Clahsen has presented an impressive range of psycholinguistic data from German regular and irregular inflection to support the view that lexical memory and the combinatorial operations of grammar are subserved by distinct mental mechanisms. Most of the data are convincing and important. I particularly applaud Clahsen's effort to extend this lexical/grammatical dichotomy from mind to brain. Here I discuss some problems with the evidence presented by Clahsen in support of a neural lexical/grammatical dichotomy, and offer some additional evidence to reinforce this neural distinction.

Embedding theories of language production and comprehension in theories of action-perception is realistic and highlights that production and comprehension processes are interleaved. However, layers of internal models that repeatedly predict future linguistic actions and perceptions are implausible. I sketch an ecological alternative whereby perceiver/actors are modeled as dynamical systems coupled to one another and to the environment.

Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky (D&M-S) do not address how a reward system accommodates the motivational dilemmas associated with (a) the decision to approach versus avoid conspecifics, and (b) self versus other tradeoffs inherent in behaving altruistically toward bonded relationship partners. We provide an alternative evolutionary view that addresses motivational conflict, and discuss implications for the neurobiological study of affiliative bonds.

Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) posit two systems – the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system – and suggest that they explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. We suggest there is no contradiction. Something does, however, require explanation: the tension between certain sophisticated beliefs about time, and certain phenomenological states or beliefs about those phenomenological states. The temporal updating mechanism posited by H&M may contribute to this tension.

Self-reported opinions and judgments may be more rooted in expressive biases than in cognitive processing biases, and ultimately operate within a broader behavioral style for advertising the capacity – versus the trustworthiness – dimension of human reciprocity potential. Our analyses of facial expression judgments of likely voters are consistent with this thesis, and directly contradict one major prediction from the authors' “negativity-bias” model.

Guala does not go far enough in his critique of the assumption that human decisions about sharing made in the context of experimental game conditions accurately reflect decision-making under real conditions. Sharing of hunted animals is constrained by cultural rules and is not “spontaneous cooperation” as assumed in models of weak and strong reciprocity. Missing in these models is the cultural basis of sharing that makes it a group property rather than an individual one.

Activity-dependent processes play an active role in shaping the structure of neuronal circuitry and therefore contribute to neural and cognitive development. Neural constructivism claims to be able to account for increases in the complexity of cognitive representations in terms of directed growth of neurons. This claim is overstated, rests on biased nterpretations of the evidence, and is based on serious misapprehensions of the nature of somatic variation and selection.

Our past work linking motivation and morality provides a basis for understanding differences in political ideology and positions across the political spectrum. Conservatism is rooted in avoidance-based proscriptive morality, whereas liberalism is rooted in approach-based prescriptive morality. Two distinct, binding, group moralities reflect these different regulatory systems and emphasize social coordination through Social Order versus social cooperation through Social Justice.

Reading speed matters in most real-world contexts, and it is a robust and easy aspect of reading to measure. Theories of reading should account for speed.

Unfortunately, reading Chow's work is likely to leave the reader more confused than enlightened. My preferred solutions to the “controversy” about null- hypothesis testing are: (1) recognize that we really want to test the hypothesis that an effect is “small,” not null, and (2) use Bayesian methods, which are much more in keeping with the way humans naturally think than are classical statistical methods.

Krueger & Funder (K&F) make the familiar accusation that social psychologists focus too much on what people do wrong, rather than on what they do right. Although there is some truth to their charge, their accusations are overstated and their conclusions are incorrect. The field is far less problem-focused than they suggest, and the proposed consequences of this approach are more imagined than real.

Comparative studies demonstrate that homologous neural structures differ in function and that neural mechanisms underlying behavior evolved independently. A neural structure does not serve a particular function so much as it executes an algorithm on its inputs though its dynamics. Neural dynamics are altered by a neuromodulation, and species-differences in neuromodulation can account for behavioral differences.

An embodied movement-planning field cannot account for behavior and cognition more abstract than that of reaching. Instead, we propose an affordance field, and we sketch how it could enhance the analysis of the A-not-B error, underlie cognition, and serve as a base for language. Admittedly, a dynamic systems account of an affordance field awaits significant further development.

I discuss Fitch & Denenberg's argument that no correction for brain size is needed when assessing callosal size. Morphometric criteria may not be sufficient to determine whether corrections are needed. Functional studies of callosal transfer will ultimately specify whether corrections for size are necessary in each case.

goldstein (1948) reported multiple cases of failure to categorise colours in patients that he termed amnesic or anomic aphasics. these patients have a particular difficulty in producing perceptual categories in the absence of other aphasic impairments. we hold that neuropsychological evidence supports the view that the task of colour categorisation is logically impossible without labels.