This chapter explains how voluntarily assumed obligations arising at common law, and also in equity, may not be unilaterally changed by the obligor thereto without the prior assent of the obligee. Wesley Hohfeld's jural relations of claim-right/duty; power/liability; privilege/no-right; and immunity/disability are employed to demonstrate that the identity of an obligee to an obligation (‘to whom’ the obligation is owed), is just as much a part of the specificatin of the obligation as, say, the specification as to ‘what’ is to be performed.

This chpater explains how the so-called ‘rule’ in Dearle v. Hall is not a special rule devised in connection with equitable assigments, but us actually the working-out the general rule of priority in equity, that qui prior est tempore potior est jure (‘he who is first in time has the better right’) in light of the Golden Rule, that one should do as one would wish to be done by. This chapter reveals that it is the giving of notice of assignment which is key, so as to bring an assignee within the Golden Rule, thereby potentially putting such assignee in a position of a better equity as compared with an assignee who had not acted in accordance with the Golden Rule.

This chapter explains in detail how the doctrine of estoppel by res judicata operates in conjunction with equitable assignments of equitable choses in action so as to lead to the result that joinder of the assignor in such proceedings is not absolutely necessry, though it may be prudent and advisable to do so. It explains the difference between the recognition of a doctrine, and its enforcement. In particular, it highlights how, since an equitable assignment is an equitable doctrine, a court acting within its equitable jurisdiction would not only recognise its operation, but would also be in a position to grant equitabel remedies to enforce the entitements arising by reason of such equitable doctrine.

This chapter summarises the principal argument of the book, that equitable assignment is a sui generis institution developed by the courts of Equity, and which has two principal effects. One, a ‘trust’ effect, and the other, an unusual ‘agency’ effect. This chapter also briefly explains Wesley Hohfeld'seight fundamental jural relations which will be applied in the analysis of the law in the following chapters.

This chapter explains how the courts of common law, by way of contrast to the courts of equity, were only in a position to recognise equitable doctrines such as equitable assignment. However,they were unable to give effect to such doctrines: they could not (and still may not) grant common law remedies to enforce such equitable entitlements. This resulted in a potential problem of proceedings being brought at common law, as well as in equity. Consequently, to forestall such problems, joinder of the assignor of a common law chose even when proceedings were brought in equity became the norm.

Receipt of notice of assignment alerts the obligee to the equtiable duties as are owed by the assignor to her assignee, In addition to the substantive liability which may arise should the obligor dishonestly assist the assignor in breaching her duties to her assignee (as discussed in the previous chpater), this chapter will explian further procedural effects as may arise from such notice, and will show how these procedural effects lie at the hart of the proposition that an assignee always takes ‘subject to equities', but such equities will stop running against the assignoee once the the obligor becomes aware of the assignment.

This chapter explores the two main conceptions of equtiable assignment as are currently found in the academic discourse, namely, a ‘substitutive transfer’ model, and a ‘partial trust’ model. The former denies that an equitable assignment operates by way of a trust, at all. The latter, however, admits taht where a legal chose in action is equtably assigned, some form of trustee-beneficiary relationship arises between the assignor and her assignee. But it denies that this arises when an equtiable chose in action is equitably assigned. The ‘partial trust’ model therefore takes equitable assignment to be a fragemented doctrrine which works differently, depending on whether the chose that is to be assigned is a common law chose, or one which arises in equity. This chapter then shows how each of these models are deficient, before showing how a composite model of equitable assignment would avoid these deficiencies.

This chapter explains how ‘statutory’ assignment under the Law of Property 1925, section 136(1) operates. It subjects the section to close scrutiny, and identifies that the statute operates by supplementing the effects as would otherwise arise by way of an equitable assignment.

This chapter sets out the scope and principal claims of the book. It also introduces the major competing conceptions of assignment as are applied outside of Engand and Wales, briefly noting the differences in approach taken in Scotland, some major European jurisdictions, and also in the United States.

This chapter sets out a number of practical implications from the analysis in the preceding chapters. It explains how, on the model of equitable and statutory assignment set out in this book, anti-assignment clauses may have a limited effect even in connection with equitable assignments. It also explains how the ‘rule’ in Dearle v. Hall may still berelevant when a chose in action has been assigned in accordance with the requirements of Law of Property Act 1925, section 136(1). Third, it shows that the English position that it is still possible to make a parol gift of a presently existing legal chose in action is dictated by the limited operation of the Law of Property Act 1925, section 136(1). Fourth, it explains how it is possible to assign parts of a chose in action, whether such chose be one arising at common law, or even in equity. Fifth, this chapter explains how equitable defences such as laches and ‘clean hands’ may have a wider role to play in connection with equtiable assignments than is usually assumed. Finally, this chapter points out that payments to an assignor of the benefit of a common law debt will not attract restitutionary liability.

This chapter deals with the effect of an obligor's knowledge that the chose in action to which his obligation pertains has been equitably assigned. It shows that such knowledge is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient to generate a form of equitable liability as between the obligor and the assignee should the obligor breach his equitable duty to the assignee not to dishonestly assist the assignor ib breach her duties to her assignee.