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4562 results in Microeconomics

Page 20 of 229

  • 8 - Insurance and Moral Hazard

  • from Part II - Game Theory and Economics of Information: New Frontiers in Economic Theory
  • Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo
  • Book:
    Mighty Microeconomics
    Published online:
    15 July 2023
    Print publication:
    06 July 2023, pp 316-330

  • Summary

    Shareholders of a company cannot directly monitor what the company’s manager is doing in her/his office. So, what can the shareholders do to ensure that the manager works hard for the sake of the company? This is a problem of moral hazard (a problem in which certain people’s actions – the manager’s effort – are “hidden” from others). To solve this type of problem, one needs to consider the following two issues.

  • 6 - Simultaneous-Move Games and Nash Equilibrium

  • from Part II - Game Theory and Economics of Information: New Frontiers in Economic Theory
  • Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo
  • Book:
    Mighty Microeconomics
    Published online:
    15 July 2023
    Print publication:
    06 July 2023, pp 243-283

  • Summary

    First, let’s begin with the simplest situation, which we call the case of “simultaneous moves,” in which everyone makes his or her decision at the same time. In order to analyze such a situation, we will express the situation using a model, which we call a “game.”

  • 10 - Last but Not Least: Let’s Talk about Social Justice and Philosophy

  • from Part II - Game Theory and Economics of Information: New Frontiers in Economic Theory
  • Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo
  • Book:
    Mighty Microeconomics
    Published online:
    15 July 2023
    Print publication:
    06 July 2023, pp 355-375

  • Summary

    It’s been a long journey, but we have finally covered the basics of economic analysis. Now that you have learned the analytical tools (theoretical models) we use in economics, I believe that you have gained a strong understanding of how society allocates resources via the market mechanism. However, that is not the end of the story.

  • Introduction

  • Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo
  • Book:
    Mighty Microeconomics
    Published online:
    15 July 2023
    Print publication:
    06 July 2023, pp 1-6

  • Summary

    Economists call (1) to (7) resource allocation issues. More specifically, (5) to (7) are called distribution issues. Each society resolves these issues with its own institutions and rules, which have historically included feudal systems, planned economies, and market economy mechanisms.

  • 9 - Adverse Selection and Signaling

  • from Part II - Game Theory and Economics of Information: New Frontiers in Economic Theory
  • Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo
  • Book:
    Mighty Microeconomics
    Published online:
    15 July 2023
    Print publication:
    06 July 2023, pp 331-354

  • Summary

    Let’s continue studying the basics of economic analysis when there is asymmetric information. As I explained in Chapter 8, there are two main types of problems with asymmetric information.

  • 2 - Theory of Firm Behavior

  • from Part I - Price Theory: Merits and Limitations of the Market Mechanism
  • Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo
  • Book:
    Mighty Microeconomics
    Published online:
    15 July 2023
    Print publication:
    06 July 2023, pp 70-126

  • Summary

    In the United States, some firms are just small-scale enterprises with a few employees, and some are huge companies with several thousand employees. Firms might have various departments, such as accounting or sales. Manufacturing firms have many factories. In order to understand the central role these firms play in markets, traditional microeconomics (price theory) makes a dramatic simplification and treats firms like “black boxes” that output goods using production inputs (see Figure 2.1). Details about what exactly is happening inside firms are ignored.

Page 20 of 229