Competition law is experiencing a transformation from a niche economic tool to a Swiss knife of broader industrial and social policy. Relatedly, there is a narrative that sees an expansive role for competition law in broad areas such as sustainability, privacy, and workers and labour rights, and a counternarrative that wants to deny it that role. There is rich scholarship on this area, but little empirical backing. In this article, we present the results of a comprehensive empirical research into whether new goals and objectives such as sustainability, privacy, and workers and labour rights are indeed endorsed in EU competition law and practice. We do so through an investigation into the totality of Court of Justice rulings, Commission decisions, Advocate General opinions, and public statements of the Commission. Our findings inject data into the debate and help dispel misconceptions that may arise by overly focusing on cherry-picked high-profile decisions while overlooking the rest of the EU’s institutional practice.

We find that sustainability is partially recognised as a goal whereas privacy and labour rights are not. We also show that all three goals are more recent than classic goals, that EU institutions have not engaged much with the areas of sustainability, privacy, and workers and labour rights, and that the Commission’s rhetoric is seemingly out of pace with decisional practice. We also identify trends that may bode for change, and we contextualize our analysis through the lens of the history and nature of the EU’s integration and economic constitution.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has been criticised increasingly for its approach to international law. While much literature focuses on reluctance to apply international law (ie refusing direct effect), this criticism also includes interpretation, arguably a more contentious area. The Court interprets international treaties through either the Vienna Convention or its own teleological method, with the latter increasingly applied. The legitimacy of applying localised methods of interpretation to international treaty law is debated in scholarship. Whether the Court’s case law applying international law is Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit (friendliness to international law) is the focus of most contributions in this area. This Article seeks to move beyond that debate by demonstrating the Court should in all instances seek to achieve the legal imperatives of certainty and justice. It is explained that justice divides into ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ forms. Whilst ‘thin’ justice is widely accepted and amounts to treating like cases alike, substantive (‘thick’ justice) outcomes are inherently debatable. The Article proves the Court is failing to clearly distinguish cases (‘thin’ justice) and that case law is uncertain. There are also significant questions concerning ‘thick’ justice. The Court has been subject to criticism for substantive outcomes in this area, with the Commission and Council even seeking to limit its role. With case law that is uncertain and appears unjust it is argued that there is failure in this ‘integral part of EU law.’ The Court is now under increased pressure, and it is uncertain how it will respond. There are certainly cautionary lessons to be learned concerning the importance of paying proper attention to justice and certainty for EU law as a whole, and beyond.

Digital Constitutionalism makes sense. We can all see the problem it tries to solve. And like many other ‘constitutionalisms’, Digital Constitutionalism is a project fuelled by the institutional hope of striking a power equilibrium between competing actors. In seeking this equilibrium, however, important assumptions are made and serious questions are oversimplified.

Firstly, Digital Constitutionalism ignores the production logics of digital technologies thereby mistaking ‘objects’ with ‘subjects’. Secondly, Digital Constitutionalism’s myopic lenses lead to narrations of ‘constitutional moments’ caused by digital powers and digital revolutions, separate from the histories of private corporations in the global stage. Finally, Digital Constitutionalism falsely implies the absence of law rather than its presence – or indeed irrelevance – as major causes of this ‘constitutional crisis’. On this account, it seeks to respond to the ‘digital revolution’ with a ‘legal revolution’.

Against this background, this Article invites legal scholars to look back to think differently, and to engage critically with the long evolution of legal regulation that has enabled the emergence of the corporate form and the consolidation of economic and political power on the global stage. This historicisation may ultimately lead us to turn inward and reflect on the role of legal experts and professionals in the political economy of technology. It may even inspire us to break free from restraining mental maps and thinking patterns and to unlock novel intellectual and methodological pathways in the field of Law and Technology.

And if it takes a Digital Constitutionalism to come to this, it will have been worth it.

