The usefulness of effect-size differs in utilitarian experiments from its use in theory corroborations. Chow introduces the question of the relationship of effect-size to practical validity and the role of the assessment of “importance” in this. This review develops this question and suggests the actuarial table as a replacement for effect-size in practical decision-making.

Comparisons between modally and amodally completed regions show that perceptual filling-in is not merely the ignoring of absences. Illusory filled-in colour arises for modal completion, but not for amodal completion in comparable displays. We find that attention spreads automatically to modally but not amodally completed regions from their inducers, revealing a functional effect of filled-in colour.

Corballis's explanation for right-handedness in humans relies heavily on the gestural protolanguage hypothesis, which he argues for by a series of “intuition pumps.” Scrutinizing the mirror system hypothesis and modern gesture as components of the argument, we find that they do not provide the desired evidence of a gestural precursor to speech.

Considerable progress has been made toward understanding the involvement of recoverin in a cancer-associated retinopathy (CAR) that results in blindness. We describe the expression of recoverin in tumors of individuals afflicted with CAR, characterize the immunological response towards recoverin in these patients, and demonstrate how the disease can be induced in rodents using recoverin as an immunogen.

Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) model is not entirely supported by common patterns of affect behaviors among people who live under varying climatic conditions and among people who endorse varying levels of (Western) religiosity and conservative political ideals. The authors' model is also unable to account for intra-regional heterogeneity in assortative sociality, which, we argue, can be better explained by a framework that emphasizes the differential expression of fundamental social cues for maintaining distinct social network structures.

The question that we deal with in this commentary is the need to clarify the synergistic role of different non–rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep stages (stages 2 and 3–4) with REM and while awake in elaborative encoding of episodic memory. If the assumption is that there is isomorphism between neuronal and cognitive networks, then more detailed analysis of NREM sleep and dreams is absolutely necessary.

We examined the CLASH model using the data on climate and violence from the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation is a huge country with dramatic climatic differences between regions. Our results are absolutely inconsistent with the model. We consider there are a range of climates in which the human organism functions optimally. Deviations from the range cause impulsiveness and aggression.

We argue that existing data on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) present challenges to Boyer & Petersen's model. Specifically, the widespread individual variation in endorsement of FEBs casts doubt on the claim that humans are evolutionarily predisposed towards particular economic beliefs. Additionally, the authors' model cannot account for the systematic covariance between certain FEBs, such as those observed in distinct political ideologies.

Several claims made by Wilkins & Wakefield require qualification. First, the proposed delineation of the parietal-occipital-temporal junction (POT) is overly restrictive. Second, focusing exclusively on the evolutionary importance of manual manipulation oversimplifies interacting evolutionary preconditions for language. Finally, Wilkins and Wakefield's perspective adheres to a homocentric, formal, linguistic definition of language instead of viewing language as a multimodal sensory enhancement system unique to each species.

We review two subjective (mis)perceptions that influence revenge and forgiveness systems. Individual differences predict more (e.g., narcissism) or less (e.g., empathy) revenge, with the opposite pattern for forgiveness. Moreover, differences in victim versus perpetrator perceptions can influence revenge and forgiveness systems, perpetuating never-ending cycles of revenge. These two examples point to the need for theories of revenge and forgiveness to address the role of cognitive and motivational biases in the functionality of such behavioral responses.