that national identity is important at both collective and individual levels. The issue of national identity is particularly relevant to the community of Hong Kong, which was reunited with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 July 1997. The fact that 97 per cent of Hong Kong's population is Chinese does not guarantee the automatic development of a sense of national identity. Mutual understanding between the people of the two places is not as easy and natural as one might expect, for objective differences, such as those found in the political, legal and economic systems, make the ‘other’ more stranger than kin. Such difficulties were compounded by the phenomenon that, unlike in many former colonies, the people of Hong Kong did not abhor their outgoing British rulers; in fact many were quite nostalgic about the colonial period.

This article argues that the integration of financial assistance capacity in the eurozone, which was meant to remedy institutional shortcomings and mitigate the distributional implications of financial support in the European Monetary Union (EMU), has instead contributed to a deepening of the existing political cleavages and the creation of new ones. This dysfunctional effect reflects the empowerment of some national parliaments in decisions on financial assistance. These arguments are tested against the empirical examination of the negotiations of the three adjustment programmes for Greece. Specifically, the article shows that negotiations moved towards the radicalization of creditors’ positions and increased divisions between creditors in conjunction with the development of financial assistance capacity. While advancing its theses, the article strikes a note of caution regarding the argument that the empowerment of national parliaments in EU policymaking is one of the most powerful antidotes to its legitimacy deficit and thus a safeguard for the integration project.

MANY COMMENTATORS HAVE VIEWED THE CITIZEN'S CHARTER programme as a cynical exercise, having little to do with either the political participation one associates with citizenship or the establishment of a general bill of rights in the manner of the great Charters of the past. Although these criticisms possess some force, they fail to recognize that a distinctive conception of citizenship and rights underlies the initiative. In section one, we give an outline of this view of the citizen and trace its origins in the New Right critique of the social-democratic theory that predominated during the post-war period. This exercise forms a necessary preliminary both for understanding the objectives of the policy, the task of section two, and for assessing its coherence and plausibility, the aim of section three. We shall conclude that the scheme fails because it either substitutes the market for the state where it is inappropriate or omits to do so where it might provejustified. In these respects, the combination of politics and markets from the mixed-economy perspective of the social democratic conception of citizenship may well be superior.

While the existence of pre-electoral coalitions fundamentally modifies the bargaining environment in which potential cabinet formulas are negotiated, the survival chances of cabinets that include them follow predictable yet different patterns to those of ‘regular’ coalition governments. This article combines original and existing data sets on Western and Central and Eastern European cabinets with information about pre-electoral coalitions (1944–2008) in order to estimate the impact of such alliances on government survival rates. In doing so, I employ a Cox Proportional Hazard model and a ‘competing risks’ research design which distinguishes between replacement and early election hazards. The findings indicate that both Western and post-communist cabinets formed by pre-electoral coalitions exhibit considerably lower rates of discretionary terminations. This effect is reversed in the case of incumbent pre-electoral coalitions. Last but not least, Western European cabinets that replicate pre-electoral coalitions are significantly less likely to end through dissolution and early elections.

This article provides a preliminary evaluation of the de-Baathification policy that has been adopted by the occupying forces in Iraq. In order to do this evaluation, the article examines the logic behind major lustration laws approved in East European countries between 1990 and 2003 and assesses their political effects. It introduces the concept of ‘lustration systems’ and provides their classification into either ‘exclusive’, ‘inclusive’, ‘reconciliatory’ or ‘mixed’ systems. It recommends a ‘reconciliatory’ system for the new Iraqi administration as an alternative to the ‘mixed’ system previously pursued by the Coalition authorities in Iraq.

Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi is attempting a bold program of ‘structural reform’ in order to revive a moribund economy. However, his actual achievements after more than a year in office have fallen far short of his original goals. Such lack of progress for a prime minister bent on reform can only be understood in the context of Japan's ‘Un-Westminster’ system in which the cabinet is not an authoritative decisionmaking body for government policy. Although modelled along Westminster lines, Japan does not have strong cabinet government; it has party-bureaucratic government. In practice this means that Koizumi's push for reform faces the de facto veto power of bureaucrats and his own ruling party.