The rise of empirical methods has had a polarising effect on legal studies in Europe. On the one hand, quantitative empiricists have frequently dismissed traditional doctrinal scholarship as unscientific and its insights as unreliable. On the other hand, many doctrinal scholars are apprehensive about the perceived displacement of domain expertise from legal research caused by the empirical turn. To bridge the gap between the two camps and address their respective concerns, we propose a wider adoption of expert coding as a methodology for legal research. Expert coding is a method for systematic parsing and representation of phenomena such as legal principles in a structured form, using researchers’ subject matter expertise. To facilitate the uptake of expert coding, we provide a step-by-step guide that addresses not only the coding process but also fundamental prerequisites such as conceptualisation, operationalisation and document selection. We argue that this methodological framework leverages legal scholars’ expertise in a more impactful way than traditional doctrinal analyses. We illustrate each step and methodological principle with examples from European Union law.

As the EU is positioned, and positions itself, as a global leader in digital regulation, it is more important than ever to challenge narratives that flatten disparities within the bloc. In this paper, I seek to problematise the perception of the European Union as the homogenous bloc sometimes alluded to, and even outwardly projected, in discussions about a ‘Brussels Effect’ in digital regulation. Using the EU Digital Services Act as a prism, I draw attention to the legal, political, social, and cultural variation within the EU and, crucially, the inter-state power dynamics and disparities that shape the development and implementation of EU digital regulation. Building on scholarship related to core-periphery dependencies within the EU and extending burgeoning critical methods in EU legal studies, leaning on decolonial approaches, I offer a foundational analysis of the DSA’s preliminary stages of the implementation of the EU Digital Services Act.

Calling for different comparative counterpoints to those routinely used in EU legal studies and digital regulation, this article presents a rare insight into the process from the perspective of the EU’s smallest member state, Malta, a former British colony considered part of the EU’s southern periphery that acceded in 2004. In this paper, I argue that, within the EU’s borders, the belief that we are moving toward increased harmonisation and standardisation in the realm of digital rights is, in practice, questionable. I underline that any meaningful assessment of the Digital Services Act’s overall success must pay close attention to the regulation’s tangible impacts (and shortcomings) from the perspective of ‘peripheral’ EU states.

The purpose of this short research note is to draw attention to two major pitfalls of working with databases of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The first one is technical in nature and relates to the discrepant coverage of the Curia and Eur-Lex databases. The second one is linguistic in nature and relates to the fact that most scholars using these databases work in English. New work on this front is capable of addressing the first issue but a change to research practices would be required to address the second.

This short Introduction outlines the purpose and structure of the Symposium on Ecosystem Restoration and EU Law. It opens by highlighting the potential relevance of the ecological move taken by the EU political institutions in the framework of the Green Deal. It then presents the issues addressed in the Symposium and the main overall argument emerging from its four contributions: whilst the EU ecological policy reflects the intention to shift from the traditional understanding of environmental protection as social regulation to a genuinely ecological and holistic vision, the functional rationale of such a move remains, for the moment, elusive and under-specified. Clarifying such rationale is an inescapable but complex task, as it requires a fresh discussion on the relationship between law and ecology, as well as a true understanding of the implications of ecosystem restoration for the evolving features of the EU polity.

Climate change law faces a serious implementation problem. New instruments promoted by states from the Global North to address the implementation gap come from the sphere of trade and supply chain regulation. This article focuses on corporate climate due diligence legislation and its potential contribution to fulfilling the objectives outlined in the Paris Agreement. By examining the EU’s legislative process towards adopting a Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), it explores various approaches to regulating the climate impacts of corporations, including along global supply chains. The article critiques both the ultimately adopted climate transition planning requirement and the European Parliament’s alternative proposal, which aimed to incorporate climate mitigation into the general due diligence framework of the Directive but was unsuccessful. It applies two overarching critiques, termed ‘not enough’ and ‘regulatory imperialism’, to the specific context of corporate climate due diligence. Although these critiques may initially appear contradictory, the article endeavours to reconcile them through a compromise approach that fosters greater participation, integrates measures to mitigate impacts on self-determination, and specifies the obligations imposed on corporations regarding climate mitigation. Finally, the article discusses the idea of a decentralised enforcement regime and highlights the importance of regulation in states of the Global South to achieve a truly planetary legal order on corporate climate accountability.

This contribution to the Symposium on Ecosystem Restoration and EU Law assesses the underground protection schemes suggested by the European Green Deal (EGD) for the European Union (EU). By addressing the overground bias that environmental laws and policies have traditionally suffered from, the analysis engages with the EU Soil Strategy for 2030, its ‘Mission “A Soil Deal for Europe”’, and the proposed 2023 Soil Monitoring Directive. The Article explores how and to what extent this agenda for the preservation and restoration of soils is legally reordering the European ground and, simultaneously, how and to what extent it is regrounding the European legal order.

