In their competition for higher-status men, women with higher socioeconomic status use indirect forms of aggression (ridicule and gossip) to derogate lower-status female competitors and the men who date them. Women's greater tendency to excuse their aggression is arguably a cultural enhancement of an evolutionarily based sex difference and not solely a cultural construction imposed by patriarchy.

Something of the relation of my work on substance concepts to Gibsonian theories of perception–action is discussed. What historical relations tie a particular substance concept to a particular substance is discussed.

Some things in our environment are not what they seem, and they provide a challenge to theories of concepts that emphasize similarity. Section 1 of my commentary explores a dilemma this situation creates for Machery. Section 2 describes a more general problem for prototype and exemplar theories. Section 3 locates a place for similarity-based concepts, and indicates an alternative to Machery's thesis.

The empirical evidence for exploration underlying the appeal of imaginary worlds is mostly absent or contradictory. Openness, and the cognitive exploration it represents, provides a better account than the overall drive to explore predicted by evolutionary theory. Furthermore, exploration cannot explain why imaginary worlds foster frequent re-engagement.

Artificial intelligence (AI) shares many generalizability challenges with psychology. But the fields publish differently. AI publishes fast, through rapid preprint sharing and conference publications. Psychology publishes more slowly, but creates integrative reviews and meta-analyses. We discuss the complementary advantages of each strategy, and suggest that incorporating both types of strategies could lead to more generalizable research in both fields.

If connectionist computational models explain the acquisition of complex cognitive skills, errors in such models would also help explain unusual brain activity such as in creativity – as well as in mental illness, including childhood onset problems with social behaviors in autism, the inability to maintain focus in attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and the lack of motivation of depression disorders.

The recognition that contentful universals are rare and often “banal” does not undermine the fact that most non-universal but recurring patterns of language are amenable to explanation. These patterns are sensical or motivated solutions to interacting and often conflicting factors. As implied by the Evans & Levinson's (E&L's) article, linguistics would be well served to move beyond the essentialist bias that seeks universal, innate, unchanging categories with rigid boundaries.

The fearful ape hypothesis (FAH) presents an evolutionary-developmental framework stipulating that in the context of cooperative caregiving, unique to human great ape group life, heightened fearfulness was adaptive. This is because from early in human ontogeny fearfulness expressed and perceived enhanced care-based responding and cooperation with mothers and others. This response extends and refines the FAH by incorporating the commentaries' suggestions and additional lines of empirical work, providing a more comprehensive and nuanced version of the FAH. Specifically, it encourages and hopes to inspire cross-species and cross-cultural, longitudinal work elucidating evolutionary and developmental functions of fear in context. Beyond fear, it can be seen as a call for an evolutionary-developmental approach to affective science.

Arguments about the nature of teaching have depended principally on naturalistic observation and some experimental work. Additional measurement tools, and physiological variations and manipulations can provide insights on the intrinsic structure and state of the participants better than verbal descriptions alone: namely, time-series analysis, and examination of the role of hormones and neuromodulators on the behaviors of teacher and pupil.

The notion of proxy failure provides considerable insight into educational processes, and in childhood education has the potential to elucidate known problems stemming from the early implementation of overly regulated educational regimes. This commentary expands on play and how its relation to learning provides a useful perspective on how activities based on nongoal-oriented interactions can lead to desired outcomes.

The hypothesis that dreaming is involved in off-line memory processing is difficult to test because major methodological issues have to be addressed, such as dream recall and the effect of remembered dreams on memory. It would be fruitful – in addition to studying the ancient art of memory (AAOM) in a scanner – to study the dreams of persons who use AAOM regularly.

What Babies Know outlines a compelling case for why infancy research is fundamental for conceptualizing what it is to be human. There is another period in human development that is relatively inaccessible, yet is more important. In order to truly understand the nature of core knowledge, perception, and cognition, we must start not with the infant, but with the fetus.

Johnson et al. suggest that we rely on narratives to make choices under radical uncertainty. We argue that in its current version Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) does not account for embodied, direct sensorimotor influences on choices under radical uncertainty that may bypass narratives, particularly in highly time-constrained situations. We therefore suggest to extend CNT by an embodied choice perspective.

Drawing on interdisciplinary, feminist insights, we encourage social psychologists to embrace the active participation of marginalized groups in social disparities research. We explain (1) how the absence of marginalized groups' perspectives in research presents a serious challenge to understanding intergroup dynamics and concomitant disparities, and (2) how their inclusion could assuage some of social psychology's “fatal flaws.”

Veissière et al.'s proposal aims to explain how cognition enables cultural learning, but fails to acknowledge a distinctively human behavior critical to this process: communication. Recent advances in developmental and computational cognitive science suggest that the social-cognitive capacities central to TTOM also support sophisticated yet remarkably early-emerging inferences and communicative behaviors that allow us to learn and share abstract knowledge.

Atran & Norenzyan (A&N) claim that an appreciation of the evolved inferential machinery underlying supernatural beliefs can greatly aid us in understanding regularities in culturally shared conceptions of religion. I explore how their model provides insight into why culturally shared tales of horror (e.g., horror movies) often combine religious and predatory content.