Two typical features of new modes of governance (NMG) are of particular concern: (1) the delegation of regulatory activities to independent regulatory authorities at the national and the European level; and (2) regulatory networks outside the legislative arenas, with both private and public actors. These features tend to make the NMG less democratically accountable. Yet some hold that NMG can confer legitimacy on the European Union, especially because they secure ‘output’ more effectively than democratic arrangements, even though they lack any ‘input’ from voters. This article challenges these normative claims: the alleged benefits of NMG may be less than often claimed, while democratic accountability measures are less of a challenge to effectiveness and credibility, properly conceived.

After the 2006 elections, a bourgeois government came to power in Sweden. This article argues that the popularity of the ‘universal’ Swedish welfare state has led the dominant ‘neoliberal’ party (Moderaterna) to adapt its policies; the party has accepted that the modern welfare state is irreplaceable. In the short run the party can only hope to achieve incremental changes, but at the same time the party wants to change society (lower taxes) in the long run. The differences between the allegedly neoliberal 1980s and 2006 should not conceal that the mechanism of welfare popularity remains largely the same. The party's policy proposals tend to suggest only incremental changes in both periods.

While it is commonly assumed that parliamentary opposition is on the wane in Western democracies, we argue that evidence supporting this established proposition is lacking. Therefore, drawing on unique data from the Swedish parliament (the Riksdag), between 1970 and 2014, this article breaks new ground by systematically testing the ‘waning-of-opposition thesis’. First, we explore patterns of cross-partisan cooperation by gauging the extent to which governments seek to accommodate the position of the opposition. Second, we study the degree of partisan conflict over time by mapping the degree to which the opposition politicizes and rejects government policies. Our findings directly contradict the waning-of-opposition thesis. In contrast to theoretical expectations, including the influential ‘cartel-party thesis’, the article finds that partisan struggles in general have intensified significantly over time. Therefore, the article casts significant doubt over the influential idea that parliamentary opposition is waning.

The Purpose of This Article is To Analyse The Document ‘A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland’, published by the British government in early 1995, and to assess its significance in terms of the theory of powersharing (consociational democracy). The Framework Document, as it is usually called, received a hostile reception from many Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland. The ideas that it contains, however, resonate with many previous blueprints for the future of Northern Ireland. In some form they are very likely to re-emerge in the proposed solutions that will follow the ‘all-party’ talks set for June 1996. I shall show that the Framework plan for democratic government in Northern Ireland is completely and thoroughly consociational in its orientation. It confirms the proposition that power-sharing is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for viable democracy in deeply divided societies.

Scholars have long debated whether populism harms or improves the quality of democracy. This article contributes to this debate by focusing on the impact of populist parties in government. In particular, it inquires: (1) whether populists in government are more likely than non-populists to negatively affect the quality of democracies; (2) whether the role of populists in government matters; and (3) which type of populism is expected to negatively affect the quality of liberal-democratic regimes. The results find strong evidence that the role of populists in government affects several qualities of democracy. While robust, the findings related to (2) are less clear-cut than those pertaining to (1). Finally, regardless of their role in government, different types of populism have different impacts on the qualities of democracy. The results show that exclusionary populist parties in government tend to have more of a negative impact than other forms of populism.

Populist radical right (PRR) parties have increasingly occupied positions of power in recent years, inspiring much scholarly interest in the mainstreaming consequences of government responsibility. This article analyses the extent and manner of mainstreaming of the Rassemblement National (RN) while in power at the local level of government in France. A municipal-level focus enables the novel inclusion of the party into the debate about the consequences of government participation for the PRR. We conduct a paired case study analysis of RN-led Hénin-Beaumont, the political base of Marine Le Pen and her ‘de-demonization’ strategy, alongside nearby Lens, which is led by a mainstream party. We analyse the policy and discourse of the administration through a qualitative content analysis of mayoral statements and data from semi-structured interviews with local politicians. The results show a partial mainstreaming due to the strategic exercise of local government power to present a more moderate and capable image, as well as the use of populist discourse to frame mainstream opposition forces and the local press as working against the interests of ‘the people’.