Much existing social commentary and scholarship around the regulation of the European digital economy is focused on how societies could better regulate that economy and its associated harms. Such analyses often portray a problematically viewed order as ungoverned, or not effectively governed, by law. Instead, I argue for more (re)descriptive analyses on how our pre-existing legal structures powerfully create order in the European digital economy. I explain why we should explore the productive connections between pre-existing European legal arrangements and socio-technical order, and discuss what such exploration could entail. The article covers three complementary ways in which legal arrangements are productively connected to sociotechnical order: as tools of ordering to address problems and promote values; as tools that can also enable projects unintended and unforeseen by policymakers; and as constitutive of technologies and other forms of order. It provides concrete examples of these productive connections from various contemporary struggles within the governance of the European digital economy. I argue that focusing on the analysis of productive connections may shed light on how pre-existing legal arrangements are baked into and shaped by the European socio-technical order. As the current order of the European digital economy is characterised by massive inequalities, these analyses can also direct our attention to how our pre-existing legal arrangements can produce and reproduce inequalities and oppression. Analyses of pre-existing legal arrangements might produce different attributions of responsibility and possibilities of contestation than analyses of legal deficiency.

Digital constitutionalism rarely focuses on value creation, extraction, and distribution. This Article introduces a symposium that contributes to filling this gap, using data taxation as an entry point and sketching the elements of a normative agenda. The contributions advance different proposals, but they share the view that the externalities of informational capitalism have constitutional significance. Based on this, this introduction keeps four issues together: (1) the impact of excessive datafication on contemporary societies; (2) the role of data in contemporary economy; (3) concrete tax design; (4) the interaction of data taxation with other legal regimes and social justice issues, also at the global level. The first goal is to increase the dialogue among strands of legal scholarship that do not necessarily speak the same language. The second goal is to expand the analytical and normative scope of digital constitutionalism, which cannot address such issues as accidental elements but needs to be (also) an economic constitutionalism. The Article proceeds as follows. Section 2 focuses on the link between the digital revolution and constitutional states, especially on their role in value creation, extraction, and distribution. Section 3 identifies such an issue as a gap in digital constitutionalism and opens the way to the following sections. Section 4 is divided into four subsections. Section 4.A stresses the need for critical approaches to datafication, which needs to be seen as an autonomous object of regulation. Section 4.B highlights the role of data within contemporary economy and offers normative justifications for its taxation. Section 4.C highlights the need to include Pigouvian, progressive, and rent-targeting elements into data tax design. Section 4.D puts these issues within the context of economic governance, highlighting the role of (global) institutions in creating, extracting, and distributing value as well as the political nature of the underlying policy choices. Section 5 concludes.

Interdisciplinary analysis of law is a powerful tool for analyzing a variety of legal problems. The strength of interdisciplinarity is its ability to unveil significant factors that remain hidden when seen solely within disciplinary boundaries. This symposium aims to focus on the analytic abilities of interdisciplinarity when exploring European law. To provide the proper background, the introduction reviews the use of interdisciplinarity for the study of European Union law in the literature. The contributions to the symposium have used a variety of interdisciplinary tools to reflect on questions relating to European law. These contributions are briefly reviewed in this introduction.

Taking the claims of Artificial Intelligence firms seriously implies that these firms now benefit from legal defaults and vacuums that allow them to enclose economically relevant intellectual capacity and therefore cause mass displacement of labour. This process is carried out unilaterally and without compensation, and thus likely results in the pauperisation of a significant proportion of people worldwide. Thomas Paine’s analysis of land enclosures provides one way to think of enclosures of economically relevant intellectual capacity, and points to a universal basic income drawing from a data tax as a right derived from this enclosure.

