This chapter presents convivialism as a conception of the good life to inform and reshape education. Drawing from Ivan Illich’s views of a convivial society and two more recent manifestos proposing convivialism as a political philosophy for a world in crisis, the chapter discusses how convivialism offers a conception of the good life focused on living with human and nonhuman others. Convivial education relies on a conception of knowledge and skills as tools for conviviality, as well as an appreciation for the necessity to limit what can be considered legitimate individual and collective desires. Finally, the chapter argues that convivialism can inspire new educational initiatives and support existing countermovements based on principles of degrowth and decolonization.

Employing “Asia as method,” this chapter examines the twofold pedagogical practice of cultivating learners’ abilities to cognize truth and create value from it as the font of authentic happiness. The chapter first summarizes the intrinsic nature of sōka kyōikugaku, or “value-creating pedagogy,” in the work of Japanese educators Makiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944), Toda Jōsei (1900–1958), and Ikeda Daisaku (b. 1928) and defines the concepts of truth, value, and happiness therein. It then considers the extrinsic relevance of these in the context of today’s politicized, semantic war on truth in the United States and the implications this has for modern notions of schooling and young people’s happiness. The chapter advances our understanding of value-creating approaches to knowledge, society, and power that increasingly inform the perspectives and practices of thousands of educators around the world and has significance for ethics in education.

This chapter tackles postmodern and poststructuralist outlooks on ethics and how these have impacted educational theory. To fulfill this task, the chapter indicates how such outlooks differ from other perspectives on the relationship of philosophy, education, and ethics. After some basic definitions, clarifications, disclaimers, and caveats that familiarize the reader with the related discourses and their challenges, the chapter shows how postmodern/poststructuralist basic assumptions beneath the corresponding ethics differ from other perspectives on (educational) normativity. Then the chapter discusses the distinction between the ethical and the moral that makes the impact of postmodern/poststructuralist ethics on educational theory most visible. It concludes with critical remarks on the current status of this impact and on the challenge of rethinking educational ethics “after post-isms”.

This chapter provides an introduction to American pragmatism as an ethical tradition with educational ramifications. The chapter first explains the origins of pragmatism and accounts for the primary features of pragmatist ethics. It then profiles the ethical views and educational bearings of two classical pragmatists: William James and John Dewey, and the most prominent neopragmatist, Richard Rorty. The chapter shows how pragmatism, from its nineteenth-century origins to its contemporary iterations, approaches education as integral to the ethical and political cultivation of a vibrant, pluralistic, democratic culture. Its philosophical orientation – away from the fixed and timeless and toward the contingent and contextualized – conceives of humans as active but fallible agents pursuing knowledge to address the concrete problems of their communities. Despite their differences, James, Dewey, and Rorty recognized the need to foster individual habits and collective sensibilities that center our moral imaginations, sympathetic attachments to others, and our situatedness in concrete social and natural environments.

This chapter explores the relationship between education and a school’s punishment and disciplinary practices. Distinct from discipline, punishment is defined partly in terms of its attempt to express moral disapproval. While there are serious criticisms of the use of punishment in educational settings, punishment is largely justified in school in terms of its ability to foster certain sorts of educative conversations. Not all punishment is justified: the particular sort of punishment, and the context that surrounds it, must match the educational nature of the school environment. The punishment must send the right educational messages and accomplish legitimate educational goals. The context of punishment that best supports these goals can be found in the restorative justice framework.

This chapter offers an overview of how indigenous Latin American ethics has centered on knowledge about the environment and earth. It proposes that although this is not a new conceptualization, it can be made more visible by examining the long process of imposition of colonial ethical values. With a focus on the centrality of the earth in indigenous ethics and education, this chapter discusses this process, from how early colonial texts like grammars and dictionaries aimed to replace indigenous ethics to bilingual language programs. In conclusion it suggests that indigenous educational practices have persisted through colonization and around the margins of top-down, state-mandated approaches, and are emerging in indigenous pedagogies that foreground the ethical dimensions of relationships with the earth.

This chapter traces the evolution of the educational concept Bildung, beginning with its roots in ancient Western thought, then to its formation in Weimar classicism and Hegel’s thought, and finally to the adoption of those German traditions in contemporary American educational thought.

