The latter years of Spain’s neutrality during the war (1759–62) saw an even greater deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. Ministers from both Courts attempted to preserve and salvage Spanish neutrality, but unresolved diplomatic grievances, as well as the deaths of both the Spanish king, Ferdinand VI, and the British monarch, George II, foiled their efforts and any gains made by the case of the San Juan Baptista. The increasing decay and eventual breakdown of Anglo-Spanish relations during the war demonstrate that the tactics used to ensure Dutch neutrality could not so easily be transferred to maintain Spanish neutrality. This chapter begins with the appellate case of the Jesús, Maria, y José and a close look at the legal arguments presented for both the Spanish shipowners and the British privateers who took the ship as prize. The proceedings of the court are analysed alongside the political developments between the Spanish and British ministries, and illustrate how they influenced one another. The case demonstrates Hardwicke’s continued attempts to make legal arguments that would set the Rule of the War of 1756 as the standard rule for how Britain’s prize court system would judge the legality of enemy goods carried in neutral ships.

The cases of the Maria Theresa and the America were designed, by Hardwicke, Holderness, and Newcastle, to instil confidence in the Dutch government that the Court of Prize Appeal would safeguard the Dutch neutral rights that had been agreed throughout the first part of the war. They were also designed to instil confidence in British privateers and naval captains and ensure that French colonial trade carried in neutral ships could still largely be stopped and condemned as legal prize. This chapter focuses on the two appellate cases and the legal arguments presented. These are then tied to the legal and strategic maritime thinking of Lord Hardwicke and his creation of the Rule of the War of 1756. This rule became the bedrock for how Britain would understand and negotiate neutral rights over the course of the next major European maritime wars. The basic premise of the rule was that trade that was prohibited to a neutral during times of peace would be considered by the British prize court system to be prohibited in times of war. The chapter, through an analysis of Dutch cases in the Court of Prize Appeal, examines how and why Hardwicke developed this rule.

This chapter provides a contextual overview of the development and operation of the British prize court system. It then introduces the specific legal rules and precedents, specifically the Rule of the War of 1756, that were developed by Britain during the Seven Years’ War in the pursuit of negotiating neutral rights to Britain’s strategic advantage. The chapter critiques the historiography on the Rule of the War of 1756 and makes the argument that the development of the rule and its influence in subsequent wars can only be understood if its strategic drivers are taken into account. The Rule, in other words, was as much a creation of strategic thinking as it was of legal thinking.

This chapter delves into Anglo-Dutch relations and negotiations in the period before the Seven Years’ War and during the war itself. It provides the background for the first two Dutch cases to come before the Court of Prize Appeal, that of the Maria Theresa and the America. The main thrust of the chapter is that, in order to understand Anglo-Dutch relations during the war, it is important to examine the interpersonal relationships between the members of the British government, the government’s relationships with the representatives of the Dutch Republic, the government’s relationships with the privateers who helped carry out commerce predation, and the government’s relationship with the Court of Prize Appeal. Through an examination of these interpersonal relations, the chapter argues that they were critical to the successes and failures of Anglo-Dutch negotiations over neutrality and critical to being able to influence decisions taken by the Court of Prize Appeal.

The Conclusion delves into the strategic and legal legacies of the Seven Years’ War. It ties the Seven Years’ War and the unresolved tensions around maritime neutrality to the outbreak of Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-Spanish hostilities during the American War of Independence. It does so by examining the peace treaty of 1763 wherein no new significant arrangements were made about neutral rights between the Spanish and the British. The argument is made that the ambiguity of existing treaties left both governments room to continue negotiations whilst the Rule of the War of 1756 would provide an understanding of how British prize courts would treat neutral ships in future conflicts. The chapter examines the legacy of the Court of Prize Appeal and the thinking behind the rule. It discusses how the court and the rule were used in subsequent conflicts through the Napoleonic Wars and the role that individual judges took in making the rule a critical or underplayed element of British maritime strategic thinking. The rule loomed large in British maritime law for many wars after Hardwicke created it and it is, perhaps, one of the best illustrations of the link between law, sea power, and strategic thinking.

This chapter focuses on the court cases of the Dutch ships the Maria Theresa and the America. It analyses the legal arguments behind the condemnation of each ship as legal prize and how these arguments are connected to, and differ from, Anglo-Dutch negotiations over neutral rights and the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1674. The chapter demonstrates that the Anglo-Dutch negotiations at the governmental level were led by four key British figures: William Pitt, Lord Holdernesse, the Duke of Newcastle, and Lord Hardwicke. Their connections with their Dutch counterparts were largely managed through Joseph Yorke who was the British representative to the Dutch Republic. These negotiations were driven by maritime strategic considerations. In contrast, early decisions taken in the High Court of Admiralty created friction between the Dutch and British governments. The Dutch believed that the condemnation of their ships was arbitrary and an abuse of Dutch neutral rights. The chapter reveals that in order to resolve this tension, the British government determined to encourage the Dutch to appeal the decisions from the High Court of Admiralty and promised that the cases would be fairly determined in the Court of Prize Appeal where decisions could be influenced and shaped by Lord Hardwicke.

As the cases of the Jesús, Maria, y José and the San Juan Baptista made their way through the High Court of Admiralty, the arguments that would eventually be laid before the Court of Prize Appeal took shape. This chapter examines the arguments made in each case and how they affected Anglo-Spanish negotiations over neutrality. The chapter also focuses on the debates between British and Spanish ministers about the meaning and interpretation of the Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1667 which governed Spanish neutral rights. It introduces two key people in Anglo-Spanish negotiations, Felix D’Abreu (Spanish representative in London) and Sir Benjamin Keene (British ambassador to Spain). Both men would be instrumental in shaping the debates on Spanish neutral rights and whether those rights could be protected through decisions handed down by the Court of Prize Appeal.

Perception, habit, and innate coping mechanisms are important features of military morale. Soldiers during the Great War relied, like anybody, on the information available to them as they made sense of their experiences. Their sensemaking was constrained by what they could see, what they could hear, and what they were told. Subtler influences also informed how they navigated the world, and these were often drawn from their cultural and social context, not to mention their surroundings. In this way, morale was nurtured (and sometimes destroyed) at the confluence of men’s physical world, their social groups, and their psychologies. Some of the components of morale morphed as time passed, but military morale rested, to a great extent, on the ability of individuals to cope with great stresses and unimaginable horrors. The army provided them with many of the tools, resources, and mechanisms that helped them to do so but, significantly, it appears that so long as victorious peace appeared likely (and necessary) men were willing to confront crisis, both acute and chronic. Of course, individuals had their breaking points, but resilience and endurance were the norm. Whilst this narrative hinges on the power of the human spirit, there were features of English infantrymen’s morale that were unique to them: their very specific local identities and patriotism, and their lack of a explicit political identity, which was a key feature of their sensemaking. English infantrymen’s perception of military service was not interwoven with their sense of citizenship. These parochial patriotisms were potentially less vulnerable to change than more pronounced political identities.

The prologue begins with the illustrative example of a single soldier whose attempts to rationalise the war in letters to his son reflect the broader themes of the book. This man’s child, Bentley Bridgewater, donated a sequence of letters written to him by his father to the National Army Museum. In these, the reader is confronted by a man looking to maintain his relationship with his distant son whilst also crafting a meaningful narrative around his war experiences. In short, it helps to expose the ways in which men sought to create or imagine agency. The preface moves on to explicate the central importance of narrative (and agency) in human cognition and sensemaking, exploring its role in psychology but also in its broader historical context.