Returning to the status quo ante as quickly as possible is frequently named as an important goal of states of emergency. This includes returning to pre-disaster levels of human and civil rights. This chapter analyzes the speed with which countries return to the institutional quality and protection of civil liberties they exhibited prior to an emergency. Across 850 emergencies around the world, we find that a fair share of countries return to their status quo ante very rapidly. However, our results also indicate that in countries with particular political characteristics, the return to the status prior to the emergency can be very lengthy and may not happen de facto. We specifically find that countries in which the emergency constitution allocates more power to the executive during an emergency take longer to reach the status quo ante.

Nine out of ten countries currently have emergency provisions written into their constitutions, here simply referred to as emergency constitutions. The nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing answers to two questions: (1) how much additional discretionary power do emergency constitutions allow and which political actors are given the additional power; and (2) is there a limited number of “typical” emergency constitutions that combine various aspects in similar or even identical fashion? To answer the first question we construct an Indicator of Emergency Powers (INEP) which takes six central elements of emergency provisions explicitly into account. To answer the second question, we draw on cluster analysis and identify six well-defined clusters. Both the INEP as well as the six clusters allow us to answer important follow-up questions such as what the factors are that determine a country’s choice of emergency constitution but also under what conditions governments are likely to declare a state of emergency given the prevalent emergency constitution.

The relationship between terrorist activities and states of emergency has never been explored in a cross-country perspective. This chapter is a first step to change that. Given that a terror act has been committed, what are the factors that lead governments to declare a state of emergency – or refrain from declaring it? And given that a state of emergency has been declared, what are the effects thereof? In this chapter, two world regions are analyzed: seventy-nine countries having Western-style constitutions and the member states of the Organization of Islamic Countries. We find that more terrorist incidents increase the likelihood of a state of emergency. Interestingly, emergencies are less likely to be declared in election years, supposedly because governments believe them to be unpopular. Once a state of emergency is declared, it generally leads to substantially more government repression. Finally, countries already under a state of emergency are more likely to suffer from additional terror attacks, challenging the effectiveness of states of emergency.

In this chapter, we ask two questions: (1) Does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events? (2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unexpected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pretext to enhance their power. Furthermore, the easier it is to call a state of emergency, the larger the negative effects on basic human rights. Interestingly, presidential democracies are better able to cope with natural disasters than parliamentary ones in terms of lives saved, whereas autocracies do significantly worse in the sense that empowerment rights seriously suffer in the aftermath of a disaster.

Nine out of ten modern constitutions contain explicit emergency provisions, describing who can call a state of emergency (and under which conditions) and the additional powers government enjoys under a state of emergency. As states of emergency typically allocate additional powers to the executive, they lend themselves easily to abuse and provide political incentives to declare emergencies. In this paper, we analyze under what conditions government behavior under a state of emergency deviates from constitutional provisions and a de jure/de facto gap thus emerges. Such a gap can be caused by the unlawful declaration of an emergency, the noncompliance with constitutional provisions in the course of an emergency, or the perpetuation of a state of emergency beyond the constitutionally defined length. Based on a novel dataset comprising 853 emergency declarations, 115 are identified as unlawful. We find that events caused by political turmoil are more likely to be followed by an unlawful emergency than natural disasters. Autocratic governments are more likely to renege against the constitution than democratic governments.

States of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit “emergency constitution,” that is, the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. This chapter asks whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory, arguing that there are important arguments, both against and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory – as applied by economists – can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution.

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only caused millions to die and even more to lose their jobs, it has also prompted more governments to simultaneously declare a state of emergency than ever before enabling us to compare their decisions more directly. States of emergency usually imply the extension of executive powers that diminishes the powers of other branches of government, as well as the civil liberties of individuals. Here, we analyze the use of emergency provisions during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and find that it can be largely explained by drawing on political economy. It does, hence, not constitute an exception. We show that many governments have (mis-)used the pandemic as a pretext to curtail media freedom. We further show that executive decrees are considered a substitute for states of emergency by many governments.

The study of constitutional emergency provisions remains in its infancy. We present the first overview and analysis of how specific emergency provisions vary across the fifty US state constitutions. The emergency provisions vary considerably across states with the Texan constitution exhibiting the most limited provisions and Georgia the most expansive ones. A cluster analysis shows support for dividing the US constitutions into six “families” and reveals the Texan constitution as substantially different from the rest. We explore whether these constitutional choices may have been affected by disaster risk, prevailing ideology, state wealth, and other factors for which historical data exist. We provide tentative evidence showing that emergency provisions have a significant effect on both the number of fatalities as well as on the damage suffered in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Clearly, therefore, the paper has implications for constitutional policy.

