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Led by German-born Carl Laemmle, Universal Pictures devoted itself to winning over the German market in the interwar period. Yet the German market proved difficult to crack, owing to political risk and cultural distance. We argue that cultural differences kept most American films from becoming more successful, even those that were shown in German theaters and prior to the advent of sound film. Universal Pictures resorted to a film strategy of localization using German actors and directors, which proved a winning formula just as the Nazis came to power.
The international monetary system imploded during the Great Depression. As the conventional narrative goes, the collapse of the gold standard and the rise of competitive devaluation sparked a monetary war that sundered the system, darkened the decade, and still serves as a warning to policymakers today. But this familiar tale is only half the story. With the Tripartite Agreement of 1936, Britain, America, and France united to end their monetary war and make peace. This agreement articulated a new vision, one in which the democracies promised to consult on exchange rate policy and uphold a liberal international system - at the very time fascist forces sought to destroy it. Max Harris explores this little-known but path-breaking and successful effort to revolutionize monetary relations, tracing the evolution of the monetary system in the twilight years before the Second World War and demonstrating that this history is not one solely of despair.
Joseph Brennan, as secretary of the Irish Department of Finance (1923–7) and chair of the Irish Currency Commission (1927–43), was a pivotal influence on Irish banking and currency affairs. Yet, within the existing literature, his adherence to conservative British norms is seen as providing a ‘bleak prescription’ for the Irish economy. However, such a view ignores the fact that Brennan was far from dogmatic on banking and currency issues and underplays his incrementalist, and often internationalist, approach to the development of Irish monetary institutions. Brennan's actions up to the early 1940s were based on the realities of Ireland's slowly receding economic and intellectual dependency on Britain, a ‘dependency’ often misrepresented in the existing literature as a more primitive, pre-Keynesian, conservative approach. However, rather than acting as a restraining influence on Irish economic development, the policies Brennan advocated enabled Ireland to avoid the instability associated with many smaller, emerging nation states in the 1920s and 1930s. The focus on continuity – which guaranteed currency and banking stability – represented the realities of Ireland's reliance on the sluggish British economy in the decades after independence. Brennan's achievement, in helping to sustain banking and currency stability notwithstanding economic uncertainty, a fragile political environment (and suspicious banking interests), deserves wider acknowledgement.
Describes the circumstances that led to the Accord and the terms of the agreement: removal of the remaining interest rate ceilings in return for a Federal Reserve commitment to support Treasury offerings priced at market.
Having settled, at least for the time being, on free reserves as a policy guide, the FOMC had to identify one or more instruments that it could use to expand or contract the size of the System Open Market Account according to the policy decisions of the Committee. Bills sufficed for operations of a modest size (no more than about $200 million) intended to remain in place for several weeks, but they were not liquid enough for larger operations expected to be quickly reversed. As a result, and in the face of strenuous objections from some Committee members, the Committee came to rely on repurchase agreements when it wanted to sterilize transient fluctuations in autonomous factors.
Examines the February 1961 decision of the FOMC to undertake purchases of intermediate- and long-term notes and bonds with the intent of keeping reserves readily available and perhaps lowering longer-term interest rates – thus marking the end of “bills preferably” – even while putting a floor under bill rates.
Reviews the study of the government securities market undertaken in response to the events of the summer of 1958, including the purported need for expanded public access to market statistics, shortcomings in dealer financing, and prospects for a dealer association aimed at improving market practices.
Faced with a growing volume of settlement fails in 1969, the FOMC approved a novel program to lend Treasury securities to primary dealers for the purpose of avoiding redelivery fails.