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The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it aims to show that the relation of the two kinds of happiness requires that civic happiness, and thus civic virtues, exist in the course of contemplative happiness. It does not mean, however, that they are related to one another as a part to the whole. Second, it may also be clear that unlike the commentaries on Parva Naturalia, the commentary on Nicomachean Ethics X witnesses Michael of Ephesus’ Platonic and Neoplatonic commitments.
This chapter explores the reception of classical ethical philosophy in the fourth-century Cappadocian Father, Gregory of Nazianzus, by focusing on the first of his five Theological Orations (Or. 27). An Athenian-trained rhetorician who became the most widely studied and imitated author in Byzantium, Gregory weaves together various strands from ancient ethical discourse in order to set out the moral and cultural prerequisites for performing theology. Gregory’s construction of the ideal theologian reflects late-antique discussions about the proper exegesis of texts, the moral character expected of teachers and students, and the policing of discourse. Finally, Gregory distinguishes the appropriate performance of theology from theology performed simpliciter through a set of qualifications that reflect a recognisably Aristotelian framework, one that can be traced back to the Nicomachean Ethics.
The transformation of the ancient world from paganism to Christianity brought with it not only a new set of ethical injunctions, but a new 'moral cosmology'—that is, a new way of conceiving of humanity in relation to God and the cosmos. One important element of such a moral cosmology is the distinction between the sexes. Why did God create humanity in two sexes, and what is the ultimate meaning of one’s sexual identity? The thought of the Greek Fathers on this subject was heavily indebted to that of Greek philosophy, especially Plato. For Plato the soul is fundamentally sexless and acquires sexual identity only upon embodiment. Although Christians (with the exception of Origen) generally rejected the pre-existence of the soul, they accepted the premise that the soul itself is intrinsically sexless. Many carried this further to the conclusion that in the afterlife there will be a gradual movement away from our current sexual condition to a higher, asexual form of existence. This chapter traces the development of such views from Plato through Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor. It further argues that on this point Christian authors accepted the pagan philosophical inheritance rather too uncritically, and that a careful consideration of their rejection of metempsychosis suggests a very different view.
Around the mid-thirteenth century, in the short-lived empire of Nicaea, the enlightened prince and philosopher Theodore II Laskaris was confronted with the dreadful death of his wife Elena. The period of mourning gave rise to his Moral Pieces (Ἐπιτομαὶ ἠθικαί), a collection of twelve essays of a profoundly ethical character, focusing on the instability of human fate as opposed to the durability of genuine virtue. What marks the collection as a whole is the overarching despondency at the loss of Elena, which leads to the discussion of broader concerns about human existence, happiness and morality. While placing the characteristics of human soul and nature into a Christian context (e.g. essay 1), Theodore is also keen to adopt Platonic and Aristotelian understandings of the soul and intellect, bringing them into alignment with his emphasis on spirituality addressed in his account. But it is perhaps the peculiar style of his moralism that stands out in passages such as the following:
Large is the sea of life and hard to cross, because the man who powerlessly sails on it is utterly unable to find harbor. For he is constantly disturbed by the motion of the winds. According to Homer, “mortals are weaker than everything,” (Od. 8.169; 18.130) because they have in themselves continuous misfortunes. For they are in every way weaker than everything, because everything in humankind has come to be nothing at all. For as everything in humankind is turned upside down and altered, the inconstancy of the affairs of life becomes evident, because also the properties of the soul, being changed, depart from their prior state and do not remember anything they cherished. For food, luxury, comfort, servants, honor, pomp, and everything else mortal nature is accustomed to value are of no benefit and use; none of them is for the sake of virtue and edification. The soul hardens and enjoys none of these things since they have no permanence. For they disappear with time and are considered to be nothing on account of fortune, because when they pass away unexpectedly, they bring sorrow rather than joy. Wretched nature, what will you do? You have been allotted a mixed composition beyond comprehension, you have earned a noble name in that you are called rational. You abound in rational thoughts and have such a divine spirit, but lo and behold, you are unluckier even than senseless objects when you incur these horrible corruptions caused by time.
(Moral Pieces, Essay 2, 61–89; ed. and trans. Angelov 256)
The present chapter aims to show the connection between the ethical views of early Neoplatonist philosophers (Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus) and their metaphysical doctrines concerning the hierarchy of being. In the first section, it is argued that Plotinus focuses on virtues within the framework of a discussion about how the embodied soul can revert to the intelligible god (Enn. 1.2(19)). According to Plotinus the intelligible god has no virtues: there are paradigms of virtues in the Intellect, but these are not the virtues themselves. This is consistent with Plotinus’ view that different levels in the hierarchy of being are heterogeneous and do not share the same properties. Plotinus’ approach makes the status of political virtues problematic. Sections two and three focus on Porphyry and Iamblichus respectively. Their arrangements of the levels of virtues are connected to their accounts of the hierarchy of being, which are different both from that of Plotinus and from each other. Porphyry’s account in Sent. 32 is based on the idea that the cause pre-contains what depends on it (hence Porphyry’s emphasis on paradigmatic virtues). Iamblichus’ account seems to rely on his view that different levels in the hierarchy are connected via analogy.