Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is the leading evidence-based form of modern psychotherapy. Albert Ellis and Aaron T. Beck, the two main pioneers of CBT, both described Stoicism as the main philosophical inspiration for their respective approaches. The idea of a Stoic psychotherapy isn’t new, and indeed the ancient Stoics referred to their philosophy as a type of therapy (therapeia) for the psyche. This chapter focuses on the ways in which concepts and practices described in the Meditations resemble those of modern psychotherapists, and indeed the direct influence of Marcus and other Stoics upon them. Marcus’ remarks about the Stoic therapy of anger provide an example of a specific application.

This chapter contends that Italy was exceptionally wealthy during the Early Empire, both in real and nominal terms. Italy’s prosperity stemmed from several sources: substantial booty, taxes, and rents were diverted from the provinces to the empire’s core; provincial elites engaged in imperial politics were expected to spend lavishly in Rome and its environs; and returns on Italian land were relatively high. Additionally, high prices in Italy for both real estate and commodities augmented Italy’s wealth in nominal terms.

This chapter argues that men with the requisite wealth for political office outside the political orders contributed to the stability of the Roman timocratic political system by serving as a reserve pool from which new magistrates and councillors were recruited. Correspondences between the surpluses of wealthy households at the senatorial, equestrian, and curial levels of the political system, and evidence of shortages of candidates at these levels, substantiate this argument.

The relationship between Marcus’ views of natural philosophy and his ethical commitments has long been a vexed issue. This chapter aims first to clarify what Marcus’ own views on physics were, relying only on the contents of the Meditations, and only then to ask how these views relate to those of earlier Stoics and to consider whether Marcus’ position was a good one for him to hold. It becomes clear that Marcus regards nature, which is for him identical with god, as directly setting some important norms for human beings, most importantly because of the thorough integration of humans into the providential and teleological order of the cosmos. Marcus’ understanding of the natural world includes his conception of human nature as naturally social, which entails other important norms for human behaviour. Humans are, for Marcus, integrated ‘vertically’ with the cosmic order and ‘horizontally’ with other human beings; these integrations structure a great deal of Marcus’ ethical theory. But natural philosophy is far from being the only source of norms for Marcus; reflection on his relationships with other people and on the workings of his own mind also have impact and, as I suggest, may even lead him to views which conflict with the materialist determinism of most earlier Stoics.

This chapter examines the development of the Italian economy over the first two centuries CE. It re-evaluates two prevalent narratives– declining economic performance and increasing inequality– using proxy data. The evidence indicates that both trends were relatively modest, began only towards the end of this period, and were marked by significant regional and local variation.

Marcus Aurelius addresses himself as sociable by nature, as someone made to belong to a political community, and as a citizen of the cosmos. The good life for him consists in obeying the gods and cooperating with his fellow citizens in service of the common interest. His fellow citizens are all beings endowed with reason, and as a human he cares for all other people, whoever they may be. The Meditations demonstrate detailed knowledge and agreement with the conceptual foundations of Stoic cosmopolitanism, but specific approaches can be identified. Marcus underscores the organismic and egalitarian nature of the cosmic community and often gives a functional account of his status as a part of the cosmos, while at the same time also suggesting a hierarchical account of degrees of sociability. His rule as emperor he conceives as a personal challenge to live up to the model of his predecessor, Antoninus Pius, also sharing the latter’s conservativism and traditionalism. Marcus’ Stoicism is more apparent in his quest for sincere and truly loving sociability, a striving that finds its limits in the aversion and disappointment Marcus often seems to experience with regard to those around him.

Marcus Aurelius acknowledges his debt to the Stoic tradition of emotions and endorses both the analysis of emotions as value judgements, the ideal of apatheia, i.e. the eradication of ‘passions’, and the promotion of ‘good feelings’. By emotions, he means all kinds of emotional reactions to everything that reaches us from the outside, i.e. pleasure and pain as well as anger, love, fear, etc. Every impression being twofold (what the object is and of what value it is to us), Marcus develops a strategy to eradicate the second judgement. But there is a positive side to the reshaping of desire and aversion, a joy resulting from the gifts of nature and the fulfilment of our human relations. Such emotions are reserved for the Sage in ancient Stoicism, but they become more accessible to Marcus, who does not reject any emotion from human life but values the appropriate ones.

This chapter shows that Italian households with sufficient wealth for political office outnumbered the men actually holding these offices by a wide margin. It achieves this by estimating the number of Italian households that satisfied the senatorial or equestrian census minimum. A new reconstruction of the distribution of elite wealth in Roman Italy is presented, which is based on an economic (power-law) model combined with a bottom-up (‘tessellated’) approach that expressly takes the heterogeneity of the Italian civitates into account.