This contribution to the Symposium on Ecosystem Restoration and EU Law is concerned with the changing features of sustainability. It argues that the Commission is gradually articulating, next to the consolidated objective of sustainable development, an ecological understanding of sustainability. It discusses the meaning and relevance of such new understanding, by asking how ecological sustainability is formulated as a policy objective and jurified in the legislation stemming from the Green Deal. It then reflects on the distinction between ecological sustainability and sustainable development. The contribution finally presents some thoughts on the relevance that the ongoing process of complication of the legal construction of sustainability may have for the Green Deal.

In their recent article ‘Europe’s political constitution’, Alexander Somek and Elisabeth Paar conclude: ‘scholactivism is the form of constitutional law of Europe. There is nothing below or above it. It is all there is’. In this reply I want to take issue with such (rather bleak) view of what European constitutional scholarship is about. Firstly, I argue that scholactivism undermines the very conditions of scholarship as a pursuit of knowledge autonomous from both public and private power. The current attacks on academic institutions by authoritarian governments, and also the increasing dependence of research on private funders result, at least in part, from the politicization of scholarship. Secondly, I argue that we should be more critical towards the infrastructure of the digital public sphere, which Somek and Paar see to be emerging through blogs and other platforms, and be more protective of the existing practices that we inherited from our predecessors.

This essay explores what can be learned from understanding EU law as a language in the literary sense of being a set of resources for manifold ethical and political expression and social action. As a contribution to new methodological approaches to studying EU law, it will propose a method highlighting how EU law can be studied in such a way by paying attention to the various linguistic and structural features of a legal text while, at the same time, diversifying the rationales through which we understand and make sense of such textual features. The Sayn–Wittgenstein decision will serve as point of reference in order to illustrate the value-added of this new theoretical and methodological insight to understanding EU law. This essay will conclude that it is not only worth taking the language of EU law seriously because it allows us to ’see’ more in the law, but also because it enables us to elevate the deeper ideas about Europe to the surface of the language we use when writing and speaking about EU law and to thereby contribute to a more productive dialogue about the foundations and future of the EU polity.

This article presents two related arguments. First, the limits of doctrinal analysis cut deeper than many EU lawyers realise. Most would probably accept that legal doctrine does not determine every legal dispute, but lawyers studying EU institutional balance often still assume that it can be deduced from the positive law what is good institutional practice. This paper argues instead that the allocation of EU institutional authority cannot be determined by the exercise of legal judgement, but instead requires the exercise of political judgement on the relative merits of different institutions. Second, this means that political and normative discourses and disciplines cannot be assumed to fall outside the domain of legal scholarship. What we need instead is a distinctive kind of legal scholarship that interweaves doctrinal analysis with normative political theory, broadly conceived. I will argue that political theory, in addition to evaluative value, has adjudicative value, provided that our theories are sensitive to the EU’s social and political setting and the constraints this setting imposes on what is realistically feasible.

Academics and policymakers alike have identified data taxes as a possible response to the emergence of the data economy. This essay aims to distill the two possible goals of a data tax. A data tax could serve as a Pigouvian tax, reducing data collection and the accompanying harms of datafication. Alternately, a data tax could serve as a new tax base, allowing for more effective revenue-raising and redistribution of the economic value being created in the data economy and preventing the concentration of economic power in the hands of digital companies. Which of these two is the primary goal of a data tax not only informs important design choices but also illuminates critical issues surrounding the political economic response to datafication. Therefore, advocates of data taxes must first consider the underlying goal of a data tax before calling for specific reforms.

This is a reply to Komárek’s criticism of our article “Europe’s political constitution”. We address the issues raised by our critic one by one. The topics range from the definition of the public sphere to the role that law blogs and social media play in it. The reply concludes by examining what it means to pursue truth in legal scholarship based on contrasting the views of Hans Kelsen und Stanley Fish.

Restoring ecosystems and enhancing biodiversity is one of many regulatory ambitions under the European Green Deal. The motivations to do so include, but are not limited to, enabling carbon removal by capturing and storing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in land. The business model of such schemes is to help the EU and its Member States meet their climate obligations whilst safeguarding biodiversity, and when relevant, enable sustainable agricultural practices by creating transferable carbon credits awarded to land managers pursuing such practices. The idea of introducing market-based mechanisms in the management of ecosystem services is not a novelty, but the increasing prominence of carbon removals in the European Green Deal and its related legislative actions warrants careful consideration of legal quandaries about how such removals are to be carried out, why, where and by whom.