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During the First World War, 198 Australians became prisoners of the Ottomans. Overshadowed by the grief and hardship that characterised the post-war period, and by the enduring myth of the fighting Anzac, these POWs have long been neglected in the national memory of the war. Captive Anzacs explores how the prisoners felt about their capture and how they dealt with the physical and psychological strain of imprisonment, as well as the legacy of their time as POWs. More broadly, it explores public perceptions of the prisoners, the effects of their captivity on their families, and how military, government and charitable organisations responded to the POWs both during and after the War. Intertwining rich detail from letters, diaries and other personal papers with official records, Kate Ariotti offers a comprehensive, nuanced account of this aspect of Australian war history.
This is the story of the highest battlefield of World War Two, which brings to life the extremes endured during this harsh mountain warfare. When the German war machine began faltering from a shortage of oil after the failed Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht launched Operation Edelweiss in the summer of 1942, a bold attempt to capture the Soviet oilfields of Grozny and Baku and open the way to securing the vast reserves of Middle Eastern oil. Hitler viewed this campaign as the key to victory in World War Two. Mountain warfare requires unique skills: climbing and survival techniques, unconventional logistical and medical arrangements and knowledge of ballistics at high altitudes. The Main Caucasus Ridge became the battleground that saw the elite German mountain divisions clash with the untrained soldiers of the Red Army, as they fought each other, the weather and the terrain.
States and empires adopted a combination of other approaches targeting the strengths of barbarian groups. First, the construction of frontier fortifications combined with the development of local forces tried to stabilize the immediate
1 Cited in Paul Beck, Columns of Vengeance (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), 247.
2 On commercial relations with nomadic tribes, see for instance, Khodarkovsky, 26-8 (for Russian and the steppe tribes); Frederick Mote, Imperial China, 900-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 692-3 (on Ming China’s relations with the Mongols).
frontier separating the polity from the barbarians. Second, great powers from Rome to the United States saw the high mobility of the barbarian tribes as a key source of their threatening power, and sought to limit it by settling them down. Finally, third, often the long-term strategy was to alter the environment that allowed barbarian groups to prosper. The empty or ungovernable spaces – the steppes, the deserts, the difficult to conquer forests – had to be dominated through technology and the gradual expansion of state institutions, thereby limiting the area where barbarians could move unhindered.
A centralized provision of security, where the state manages the resources and controls the immediate responses to the threats, is likely to fail when facing barbarian threats. At a minimum it is likely to fail the communities and locations immediately targeted by the barbarians, diminishing its own legitimacy while at the same time doing little to foster order. When the failure of security is localized and relatively small, the most effective and most necessary response is likely to be local.
This dynamic of security decentralization – of the growing role of local authorities and of the weakening of their commitment to the wider polity – is well illustrated through the experiences of three individuals in their respective and very different regions affected by barbarian attacks: Saint Augustine in North Africa, Saint Sidonius Apollinaris in Gaul, and Saint Severinus of Noricum along the Danube.
Barbarians are back. Small, highly mobile groups can again be strategic actors that compete with wealthier and by all accounts more powerful states. It can be useful therefore to look back at pre-modern history for insights into the challenges that such groups posed and the strategies adopted by states to deal with them.
The conditions and features that characterized a pre-modern security environmnet are coming back. The proliferation of violence and the rise of ungoverned spaces are making statelessness feasible and perhaps even desirable. This is allowing the rise of new strategic actors, motivated by new objectives that do not fit neatly into the modern international setting and, because of the loose organization and small size, more difficult to detect and monitor. The end result is that, like in pre-modern history, diplomacy and deterrence may not be as effective as they had been over the past two or three centuries. And the world will be characterized by more pervasive, geographically diffuse, even if low-intensity violence.
The features of pre-modern history allowed the rise of highly mobile, often small groups that were capable of great violence. Their unsettled nature made the use of force by settled polities often ineffective, and the tools of deterrence and diplomacy were more difficult to employ in the strategic interactions.
Modern states are a particular response to a particular security challenge, namely, fellow modern industrial states. They may not be the most effective way of dealing with a pre-modern type of threat, the barbarian menace, which tends to be ubiquitous, relatively small, and localized. A persistent barbarian threat can initiate a dynamic of decentralization within the targeted polity because a localized threat demands and generates a local response.
The strategic environment that we face is akin to that of pre-modern history, which was characterized by particular trends. For example, military technology was easy to adopt while there were large regions outside of imperial reach. As a result, conflicts were over the allegiance of people rather than territory, and prestige rather than economic gains.
