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This chapter draws on the analysis in the preceding two chapters, and puts forward the hypothesis that the important case of William Brands’ Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co is a decision of the House of Lords within its equitable jurisdiction, and not its common law jurisdiction, as is usually assumed to be the case.
This chapter explains how, by combining the trust with the ‘agency’ effects described in the previous chapters, the difficulties of each doctrine, operating in isolation, are overcome, In particular, this chapter explains how, through combination, the agency aspect of equtiable assignment becomes irrevocable; how the usual rule of agency that an agent may not sub-delegate is reversed; how substantial damages may be recovered by the assignee in right of the assignor;and how double liability of the assignor may be avoided, in part, through legislative intervention in the form of Common Law Procedure Act 1854, section 83.;
This chapter explores a number of misconceptions which have obscured understanding of the law on equitable assignment. In particular, it shows that the perception that an equitable assignment of an equtiable chose in action leads to the ‘dropping out’ of the equitable assignor because such assignor retains ‘no interest whatsoever’ following the assignment misundestands the caselaw.
This chapter examines how certain other forms of intangible assets, namely: patents, copyright, registered trade marks; and the benefit arising under a policy of life assurance, or a marine policy, may be dealt with by means of statutes specifically tailored for such assets. It compares the operation of such statutes to the operation of Law of Property Agt 1925, section 136(1).
The practical importance of intangible personalty such as debt, bonds, equities, futures, derivatives and other financial instruments has never been greater than it is today. The same may be said of interests in intellectual property. Yet the assignment of these intangible assets from one to another remains difficult to understand. Assignments are often taken to operate as a form of transfer akin to conveyances of legal titles to tangible personalty. However, this conception does not accurately reflect the law of assignment as it has developed in the caselaw in England and Wales. This book sets out a different model of the workings of assignments as a matter of English law, one that provides an analytical, yet historically sensitive, framework which allows us to better understand how, and why, assignments work in the way the cases tell us they do.
It provides an early overview of the cases where the use of smart contracts may prove significantly beneficial in B2C transactions. It focuses on the capacity of smart contracts to mitigate some of the well-known problems affecting B2C and B2B relationships. The adoption of regulatory sandboxes in the rail and air sectors will be described as a first testing ground to assess the potential of smart contracts.
Chapter 14 defines the term algorithmic contract, distinguishing it from the term smart contract, and justifying the need for the term. Then, it argues that business-to-consumer algorithmic contracts present distinct issues from business-to-business algorithmic contracts. In particular, Chapter 14 argues that privacy is the canary in the coalmine with respect to the potential threat to civil liberties presented by personalized law by way of pseudo-contract regime. Without any deliberate choice on the part of consumers or change in attitudes, contracts and practices have severely eroded consumer privacy over the past two decades. Thus, privacy terms provide an ideal case study to examine what limits on the ability of consumers to contract with businesses using algorithms to determine customized terms might look like. Personalized law, in the absence of proper fiduciary incentives or default rules, could be a major threat to the civil liberties necessary for a liberal society.
The public debate about smart contracts, meant as self-help remedies grounded on distributed ledger technology, is filled with alarms and high expectations. They have been praised by the tech community as infallible software able to carry out the whole contractual cycle, from formation to enforcement. Conversely, several legal scholars have raised concerns regarding both smart contracts’ inability to reflect relational aspects of contract governance and the augmented complexity generated by the translation of an agreement into computer code. The chapter focuses the discussion on the potential areas which could effectively benefit from implementation of smart contracts. Firstly, it argues that smart contracts might be a viable tool to tackle effectively consumers’ inertia in triggering and enforcing their rights which are standardized and easily verifiable. Secondly, smart contracts have the potential to foster commercial relationships by lowering down transaction costs arising from lack of trust between merchants. Thus, smart contracts are likely to provide better alternatives to traditional tools of business practice, such as letters of credit and escrow agreements.
The chapter focuses, in the area of property and security rights, on the interface between the virtual and transnational dimension of transactions on the blockchain on one hand and the “real” world of compulsory and public policy rules applying on a given territory and on given property on the other. The author takes the perspective of a continental lawyer analyzing the validity of transactions, the validity and integrity of the property title electronically created and transferred. In doing so, he relies not only on the traditional legal tools but also on the most recent legislative initiatives, especially in France, introducing a legal framework encompassing new ways of transferring property (based on blockchain technologies) and new titles (e.g., tokens in the context of initial coin offerings). Through this analysis, the core issue is to determine whether these new transactions and these new property titles can be effective, in a national and international context. The author raises questions and concerns about the actual legal uncertainty and the best (local and global) regulatory responses to the technological challenges.