The neural structures implicated in crying are reviewed, based on studies in animals. Brain regions involved include the anterior cingulate gyrus (a cortical structure), amygdala, thalamic tegmentum, periaqueductal gray of the midbrain, and the nucleus ambiguus of the caudal brainstem. It is hypothesized that the crying associated with colic may be a manifestation of differing developmental stages in the brain circuits involved.

Chaotic itinerancy is useful for illustrating transitions in attractor dynamics seen in the olfactory system. Cantor coding is a good model for information processing, but so far it lacks perceptual proof. The theories presented provide a large step toward bridging the use of chaos as an interpretive tool and hard examination of chaotic neural activity during perception.

A minority position is presented in which evidence will be cited from the Hobson, Solms, Revonsuo, and Nielsen target articles and from other sources, supporting major tenets of Freud's theory of dreaming. Support is described for Freud's view of dreams as meaningful, linked to basic motivations, differing qualitatively in mentation, and wish-fulfilling.

[Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Revonsuo; Solms]

Two of the premises of Pylyshyn's target article – surface reconstruction as the goal of early vision and inaccessibility of intermediate stages in the process presumably leading to such reconstruction – are questioned and found wanting.

Life history shaped language as, cascading in time, social strategies became more verbal. Although the insight is important, Locke & Bogin (L&B) also advocate a code model of language. Rejecting this input-output view, I emphasize the interpersonal dynamics of dialogue. From this perspective, childish minds as well as language could be derived from the selective advantages of a total interactional history.

Stepping away from a normocentric understanding of autism goes beyond questioning the supposed lack of social motivation of autistic people. It evokes subversion of the prevalence of intellectual disability even in non-verbal autism. It also challenges the perceived purposelessness of some restricted interests and repetitive behaviors, and instead interprets them as legitimate exploratory and learning-associated manifestations.

Negative feedback is an important mechanism whereby the organism maintains its balance in a complicated system. It may be regarded as a modern version of the ancient Eastern wisdom of Yin and Yang balance. Control of pain and analgesia, is no exception: CCK seems to serve as a built-in mechanism for the modulation of opioid analgesia system [dickenson].

According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. We argue that this isn't the paradigmatic form of rationalization. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.

Identifying objects as members of ontological domains activates category-specific processes. There is evidence that these processes include particular ways of “tracking” substances and could do all the “tracking” necessary for concept acquisition. There may be no functional need or evolutionary scenario for a general tracking capacity of the kind described by Millikan.

In active agents, sensory and motor processes form an inevitable bond. This wedding is particularly striking for saccadic eye movements – the prime target of Shadmehr and Ahmed's thesis – which impose frequent changes on the retinal image. Changes in movement vigor (latency and speed), therefore, will need to be accompanied by changes in visual and attentional processes. We argue that the mechanisms that control movement vigor may also enable vision to attune to changes in movement kinematics.

Rose erroneously believes that the sciences of human behavior are being swept with a wave of genetic determinism. Actually, sociologists and psychologists remain predominantly hostile to any genetic influence on behavior. They will love Rose. The few behavior geneticists and sociobiologists in these disciplines are marginalized and looking for a little respect. Rose impugns their motives and ridicules their science.

Data from archaeology and paleoanthropology directly challenge the validity of the basic assumptions of the CLASH model. By not incorporating a “deep time” perspective, the hypothesis lacks the evolutionary baseline the authors seek to infer in validating the model.

Boyer & Petersen (B&P) argue that folk-economic beliefs are widespread – shaped by evolved cognitive systems – and they offer exemplar beliefs to illustrate their thesis. In this commentary, we highlight evidence of substantial variation in one of these exemplars: beliefs about immigration. Contra claims by B&P, we argue that the balance of this evidence suggests the “folk” may actually hold positive beliefs about the economic impact of immigration.

I urge return by the lights of logic and commonsense to a dialectical tabula rasa – according to which: (1) consciousness, in the ordinary pre-analytic sense of the term, is identified with P-consciousness, and “A-consciousness” is supplanted by suitably configured terms from its Blockian definition; (2) the supposedly fallacious Searlean argument for the view that a function of P-consciousness is to allow flexible and creative cognition is enthymematic and, when charitably specified, quite formidable.