This chapter briefly recapitulates the main findings of the book. In addition, it provides a discussion whether major current developments – such as climate change – make modifications in constitutional emergency provisions necessary. It also discusses the relationship between independent agencies (such as central banks) and emergency provisions. Finally, it asks how resilience can be improved.

Media freedom is often curtailed in the wake of terrorist attacks. In this chapter, we ask whether constitutional provisions that are intended – directly or indirectly – to protect media freedom affect the degree to which press freedom is curtailed after terrorist incidents. We find that neither provisions explicitly protecting media freedom nor provisions that might protect media freedom indirectly (such as those guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary) mitigate the post-terror curtailment of press freedom.

In this chapter, we are interested in two questions: (1) What domestic events are most likely to trigger the declaration of a state of emergency? (2) Given that any kind of domestic turmoil is observed and a state of emergency has been declared: what are the consequences for civil and political rights? We find that a general conflict index is highly correlated with the declaration of a state of emergency. The events most likely to trigger a state of emergency are major government crises, riots, and revolutions. With regard to coups – both successful and unsuccessful – we find a significant correlation with states of emergency in autocracies only. We do find that a coup followed by a state of emergency does lead to a (further) reduction in civil liberties.

States of emergency do not only imply a significant change in the balance of powers between the three branches of government, they are also very frequently declared: between 1985 and 2014, at least 137 countries were subject to at least one such event. Our analysis shows that it is crucial to distinguish between states of emergency declared as a consequence of a natural disaster from those declared as a consequence of political turmoil. Distinguishing between the costs of declaring an emergency and its benefits, we find that the less costly it is to declare an emergency, the more emergencies will be called on the grounds of natural disasters but not on the grounds of political turmoil. This is, hence, more evidence that constitutions matter. Finally, emergencies based on political turmoil are more likely to be declared if an economic crisis is hitting the country, large natural disasters are more likely to lead to a state of emergency when more powers are allocated to the legislature, and results suggest that even military coup governments are subject to constitutional constraints.

Although nine out of ten countries have emergency provisions written into their constitutions, the nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing first answers to two straightforward questions: (1) which factors cause the inclusion of emergency provisions into constitutions? and (2) given that emergency provisions are constitutionalized – which factors determine the type of emergency provisions enacted? We find that the way in which a country’s constitution is produced has important consequences for its emergency provisions: constitutional assemblies dominated by legislators are loath to grant the executive many extra powers. Further, emergency constitutions in countries with stronger veto institutions and higher average income allow more discretionary power. This also holds for countries that recently experienced a coup. Interestingly, countries prone to natural disasters and countries far from the equator allow less power.

Legally, development charges are a fee, not a tax. Therefore, jurisdictions should use revenue generated from development charges to provide the infrastructure and services to serve the charge-paying real estate development. That is, the charges must meet the nexus principle, which calls for a direct relationship between the real estate project and the development charges-funded infrastructure and services. Furthermore, they must meet the rough proportionality principle. That is, they should be proportional to the cost of providing the infrastructure and services needed to serve the real estate project. When combined, the nexus and rough proportionality principles are called the rational nexus principle.

Furthermore, development charges can disproportionately burden lower-income households by negatively influencing their ability to pay (ATP), causing vertical inequity. The ATP principle undergirds vertical equity. As per this principle, the higher-income community members should pay more than the lower-income members for the publicly funded infrastructure and services. The need to promote vertical equity is even more critical in developing countries such as India. A large proportion of these nations’ population is low-income, and development charges could overburden them if the design of the charges does not consider ATP.

This chapter describes the aforementioned nexus, rough proportionality, and vertical equity issues. It also discusses other major factors to consider while designing and implementing a development charge program. These factors include the political feasibility of levying development charges and the enabling legal framework required to do so, the ways to enhance revenue yield and ensure its stability, and the institutional capacity required to levy these charges.

Nexus and rough proportionality principles and equity considerations

Two US Supreme Court cases—the Nollan and Dolan cases—form the foundation of the nexus and rough proportionality principles. These casesrequired that exactions must be related to the improvements made to a land parcel (the nexus principle) and must be roughly proportional to the improvements’ monetary impacts (Johnson 2008).

As noted in the previous chapter, in the Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) case, the Nollan family requested permission to expand their house from the Commission. In turn, the Commission asked the Nollans to grant a public easement along the section of their land parcel that faces the beach. The US Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Nollans, noting that the Commission did not establish a connection (nexus) between the house’s expansion and the easement (Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993).