This chapter deals with the beginnings of World War II in Europe: the revision of the the 1919 Versailles Treaty by Nazi Germany, culminating in the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the renewal of war with Britain and France. Hitler takes power. Beginning of German rearmament in violation of 1919 Versailles Treaty, including remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Rapid development of the German armed forces (Wehrmacht), including creation of Panzer forces in the army. The Luftwaffe as a powerful threat in the pre-war crises. The French and British armed forces. Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia, and strengthening relations with Germany. Russian and American detachment from the pre-war crises. The 1938 Sudeten (Munich) crisis and the partition of Czechoslovakia. Hitler’s plans for war with Poland and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939. France and Britain declare war. The German invasion, and the rapid overthrow of Poland. The start of war: comparisons between Europe and mainland Asia.

This chapter deals with the peripheral regions of Axis-occupied territory, as opposed to the core of Greater Germany. These regions formed a strategic ‘ring’ to be closed around the Axis, and some Allied leaders hoped that the Nazi regime could be brought down by strategic encirclement rather than by a bloody direct ground assault on the Reich. Unsuccessful Italian offensives against Britain in in Egypt. British naval superiority in the Mediterranean. The German invasion of Greece succeeds despite the dispatch of British troops. Crete abandoned and serious Royal Navy losses suffered. The German Afrika Korps arrives in Libya to bolster the Italian contingent. Value of German central strategic position, fighting on interior lines and with the ability to move ships and aircraft between fronts. Could Hitler have adopted a ‘Mediterranean’ strategy, attacking British external positions rather than Russia? Conflicting objectives among Hitler’s ‘allies’ and collaborators, and resulting weakness of the Third Reich in northwestern Africa. Allied decision to mount indirect Operation TORCH invasion in North Africa in November 1942, rather than a direct landing across the English Channel. Invasion of Sicily and the overthrow of Mussolini in July 1943, followed by Allied landing on mainland Italy in October. Guerrilla war in Yugoslavia. Defection of Romania followed by rapid Russian advance to the west and into Hungary. German evacuation of Greece followed by political crisis in Athens. Norway and Finland as another part of the Axis periphery; the Finns change sides in September 1944.

This chapter outlines the strengths and background of the major powers before the war, as well as competing political and ideological factors, and the general development of military forces. The largest of the eventual belligerents: Britain, China and Russia, and their different structures. Similar contrasts between medium-sized powers, the United States and Japan. Smaller powers in continental Europe: France, with its empire, Germany, and Italy. Population advantage of Germany within Europe, despite territorial losses after World War I. ‘Satisfied’ and ‘unsatisfied’ powers. Political and ideological factors leading to war. Liberal democracy challenged. Communism as a dynamic force both in Europe and Asia. The radical right, a response partly to Communism and partly to the perceived failings of liberal democracy. Leaders of the radical right, Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. Nationalist China, Jiang Jieshi, and anti-colonialism. Expectations about the nature of future war. Failure of arms limitation. ‘Total War’ theory and totalitarianism. Developments in armies, including armoured vehicles and mobility. Developments in navies. Independent/strategic and combined-arms use of air-power.

This chapter covers the final stages of Japan’s offensive in the Pacific in the spring of 1942 and the successful Allied counter-attack there, and in Burma, through to the end of 1944. Allied grand strategy: Germany or Japan first? Aircraft carriers replace battleships. The Battle of the Coral Sea as the culminating point of the Japanese Pacific offensive. The Battle of Midway: the decisive defensive naval battle. The US Navy regains the strategic initiative. The counter-offensive towards Rabaul, with Guadalcanal as the first objective. Japanese failure to gain a political or military victory in China. British and American aims and disappointments regarding Jiang Jieshi. The successful Japanese Army ICHI-GŌ offensive in China in April 1944. Overview of China’s role in the war. The important political and military role of British India, including the defeat of the Japanese army at Imphal-Kohima in 1944. American amphibious offensives in the South Pacific and, from early 1944, in the Central Pacific. The decisive offensive Battle of the Philippine Sea and the capture of the Marianas. The successful invasion of the Philippines, following the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944.

