Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) interesting and insightful article did not integrate several potentially useful notions from emotion theory and research into their explanatory framework. I propose that emotions are indigenous elements of mind and that children's understanding of them is fundamental to their understanding of the mental life of self and others, understandings critical to the development of social and emotional competence.

Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer (henceforth Levelt et al. 1999) propose a model of production incorporating a lemma stratum, which is concerned with the syntactic characteristics of lexical entries. We suggest that syntactic priming experiments provide evidence about how such syntactic information is represented, and that this evidence can be used to extend Levelt et al.'s model. Evidence from syntactic priming experiments also supports Levelt et al.'s conjecture that the lemma stratum is shared between the production and comprehension systems.

In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.

Although structural priming is often the most suitable paradigm, it sometimes misses effects that are detected by more sensitive acceptability-judgment tasks, thus yielding incorrect conclusions. For example, Branigan & Pickering's (B&P's) claim that “syntactic representations do not contain semantic information” (sect. 2.1, para. 2), while supported by structural-priming studies of the passive, is undermined by an acceptability-judgment study of this construction.

Language production and comprehension are intimately interrelated; and models of production and comprehension should, we argue, be constrained by common architectural guidelines. Levelt et al.'s target article adopts as guiding principle Ockham's razor: the best model of production is the simplest one. We recommend adoption of the same principle in comprehension, with consequent simplification of some well-known types of models.

The Distancing-Embracing model reserves a role for genre scripts in the hedonic valuation of negative emotion in art. Genre scripts, as defined in the target article, leave higher-level recipient intuitions out of scope. We argue that, in film genre scripts, lower-level stylistic features lend access to more complex conceptual knowledge, including pragmatic principles. The argument implies a consideration of the communicative dimension of aesthetic works, which could strengthen both factors of the Distancing-Embracing model.

Integration of different lines of research concerning grandparental investment appears to be both promising and necessary. However, it must stop short when confronted with incommensurate arguments and hypotheses, either within or between disciplines. Further, some hypotheses have less plausibility and veridicality than others. This point is illustrated with results that conflict previous conclusions from evolutionary psychology about differential grandparental investment.

Evolutionary theories of human cognition should refer to specific times in the primate or hominid past. Though alternative accounts of tool manufacture from Wynn's are possible (e.g., frontal lobe function), Wynn demonstrates the power of archaeology to guide cognitive theories. Many cognitive abilities evolved not in the “Pleistocene hunter-gatherer” context, but earlier, in the context of other patterns of social organization and foraging.

There are three independent properties of a mode of presentation (m.p.) of a number: being specific; being recognitional; and being canonical. A perceptual m.p. of the form that many Fs is specific although it is neither recognitional nor canonical. The literature has not distinguished noncanonical from nonspecific m.p.s of numbers. Ratios are fundamentally ratios of magnitudes.

The target article says surprisingly little about the possible role of shared circuits in language and communication. This commentary considers how they might contribute to linguistic communication, particularly during dialogue. We argue that shared circuits are used to promote alignment between linguistic representations at many levels and to support production-based emulation of linguistic input during comprehension.