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This article rethinks the relationship between trade and industry in the development of Indian capitalism, focusing on Tata, pioneers in textile and steel production. It shows how two little-known affiliated trading companies, R.D. Tata & Co. in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Kobe, and Tata Limited in London, played a crucial intermediary role in securing financing and market access for the parent firm in Bombay while simultaneously increasing its exposure to the effects of global crises. Tata's ultimately dominant position in a protected national economy was due to the contingent failure of these trading companies rather than a foregone conclusion.
In this book, Kenneth Hirth provides a comparative view of the organization of ancient and premodern society and economy. Hirth establishes that humans adapted to their environments, not as individuals but in the social groups where they lived and worked out the details of their livelihoods. He explores the variation in economic organization used by simple and complex societies to procure, produce, and distribute resources required by both individual households and the social and political institutions that they supported. Drawing on a wealth of archaeological, historic, and ethnographic information, he develops and applies an analytical framework for studying ancient societies that range from the hunting and gathering groups of native North America, to the large state societies of both the New and Old Worlds. Hirth demonstrates that despite differences in transportation and communication technologies, the economic organization of ancient and modern societies are not as different as we sometimes think.
Using social tables and modern household surveys, this article explores Brazil's income distribution from a historical perspective (1850-2010), examining its relationship with economic development and the factors driving inequality changes. It shows that Brazil's inequality was not always high, but rather followed a Kuznets curve, increasing from the early 20th century, reaching a high plateau between the 1970s and 1990s and declining thereafter. Notably, results highlight the importance of both economic and political factors for enabling the completion of the second Kuznets curve phase.
Recent contributions on ‘financial repression’ and ‘money illusion’ have referred to Maynard Keynes's How to Pay for the War as a supporting document. This article discusses whether Keynes prescribed policies of ‘financial repression’ that were implemented in the United Kingdom, and other countries, following World War II. It seems reasonable that Keynes's writings were instrumental in translating British monetary experiences of the 1920s and 1930s into expectations of policymakers during and after World War II, including a belief in ‘money illusion’ that suggested the use of inflation for driving down real interest rates of public bonds. If this was the case, How to Pay for the War could indeed provide an important explanation for the why and when of ‘financial repression’. This article argues that How to Pay for the War only partly provided support for a policy of ‘financial repression’, and none for using inflation as a ‘tax gatherer’ to the detriment of domestic savers in general. Crediting Keynes as a source for widespread ‘money illusion’ is also out of line with the historical record.
This study explores parliamentary reforms related to the financial accountability of banks following the 1825–6 and 1836–7 financial crises in England. An appraisal of nineteenth-century parliamentary Hansard transcripts reveals early banking legislative pursuits. The study observes the laissez-faire and interventionist approaches towards the banking enactments of 1826, 1833 and 1844 that underpin the transformation of financial accountability during this era. The Bank Notes Act 1826 imposed financial accountability on the Bank of England by requiring the mandatory disclosure of notes issued. The Bank Notes Act 1833 extended this requirement to all other banks. The Bank Charter Act 1833 increased the financial accountability of the Bank of England by requiring it to provide an account of bullion and securities belonging to the governor and company, as well as deposits held by the bank. Thereafter, the Joint Stock Banks Act 1844 pioneered the regular publication of assets and liabilities and communication of the balance sheet and profit and loss account to shareholders. State intervention in the financial accountability of banks during the period from 1825 to 1845 appears to have been cumulative.
Why do stock and housing markets sometimes experience amazing booms followed by massive busts and why is this happening more and more frequently? In order to answer these questions, William Quinn and John D. Turner take us on a riveting ride through the history of financial bubbles, visiting, among other places, Paris and London in 1720, Latin America in the 1820s, Melbourne in the 1880s, New York in the 1920s, Tokyo in the 1980s, Silicon Valley in the 1990s and Shanghai in the 2000s. As they do so, they help us understand why bubbles happen, and why some have catastrophic economic, social and political consequences whilst others have actually benefited society. They reveal that bubbles start when investors and speculators react to new technology or political initiatives, showing that our ability to predict future bubbles will ultimately come down to being able to predict these sparks.
Chapter 4 examines the bubble in railway shares which occurred in the UK in the mid-1840s. Railway share prices more than doubled between 1843 and the autumn of 1845. In addition, there was a promotion boom with hundreds of new railways being authorised by Parliament. By the autumn of 1845, 562 new railway schemes had been submitted to Parliament. Following several major newspaper editorials regarding this folly, the bubble came to an end. The chapter then moves on to discuss the causes of the bubble. The incorporation of hundreds of railway companies by Parliament resulted in an increase in marketability. In terms of money and credit, interest rates were at an historical low and part-paid shares leveraged the buying of shares. The railway bubble witnessed the democratisation of speculation, with many middle-class individuals buying shares for the first time. The spark which set the bubble fire alight was the Railway Act. This Act signalled that railways had the potential to be very remunerative investments. It also created the Railway Board, which was a means of coordinating applications to build railways so that a national rail network was constructed. The chapter concludes by examining the consequences of the bubble, arguing that the bubble was a deeply inefficient way to create a national rail network, and much too wasteful to be considered useful.
