This paper analyzes the use of unconventional policy instruments in New Keynesian setups in which the “divine coincidence” breaks down. The paper discusses the role of a second instrument that, in addition to the effect of conventional interest rate policy, may enter the Phillips curve, the investment–saving (IS) curve, and the welfare function, thus influencing inflation and output. The paper presents theoretical results on equilibrium determinacy, the inflation bias, the stabilization bias, and the optimal central banker’s preferences when both instruments are available. We show that the use of an unconventional instrument reduces the zone of equilibrium indeterminacy and may reduce the volatility of the economy. However, in some circumstances, committing to not use the second instrument may be welfare-improving (a result akin to Rogoff (Journal of International Economics 18(3-4), 199–217, 1985) example of counterproductive coordination). We also show that the optimal central banker should be both aggressive against inflation and interventionist in using the unconventional policy instrument, and we analyze the optimal central banker’s preferences when social preferences would yield equilibrium indeterminacy.

Using monthly data from 1978:M1 to 2019:M9, this paper provides empirical evidence concerning the role that monetary policy plays in the US housing market. We first show that shocks to short-run interest rates have significant impacts on house prices and that these effects are persistent. Our findings also provide evidence supporting the claim that too-low-for-too-long interest rates are responsible for the 2002–2006 US housing boom. We further investigate the different channels through which an easing monetary policy fuels the house price boom and find that faster sales and lower inventory levels in the housing market most amplify the policy effects. Lastly, we provide compelling evidence of the asymmetric effects of contractionary and expansionary monetary policies on house prices.

This paper analyses the effects of disease and war on the accumulation of human and physical capital. We employ an overlapping generation framework in which young adults, motivated by old-age provision and possibly altruism, make decisions about investments in schooling and capital. A poverty trap exists for a wide range of constant war losses and premature adult mortality. If parents are altruistic and the sub-utility function for own consumption is more concave than that for their evaluation of their children’s full income in adulthood, the only possible steady-state growth path involves full education. Otherwise, steady-state paths with incompletely educated children may exist. When mortality and destruction rates are stochastic, the initial boundary conditions and agents’ beliefs have a strong influence on the paths generated by a sequence of shocks. Calibrating the model to Kenya, simulations for stochastic settings yield the finding that a trap exists and is always avoided, but the chances of a slow recovery are substantial.