Firestone & Scholl (F&S) postulate that vision proceeds without any direct interference from cognition. We argue that this view is extreme and not in line with the available evidence. Specifically, we discuss two well-established counterexamples: Attention directly affects core aspects of visual processing, and multisensory modulations of vision originate on multiple levels, some of which are unlikely to fall “within perception.”

As the cultural evolution of a puritanical moral norm in Turkey illustrates, puritanical moral norms are not developed by nonrational reasoning concerned with purity and cleanliness. People use puritanical moral rules as moral heuristics for making intendedly rational decisions about whether to cooperate or not when the commitment of the counterparty is uncertain.

This commentary argues against the indictment of current experimental practices such as piecemeal testing, and the proposed integrated experiment design (IED) approach, which we see as yet another attempt at automating scientific thinking. We identify a number of undesirable features of IED that lead us to believe that its broad application will hinder scientific progress.

Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behavior unexplained. Team reasoning solves problems of coordination and cooperation, but aggregation of individual preferences is problematic.

Yarkoni highlights patterns of overgeneralization in psychology research. In this comment, we note that such challenges also pertain to applied psychological and organizational research and practice. We use two examples – cross-cultural generalizability and implicit bias training – to illustrate common practices of overgeneralization from narrow research samples to broader operational populations. We conclude with recommendations for research and practice.

Whether or not a replication attempt counts as “direct” often cannot be determined definitively after the fact as a result of flexibility in how procedural differences are interpreted. Specifying constraints on generality in original articles can eliminate ambiguity in advance, thereby leading to a more cumulative science.

This commentary extends the target article's useful concepts to consider collective instances of representational exchange. When groups collectively rationalize their actions, entire networks of beliefs and desires can be created and maintained in the form of shared moral narratives and system-justifying ideologies. These collective rationalization cases illustrate how adaptive advantages can come at the expense of the truth.

Body image distortions are common in healthy individuals and a central aspect of serious clinical conditions, such as eating disorders. This commentary explores the potential implications of body image and its distortions for the insurance hypothesis. In particular, we speculate that body image may be an intervening variable mediating the relationship between perceived food scarcity and eating behavior.

The interesting and deep commentaries on our target article reflect the continued high interest in the problem of colour categorisation and naming. Clearly, colour remains for many cognitive science related disciplines a fascinating microworld in which some of the most fundamental issues for cognition and culture can be studied. Although our target article took the stance of practically oriented engineers who are trying to find the best solution for orchestrating the self-organisation of communication systems in artificial agents, most commentators focus on the implications for cognitive science and we will do the same in our reply.

We agree with Christiansen & Chater (C&C) that language processing and acquisition are tightly constrained by the limits of sensory and memory systems. However, the human brain supports a range of cognitive functions that mitigate the effects of information processing bottlenecks. The language system is partly organised around these moderating factors, not just around restrictions on storage and computation.

Loring Brace's assertion that “Neanderthals were just as capable of articulate speech as we are” reflects ignorance of speech anatomy and physiology. Metrical analyses of hyoid bone morphology cannot predict supralaryngeal vocal tract (SVT) shape. Houghton's (1993) “modern” Neanderthal SVT reconstruction yields an impossible creature who had a larynx positioned in his chest. The reconstructed modem SVTs of early fossil Homo sapiens indicate brains that can regulate speech, consistent with Merlin Donalds timetable for the evolution of language.

Fighting and dying, or what Whitehouse calls “out-group hostility” and “extreme self-sacrifice,” are not conceptually overlapping, but in fact are highly distinguishable, both theoretically and empirically. I present empirical evidence from a reanalysis of Ginges et al. (2009, Study 4), demonstrating the potentially inverse relationship between “parochial hostility” – fighting and “sacrificial altruism” – “and” dying.

The neurophysiological phenomenon of LTP (long term potentiation) is considered by many to represent an adequate mechanism for acquiring or storing memories in the mammalian brain. In our target article, we reviewed the various arguments put forth in support of the LTP/memory hypothesis. We concluded that these arguments were inconsistent with the purported data base and proposed an alternative interpretation that we suggested was at least as compatible with the available data as the more widely held view. In doing so, we attempted to illustrate that the inadequacy of present experimental designs did not permit us to distinguish between equally viable hypotheses. In the four years since we wrote the first draft of our target article, hundreds of additional studies on LTP have been published and their results have been incorporated into current theories about memory. A diverse group of commentators responded to our target article with their own theories of how memories might be stored in the brain, some of which rely on LTP. Some commentators doubted whether memories can be stored through modifications of synaptic strength. Some assert that it will never be possible to understand the neural mechanisms of memory; still others remain hopeful that we will accomplish some semblance of a resolution, provided we appreciate LTP's role in a subset of seemingly amorphous memory systems. In summary, although it is commonly written that “LTP is a memory storage device,” the divergence of views among the commentators suggests, at least as strongly as our target article, that such conviction is unwarranted and fails to acknowledge both the lack of consensus regarding the role of LTP in memory and the complexity of the phenomenon of memory itself.

The GANE (glutamate amplifies noradrenergic effects) theory posits a mechanism for amplifying noradrenergic modulatory actions and enhancing the processing of high-priority sensory signals for immediate or future experience-guided action. This theoretical construct is thought provoking with respect to the central processing of high-priority versus low-priority stimuli, but it requires some refinement to account for physiological fluctuations in NE efflux as a function of naturally occurring transitions in behavioral state and the experimentally observed phenomena associated with noradrenergic regulation of sensory signal transfer.