Chapter 11 examines the stock market bubbles which occurred in China in 2007 and 2015. Between the end of 2005 and October 2007, the stock market soared by over 400 per cent. One year later, the market had fallen by 70 per cent. Similarly, in the year before June 2015, the stock market had increased by more than 150 per cent. It then collapsed by more than 50 per cent in under three months. The chapter discusses how, in the space of 20 years, China went from having almost no marketability to having heavily controlled marketability, and then near-free marketability. China also went from having virtually no middle class to having the world’s largest middle class, which then became the new speculating class. Thanks to margin lending, they were able to borrow heavily to finance their investments. Both bubbles are very clear examples of how and why governments engineer bubbles in the first instance. In 2007 the Chinese authorities needed to stimulate privatisation and in 2015 they needed to unwind the largest economic stimulus in history.
Chapter 8 examines the land and stock market bubbles that occurred in Japan in the 1980s. In the seven years before its peak, the Japanese stock market appreciated 386 per cent. Similarly, land prices rose by 207 per cent. By August 1992, the Japanese stock market had fallen 62 per cent from its peak, and by 1995, land was 50 per cent below its peak. Both land prices and the stock market continued to fall into the next decade. The chapter then uses the bubble triangle to explain the Japanese land and stock bubbles. These bubbles were purely political creations. Not only did the Japanese government provide the spark, but it systematically cultivated all three sides of the bubble triangle with the explicit goal of generating a boom. This process was clearest in the realm of money and credit, where an expansion was both a central part of Japan’s economic policy and, after the Plaza Accord, an international commitment. The chapter concludes by looking at how the collapse of the Japanese bubbles weakened the country’s banking system, which eventually had to be rescued by the government, and resulted in a stagnant economy for over two decades.
Chapter 10 examines the housing bubble which occurred in Ireland, Spain, the UK and the United States in the 2000s. House prices in many parts of these countries more than doubled in the years leading up to 2007. They then crashed with terrible consequences for the global financial system, which imploded in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy. The chapter then discusses how the bubble triangle explains this episode. Financial alchemy meant that mortgage finance could be provided to a wider range of people, thus making the family home much more marketable and an object of speculation. The spark which ignited the subprime bubble was a policy decision taken in the late 1990s that attempted to use loose mortgage lending standards as a substitute for government-provided social housing. The chapter concludes by examining the economic, social and political consequences of the bubble. The housing bubble of the 2000s is a perfect example of an economically and socially destructive bubble, despite extraordinary measures taken by governments and central bankers to save the system. The chapter concludes by drawing a line from the housing bubble and its collapse to the rise of populism.
Chapter 12 is the conclusion of the book. The chapter starts by arguing that the bubble triangle can explain why the cryptocurrency bubble occurred in 2017. It then asks whether the bubble triangle is a good predictive tool. The answer to that question is yes, but bubbles are still difficult to predict because the sparks are difficult to discern. The bubble triangle is also able to predict which bubbles will be destructive (politically sparked bubbles with high bank lending) and which will be useful (technology sparked bubbles with low leverage). The chapter then moves on to look at what governments could do to prevent bubbles. However, since political bubbles are often created because they are in the government’s interest, governments cannot be relied upon to take these measures. The question then arises as to whether the news media can alert investors to the presence of bubbles. The answer to this question very much depends on whether they have the incentive to do so, and this incentive appears to be diminishing over time. The chapter concludes by arguing that investors need to build broad mental models, which include history, if they are to have any chance of predicting bubbles.
Chapter 5 examines the bubble that occurred in Australia in the late 1880s. During 1887 and 1888, there was a major bubble in the price of suburban land, particularly in Melbourne. In addition, companies involved in the financing and development of urban land were created at this time and during the first half of 1888, their share prices doubled. After the peak in October 1888, the share prices of these companies and urban land prices fell sharply. We then explain why it took several years for the liquidation of the land boom to affect the wider economy. The chapter then moves on to discuss how the bubble triangle explains this episode. In particular, this was the first major bubble where investors were speculating with other people’s money, provided ultimately by the country’s banks. The spark which ignited the land boom was the liberalisation in 1887 of the restriction on banks’ lending on the security of real estate. This was the final act in a 25-year liberalisation process. The chapter concludes by examining the dire consequences of the bubble. In 1893, the Australian banking system collapsed and, as a result, Australia experienced a very long and deep economic recession
Chapter 1 explains why the study of bubbles is important. Bubbles can have huge economic, social and political costs, but some bubbles may be useful. The chapter discusses the origin of the ‘bubble’ metaphor and the definition of a bubble. It then develops a new metaphor and framework for bubbles based on the chemistry of fire - the bubble triangle - in order to better understand their causes and consequences. The three sides of the bubble triangle are marketability, credit and money, and speculation – these correspond to oxygen, fuel and heat in the fire triangle. The spark which sets the bubble fire alight is either technological change or a government policy decision. This analytical framework helps predict when bubbles will occur, when they will burn out and what their economic effects will be. The chapter concludes by outlining the catalogue of 12 historical bubbles that will be examined in the rest of the book.