World War One was the cause, catalyst, trigger and accelerator of revolutionary change on an unprecedented scale. This is an indispensable new introduction to the global history of the conflict and its revolutionary consequences from the war's origins to the making of peace and across all of its theatres, including the home fronts and the war at sea. Lawrence Sondhaus sets out a new framework for understanding key themes such as the war aims which inspired the belligerents, the technological developments that made the war so deadly for those in uniform, and the revolutionary pressures that led to the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg and Ottoman empires. He also highlights the war's transformative effects on societal norms and attitudes, gender and labour relations, and international trade and finance. The accessible narrative is supported by chronologies, personal accounts, guides to key controversies and debates, and numerous maps and photographs.
A second edition of this leading introduction to the origins of the First World War and the pre-war international system. William Mulligan shows how the war was a far from inevitable outcome of international politics in the early twentieth century and suggests instead that there were powerful forces operating in favour of the maintenance of peace. He discusses key issues ranging from the military, public opinion, economics, diplomacy and geopolitics to relations between the great powers, the role of smaller states and the disintegrating empires. In this new edition, the author assesses the extensive new literature on the war's origins and the July Crisis as well as introducing new themes such as the relationship between economic interdependence and military planning. With well-structured chapters and an extensive bibliography, this is an essential classroom text which significantly revises our understanding of diplomacy, political culture, and economic history from 1870 to 1914.
Barbarians are back. These small, highly mobile, and stateless groups are no longer confined to the pages of history; they are a contemporary reality in groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and ISIL. Return of the Barbarians re-examines the threat of violent non-state actors throughout history, revealing key lessons that are applicable today. From the Roman Empire and its barbarian challenge on the Danube and Rhine, Russia and the steppes to the nineteenth-century Comanches, Jakub J. Grygiel shows how these groups have presented peculiar, long-term problems that could rarely be solved with a finite war or clearly demarcated diplomacy. To succeed and survive, states were often forced to alter their own internal structure, giving greater power and responsibility to the communities most directly affected by the barbarian menace. Understanding the barbarian challenge, and strategies employed to confront it, offers new insights into the contemporary security threats facing the Western world.
The “conduct of Japan and her military forces” had everything to do with relocation and internment. World War II interrupted this general Nikkei progress and without it there would have been no relocation, nor internment. At the advent of World War II there was no large-scale movement to remove the Nikkei from the West Coast and there was virtually no prospect that there would ever be one. This unlikelihood stemmed from the impressive adaptation of the Japanese Americans, especially to West Coast economics and society and the inexorable decline of the Issei. For no fault of their own, the Issei were the principal stumbling block to Nikkei acceptance and they were dying out each year, thus removing the principal rationale for exclusion and the principal symbol of Imperial influence and control of the Nikkei. That demographic decline denied anti-Japanese demagogues of one of their principal weapons. This was widely recognized by sophisticated observers at the time, such as Navy expert on Japanese Americans, Kenneth D. Ringle, and West Coast residents in general were rapidly coming to share this epiphany.
The introduction traces the historical interaction of Japanese immigrants (Issei) and their children (Nisei, Kibei, and Sansei) with the largely Caucasian American majority. Beginning in 1906 with the San Francisco School Board case, the interaction of the two groups unfolded in a series of conflicts. The California Land Laws of 1913 and 1920, diplomatic disagreements during World War I, and general restriction of American immigration of 1924 which banned all Japanese immigration, each in turn roiled the waters. These relations were complicated further by Japanese claims that their immigrants were still under the jurisdiction of the Empire and that the territory occupied by Japanese immigrants was almost an extra-territorial possession of the Empire, a kind of Overseas Japan. That sentiment angered Americans who thought that it compromised American nationality. However during the 1930s such Imperial claims were muted and Nikkei progress was steady. Beginning in 1928 with the founding of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) the Nikkei (all American Japanese) undertook a precocious campaign to win a place in American life. By World War II the Nikkei had made considerable progress toward acceptance, especially in California, home of the largest group of Mainland Japanese. At that point there was no large-scale movement to remove the Nikkei from the West Coast. None was likely either. The Japanese older generation with closest ties to Imperial Japan was dying out and being rapidly replaced by the Nisei. That removed the principal objection to the Americans of Japanese Ancestry and thus the putative provocation against the group as a whole.