This part invites the reader to survey a variety of ethical traditions that have historically informed, and still inform, our educational thought and practice. Dedicating a section to ethical traditions in education comes with obvious challenges. Not only is there an almost infinite number of traditions one could justifiably consider; it is also unclear what traditions rooted in the past can contribute to the complex and ever-changing concerns of the present age. Some of our readers no doubt share Hannah Arendt’s view that the dismantling of metaphysics has also meant that “the thread of tradition is broken and that we shall not be able to renew it,” leaving us with little more than “a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation.”

Why educate? This question has been considered throughout history and around the world. Many reasons and rationales have been proposed. Some are overlapping, while others are competing. Considering why to educate is important for considering how to educate: that is, what policies, curriculum, and pedagogy to use, in relation to purposes. This chapter discusses some of the major frameworks underpinning various educational practices that have taken place historically and today. The aim is to elaborate ethical frameworks as they relate to justifications for educational practices, before giving some examples to clarify and demonstrate how choices among frameworks make a difference in relation to practice. Additionally, the chapter considers some of the noteworthy limitations of each.

This chapter begins by addressing settler colonialism and how it has affected and influenced educational practices in the United States. The authors discuss how they define decolonization and ask themselves and their readers if it is truly possible to decolonize schooling in the United States. They offer the concept of a critical settler consciousness to push back against settler colonization, and give multiple examples of communities and schools that are decolonizing their curriculums. The authors emphasize that decolonizing the curriculum is not easy; it is complicated, convoluted, and often unclear. They conclude that there is hope in the communities, parents, and students employing decolonizing practices to educate their young people.

This chapter explores some central features of morality in terms of what are commonly regarded as virtues. A virtue is a disposition that is an important feature of one’s character. As such, a virtue endures over an extended period of time, not just for a brief moment. Still, a virtue such as honesty implies its regular exercise. However, one can occasionally behave dishonestly without this undermining its standing as one’s virtue. The notion that some emphasis on basic moral virtues should be included in K-12 and college education has long received strong public support. However, there has also been widespread disagreement about just how this should be done and with what ends in mind. Presumably, some general uncertainty, if not disagreement, about the nature and foundation of morality accounts for much of this. This uncertainty is discussed in terms of reasonableness.

This chapter explores the connections between ethics, the phenomenological (and hermeneutical) traditions, and education. It focuses on the idea of the subject, showing phenomenology’s contrast with the modernist picture of the autonomous subject. The chapter first briefly traces the idea of the subject in phenomenology through four representative figures – Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Levinas – and then sketches their approaches to ethics. Then it pivots to four ethical concepts in philosophy of education in this tradition – understanding, risk, subjectification, and responsibility – by connecting them to phenomenological tradition’s broad conception of the subject. The chapter brings into relief the contribution phenomenology makes to envisioning living well together and human flourishing, and education’s role in fostering ethical subjects that would enact such societies.

This chapter explores the concept of virtue (de) in Confucianism and Daoism, which are the two prominent indigenous traditions in ancient China. It is argued that virtue, from an ancient Chinese paradigm, is essentially about moral excellence and influence. In the Confucian traditions, virtue is manifested in the exaltation of moral goodness and ethical charisma of exemplary persons. In the Daoist traditions, virtue is encapsulated in the emptying of one’s heart-mind and in noncoercive action. Chinese ethics in the ancient past stress the utmost importance of (inter)personal cultivation of virtues and role-modeling. School leaders, teachers, students, and other educational stakeholders should develop themselves and others morally so as to collectively achieve dao (the Way), which is a shared vision of human excellence.

This chapter considers the major Abrahamic faiths on a continuum from dynamic to dogmatic. On the dynamic side lies the God of covenant and a life consistent with an open society. On the dogmatic side lies the ruler of the universe and a life aligned with a closed society. Readings of Abraham’s story leaning toward the dynamic end of this continuum are more authentic than those tending toward the dogmatic end. Dynamic readings of Abraham’s legacy are also more ethically robust and their transmission more genuinely educational, conceived as initiation into intelligent worldviews while learning from and about alternatives. This dialogical concept of education, called the “pedagogy of difference,” can lead us out of our current morass in which people of deep difference are increasingly incapable of communicating with one another.