All animal species seem to have some sort of communication system that is (largely or completely) innate. What is the nature of such systems? We will only have space to look at a few examples, which will show that some species use very complex systems. We can then ask, assuming that the human language capacity consists of several cognitive submodules, whether it is the case that some of those modules are shared with the innate communication capacities of other species. As we have seen, in recent years Chomsky has argued that the language capacity that is uniquely human (being specific to the domain of language) is the ability to form recursive structure. This has led to research to find out whether other animal species can also “handle” recursive patterns either in their communication systems or in other cognitive systems.

In this chapter we enter the field of neuroscience, the study of the structure and workings of the brain. We will focus on the issue of locating brain areas that are activated when people engage in specific activities, especially those that relate to language, which includes producing and perceiving language utterances. We will briefly discuss some methods for the localization of brain functions that were established before modern neuroimaging techniques became available. We discuss instrumental techniques that can be used today to establish which parts of the brain do what. We then review some of the results in modern neurolinguistic work which has revealed very specific brain areas for very specific language functions.

People have always been fascinated by “talking animals.” Dr Dolittle could understand the “languages” of animals, but what if they could use our language? Can they? This chapter reviews various attempts to teach human language, or something close to it, to other animals. Bottom line: They can’t do it. (But we can’t do their “languages” either!)

The idea of sound symbolism as “an inmost, natural similarity association between sound and meaning” (Jakobson and Waugh 2002: 182) in onomatopoeia and, more broadly, in ideophones has a long tradition. This chapter maps different views of the role of sound symbolism in onomatopoeia and provides an overview of phonesthemes as manifested in onomatopoeias in the examined sample of the world’s languages. The objective is (i) to identify cross-linguistic similarities in the use of phonesthemes to arrive at a universally system applicable to onomatopoeia and (ii) to identify language-specific phonesthemes. Based on these findings, the classical onomasiological model of word-formation is modified to show the actual role of phonesthemes in onomatopoeia-formation. The results contribute to the discussion on the significance and extent of sound symbolism in onomatopoeia.

This chapter introduces the field and the scope of research and the fundamental terminology. The basic objective of this monograph is primary onomatopoeia defined as imagic icons of the signified objects; prototypically, they are underived and uninflected monemes. The Introduction maps the state of the art in onomatopoeia research, mainly based on a questionnaire-based survey among language experts covering 124 languages of the world. It accounts for the method of language sampling. Since data collection can be significantly affected by the status of the sample languages, this section also provides their classification according to the Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale. This chapter also provides an overview of resources available for research in this field with a focus on the availability of dictionaries and corpora that identify the class of onomatopoeia. Significant attention is given to the categorization of sounds, an aspect often overlooked in onomatopoeia studies. This categorization is crucial for mapping the sound sources and sound events that onomatopoeias represent across the sampled languages.

In this chapter, I will provide a brief outline of the structure of the mental grammar, referring for a more extensive treatment to ML, Chapter 6. This chapter then offers a conversation about what Noam Chomsky considers to be the most central linguistic argument for his Innateness Hypothesis (IH), the poverty of the stimulus argument. We then discuss some different ways in which the mental grammar could be organized. Finally, I will raise questions about what kinds of evidence could falsify the IH and whether such evidence can actually be found. In this connection, we will also ask how rich the alleged innate system needs to be.

The question “where does language come from?” has fascinated people for as long as we know. While all sorts of answers have been proposed, ranging from an appeal to divine intervention to “by chance,” there is currently a trend to approach this difficult question using circumstantial evidence from many different disciplines. While no agreement is in sight, advances have been made, in part because scientists are now able to ask better, more specific questions due to the fact that linguists have made a lot of progress in their detailed understanding of language structure and the way in which languages can change over time.