This chapter covers the Soviet-German war after the December 1941 Battle of Moscow and the failure of the initial Blitzkrieg; the Red Army takes the initiative after the Battle of Stalingrad and drives the Wehrmacht back to the western borderlands of the USSR by the spring of 1944. The Soviet winter offensive in 1941-2. Stalin’s over-optimism leads to setbacks at Kharkov and in Crimea. Hitler’s spring 1942 ‘second offensive’, Operation BLUE, concentrated in southern Russia. The Battle of Stalingrad; reasons for the success of Russian counter-attack. The responsibility of Hitler and his generals. Improvements in the Red Army are critically important. Spring 1943 and Hitler’s delayed attempt at a limited offensive in Operation CITADEL. The Battle of Kursk is followed by a successful Red Army counter-offensive across Ukraine in 1943-4. Developing diplomatic relations between Russia, Britain, and America. The Communist International disbanded. The first meeting of the ‘Big Three’ leaders at Tehran in late 1943: agreements about Polish borders and the timing of the British and American cross-Channel landing.

The introduction lays out the basic arguments, and also explains the emphasis on grand strategy and operations. The Axis powers declared their aim as a ‘new order of things’, notably in their 1940 Tripartite Pact. This contrasted with the ‘old’ order created by the Allies after World War I, exemplified by the Paris peace treaties of 1919 and Washington Treaty of 1922. These treaties dealt with Europe and Asia respectively, and they demonstrate that the causes and course of the next struggle would be global. World War II began in China in July 1937, rather than in Europe in 1939; the Asia-Pacific war was as important as the war in Europe. The book’s focus on grand strategy and military operation is warranted, partly for reasons of space and partly because this is the history of a war, and the outcome was victory or defeat.

This chapter covers the background in East Asia, the outbreak of war there in the 1937, and events to 1941. The Japanese annexation of Manchuria in 1931. Pre-war development of the Chinese and Japanese armed forces. The Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 1937 as the actual beginning of World War II; Japan and China will now be at war continuously until August 1945. The extension of war to eastern central China; the Battle of Shanghai and the Nanjing massacre. International reactions and extension of the Sino-Japanese War. Japanese occupation of eastern China, followed by strategic stalemate. China suffers heavy losses, but Japan is unable to bring the war to a conclusion. Relations between Japan and Russia. The Japanese threat as a factor in Russian rearmament. The Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol border fighting in 1938 and 1939.

This chapter looks at developments in Japan and the USA before December 1941, and the triumph of Japan’s forces in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in the first four months after they began a war against Britain and the USA. Why Japan attacked: unresolved war in China and developments in Europe. Resource objectives in Southeast Asia. American economic strength, and President Roosevelt’s response to developments in Europe. Growth of the US Navy from the late 1930s. Support by neutral USA for Britain and Russia, including Lend-Lease military aid. American economic pressure on Japan. Failure of American-Japanese negotiations in Washington. Pearl Harbor: the ‘Southern Operation’ versus the ‘Hawaiian Operation’. The German declaration of war on the USA on 10 December 1941. Failure of American forces in the Philippines. British naval disaster off Malaya. Japanese advance into Malaya, Burma, and the Netherlands Indies; the fall of Singapore and its implications for the British Empire.

This chapter discusses World War II in Europe, as it changes in 1941 from a primarily military struggle to one with a strong ideological dimensions; this includes the anti-Communist crusade in Russia and the mass murder of European Jews. Problems with the plan for Operation BARBAROSSA. Strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army. Intelligence warnings ignored by Moscow. The first Blitzkrieg campaign in Russia. Negative effect of space and climate on the German offensive. Russian nationalism used to rally the population. Operation TYPHOON and the Battle of Moscow. Accumulation of Red Army reserves. Failure of the initial Blitzkrieg in Russia and its long-term implications. Criminal and counter-productive occupation policy. Nazi racial policy extends to mass murder of the Jews and others in 1941. Relationship between genocide and total war. Mobile killing units in Russia, and deportation of Jews to killing centres in western and central occupied Europe. Effect of the Holocaust on the course of the war.

