Chapter 7 analyzes misinformation and conspiracy theories as contemporary examples of fake news. These include the “death panels” controversy, the Obama “birther” conspiracy, Pizzagate, QAnon, and Covid-19–related myths and conspiracies. Not all conspiracy theories originate from the American right, although this chapter documents how the highest profile ones are embraced by right-wing media and the Republican Party. These conspiracies rise to prominence after being indulged by Republican officials, right-wing media outlets, and in social media. Social media increasingly serve as prime disseminators of reactionary conspiracies. I also examine how traditional “agenda setting” news media have held the line against these conspiracies, with consumption of these venues associated with increased rejection of the conspiracies. In contrast, social media consumption – in general and particularly for Republican Americans – is regularly associated with embrace of conspiracies. This rising culture of conspiratorialism has reached crisis levels with movements like QAnon, and with the Covid-19 pandemic and the failure of millions of Americans to take the crisis seriously or think about it in factual ways. In an era when traditional media gatekeepers are being pushed aside in favor of social media venues, people curate their own information and construct echo chambers, allowing conspiracy theories free reign.

Chapter 3 documents how the meaning of fake news changes over time. I look at how fake news was understood during the 2000s and 2010s – prior to the Trump era – in the New York Times. I discuss how fake news was primarily understood in three ways – related to fabricated stories passed off as real news events, as entertainment content pertaining to current events, and as government propaganda masquerading as journalism. Further, the US media’s understanding of fake news has shifted over the years. My analysis of the New York Times’ coverage of fake news in the 2010s finds that the paper defined the concept in many ways, compared to Trump’s various definitions, with little overlap between the paper and the former president. Editorially, the paper emphasizes conventional definitions of fake news that avoid understanding it as a form of propaganda operating in service of governmental interests. I examine various competing definitions of fake news in other media venues, providing evidence that the social construction of fake news is a contested phenomenon. I examine US partisan cable media, alternative left- and right-wing media, and social media venues – each of which puts forward its own interpretations of what fake news means.

Chapter 4 analyzes public opinion surveys to understand how Americans define fake news. I show that concern with fake news is pervasive among Americans, despite a majority who struggle to define what it means. I identify various ways that the phenomenon of fake news is contested by Americans, with at least nine different definitions for the concept being embraced by large segments of the public. I examine where concerns with fake news are likely to originate, identifying statistical predictors of public concern with the phenomenon. Such concerns are more likely to be expressed by privileged sociodemographic groups, heavier media consumers, and those with high levels of media distrust – the last factor itself appearing to be a function of right-wing partisan and ideological socialization. I examine Americans’ thoughts about how to best combat fake news. I focus on various definitions of fake news that I argue are the most practically significant out of the nine identified in the chapter – those related to reporters’ overreliance on official (corporate and governmental) sources in producing the news, partisan biases in the news, and the rise of conspiracy content in media sources.

After summarizing the findings from the book, I discuss steps for how Americans can tackle the challenge of fake news. These include promoting more effective civic education and information literacy, guiding Americans in recognizing the value of empirical evidence and reasoning, identifying the value of reliable informational and news sources, and assessing potential governmental actions for combating rising misinformation. Mass disinformation and misinformation do not have to be facts of life in contemporary society, and there are steps that Americans can take to combat them.

Chapter 5 analyzes two cases of fake news as disinformation – the 2003 Iraq war and climate change. I look at how political and economic actors manipulate the news media to promote disinformation, in the process “manufacturing consent” for the public. With Iraq, I document the initial success of the Bush administration in selling the US invasion, producing growing support for the war, with the news-consuming public based on notions that Iraq possessed WMDs and ties to terrorism. Support for war declined over time, as the public was increasingly sensitized to rising casualties and the financial cost of the war, after the United States failed to find WMDs, and as the war was increasingly seen as unwinnable and immoral. I also examine how the fossil fuel industry utilized “false balancing” as a news management technique for encouraging mass confusion related to climate change, pitting climate-change skeptics against individuals recognizing planetary warming. Examining “climategate” and cap-and-trade legislation in the late 2000s, I show how reactionary narratives dominated the news, driving increased public opposition to efforts to address climate change. Public opposition receded by the mid-to-late 2010s as extreme weather and a warming planet undermined efforts to foster mass ignorance.

Chapter 6 examines two case studies from the Trump years involving allegations of “fake news” – Russiagate and Ukrainegate. I review the historical timelines of each case study, documenting the allegations made against Trump. With the social construction of reality, the way presidential scandals are reported is integral to reinforcing or contesting Americans’ beliefs regarding perceptions of a given scandal. With Russiagate, the president’s critics speculated with worst-case scenarios about collusion with Russia, and much of the media coverage of the controversy was heavily critical of Trump, despite right-wing media downplaying the notion that a scandal occurred. Regarding concerns with fake news, I document how critical reporting on Russiagate had significant consequences in terms of cultivating increased suspicion of a sitting president. For Ukrainegate, I document how the president engaged in an abuse of power, and that critical reporting recognized this abuse, thereby undermining Trump’s claim that reporting on the scandal was “fake news.” Critical reporting was associated with increased suspicion of the president among heavier media consumers. Finally, I document the role of social media in impacting how people think about scandals of the Trump era, with evidence of a balkanization–“echo chamber” effect between Democratic and Republican users.

The introduction provides an overarching discussion of the main contributions of the book. It reviews the main argument of the book, that the meaning of social construction theory varies dramatically depending on the sociopolitical context within which one engages, as related to partisanship, media consumption, socialization, and other factors. The book consists of two parts, the first exploring what fake news means to different groups of Americans, as related to Donald Trump’s rhetoric, media coverage and discourses on fake news, and public opinion of fake news. The second part of the book includes case studies of how fake news is discussed and understood in various contexts, related to US foreign policy, climate change, and conspiracy theories.