This chapter assesses the role of maritime power and global logistics in the outcome of the naval war in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Theories of sea power and land power: Mahan and Mackinder. Blockade in Allied and Axis strategy. The vital importance of the British merchant fleet. New German submarine tactics, and Allied counter-measures. The US Navy in the Atlantic before the formal outbreak of war. Success of the U-boat attacks in early 1942. Allied anti-submarine warfare, including communications intelligence and radar. Large-scale Allied construction of escort ships, and growing role of long-range patrol aircraft and escort carriers. Admiral Dönitz recalls U-boats from the North Atlantic in May 1943. Inability of the German forces, including the U-boats, to oppose amphibious operations. Failure of new U-boat types. Limited success of the Japanese submarine fleet against Allied supply lines. Japanese failure to develop effective escort forces. The American submarine campaign develops after torpedo problems are solved. Global importance of Allied construction of new merchant ships and port facilities; this is crucial for Allied survival and then for successful global counter-attack. Advantages of the oceanic powers over the continental ones.

This chapter discusses violence associated with the exercise of lordship and the culture of nobility in Europe from ca. 500-1500. For most of the twentieth century, historians argued that lordly violence rose and fell in inverse proportion to the power of ‘sovereign’ rulers, such as kings and emperors. It is now recognized that aristocrats in general and lords in particular played roles in medieval societies and polities that made their use of violence not just tolerable but also necessary. The practice of ‘feud’ has also come in for reassessment, increasingly understood not as anarchic or usurpatory, but re-envisaged as rule-based and self-limiting. Yet, if seigneurial violence now appears much more socially productive and politically intelligible to historians, it is important to realize that the exercise and experience of seigneurial violence varied a great deal according to social position and context. Aristocratic women were less likely than aristocratic men to be involved in such conflicts, and non-aristocrats, of both sexes, bore the brunt of the violence. This essay proceeds chronologically, examining changes in the ideas and practices that shaped how lords and nobles used violence in different regions.

This chapter deals with homicide and serious interpersonal violence in modern Europe, comparing this with the rest of the world for as much as the evidence allows. It focuses, but not exclusively, on male-on-male violence. This is discussed for three subperiods: 1800-1914, 1920-1970, 1970-present. More is known about the global context as we approach the present. In Europe homicide ceased to be a day-to-day affair in urban and rural communities, so that the remaining acts of murder assumed the character of sinister or sensational exceptions. In this connection, the phenomena of serial murder and the underworld are discussed. For the non-Western world, the evidence remains patchy and fragmented up to 1970. Traditional male honor remained important and affected interpersonal violence in independent Latin America as well as Colonial India and Indonesia. Dueling was rather prevalent among European men in colonial societies. The chapter concludes with a tentative thesis that we can speak of a world history of violence since about 1970, under the influence of globalization. International organized crime was a major factor in this.

In 1970, a senior civil servant in the British Home Office published The Conquest of Violence, which chronicled what he considered to be a social triumph within the United Kingdom. The book was an expression of the way that many felt in the European liberal democracies a generation after the Second World War. It built on perceptions apparent during the nineteenth century that violence, especially criminal violence and harsh responses by those in authority were alien to what were essentially progressive and humanitarian developments within European culture and society. The aims of this chapter are to probe such beliefs particularly with reference to criminal violence and responses to it. It assesses the ways in which the media have provided vicarious thrills since the early nineteenth century, the construction of a criminal class as a separate social group, and the ways in which eyes were closed to violence by agents of the state who were perceived as disciplining the uncivilized.