This chapter is the first detailed study to date of the methodological debate between Critias and Socrates with regard to an aspect of the so-called technê analogy, namely an analogy or set of analogies that Socrates frequently draws between virtue and the technai (arts, crafts, disciplines) on the basis of the assumption that the former closely resembles the latter. The feature of the analogy under debate concerns the object of an epistêmê or technê (these two terms are used interchangeably in this context). While Socrates maintains that temperance, like every other science or art, has an aliorelative object, i.e. it is a science of something distinct from itself by virtue of which it is beneficial, Critias contends that temperance, unlike the other sciences or arts, is a ‘science of only itself and the other sciences’ or, as a shorthand, a ‘science of science’; and is beneficial precisely by virtue of its strictly reflexive character. In the end Critias is allowed to get his own way but, as the following chapters argue, his position proves to be untenable.

The chapter offers a new reconstruction of the initial philosophical exchange between Critias and Socrates. It makes manifest the complex argumentative structure of that exchange and interprets the elenctic arguments deployed in the opening phases not as self-standing refutations, but as arguments intended to disambiguate the meaning of ‘doing one’s own’ and invite Critias to restate his position in clearer terms. Thus they pave the way for the final refutation of this definition (163d7–164d3). The commentary also reassesses Critias’ interpretation of Hesiod and its dialectical value.

This chapter examines how the interlocutors articulate more fully Critias’ conception of temperance or self-knowledge as a ‘science of science’. Also, it highlights features of the text designed to remind us of Socrates’ pursuit of self-knowledge through the cross-examination of himself and others about ‘the most important things’. Next, the analysis focuses on Socrates’ twofold puzzle motivating the investigation that will follow. The latter will be centred on two problems, one having to do with the possibility or conceivability of a ‘science of science’, the other with the benefit that such a science might bring.

The chapter examines Charmides’ first definition of temperance as ‘a kind of quietness’ and Socrates’ refutation of it. It reconstructs the argument by which the definition is refuted and argues that, if we pay attention to the details and nuances introduced by Socrates, we find that the refutation is more successful than it has been commonly believed to be.

This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of the main issues raised by the Charmides and debated in the secondary literature. In addition to an interpretative summary of the dialogue, it discusses the historical context, contends that the main characters are systematically ambiguous, surveys the rival interpretations of the dialogue’s subject and strategies, and explores its intertextual dimensions. Importantly, it outlines the interpretation that will be defended in the following chapters, which pivots on a distinction between two rival conceptions of self-knowledge at play in the dialogue, one attributable to Socrates and consisting in finding the limits of human knowledge, the other advanced by Critias and transcending those limits. The latter is Critias’ conception of the ‘science of science’, which, the commentary contends, is the sole direct object of refutation occupying the second part of the dialogue.

The chapter addresses the second horn of the puzzle articulated by Socrates, i.e. whether, assuming that a ‘science of science’ is possible, it is beneficial for us. The Argument from Benefit suggests a negative answer to that question and conducts a devastating attack against Critias’ conception of temperance as a science only of science itself. Even though the Argument from Benefit raises conceptual and psychological issues, its main focus is ethical and political. In particular, Critias’ ideal of the rule of the ‘science of science’ is suggestive of an incongruous society run by technocrats rather than statesmen, under the guidance of a science revolving solely around itself and oblivious to the common good. Socrates’ critique is particularly relevant in light of contemporary populist tendencies away from politics and towards a technocratic and managerial model of governance.

This chapter as well as the next lie at the heart of the interpretation defended in this monograph. Chapter 10 focuses on the Argument from Relatives, which addresses the first horn of the puzzle raised by Socrates, namely whether a ‘science of science’ is possible. While this argument is commonly believed to deliberately undermine its own point, on the account offered in this chapter the Argument from Relatives is both dialectically effective and philosophically legitimate. Notably, it makes a perfectly plausible philosophical point, namely that strict reflexivity is a phenomenon both psychologically implausible and conceptually problematic. The commentary takes on board recent advances in the interpretation of Platonic relativity and shows Plato venturing into the domains of epistemology, metaphysics, and logic.

The topic of this chapter is Charmides’ final attempt to define temperance: temperance is ‘doing one’s own’. Dramatically, this is a turning point in the dialogue, since, after Charmides is refuted, he withdraws from the forefront of the action and is replaced by Critias, who will undertake to defend the definition anew. Philosophically, the twofold discussion of temperance as ‘doing one’s own’ links the first part of the search, in which Socrates and Charmides aim to discover whether there is temperance in Charmides’ soul, to the second part, in which Socrates and Critias explore the relation between temperance and self-knowledge. In addition to reconstructing and assessing the refutation of Charmides by Socrates, this chapter also includes a discussion of the sociopolitical context in which ‘doing one’s own’ was considered a virtue.

In this chapter, I examine to what extent Epicurus’ message was still relevant as such in the late Roman Republic and to what extent it had to be adapted to the new ideological and political circumstances. An analysis of books 1 and 2 of Cicero’s On Ends shows that Cicero had perfectly appropriated the Greek philosophical tradition and that he basically thought along the lines of the age-old school discussions. A typically Roman context seems to have had only limited influence on his argument: his conception of virtue, for instance, or his stress on the importance of the brilliant achievements of famous ancestors, though illustrated with many Roman examples, are borrowed from traditional Greek arguments. His attack on Torquatus’ inconsistency between words and deeds is clever and convincing, but rests on a theoretical construct. All in all, the Epicureans of Cicero’s day saw no major problems in adapting their philosophical convictions to the complex world of the Roman Republic.

Catullus’ collection contains several clear echoes of the work of two contemporary Epicurean poets, Lucretius and Philodemus. Indeed, several of the neoteric poet’s central themes (the attractions of otium and disengagement from public life; patronage by members of the high elite and its pitfalls; dissatisfaction with the mos maiorum) bring him potentially into close alignment with Epicurean ideals. In this chapter, however, I argue that, on closer consideration, Catullus’ intertextual engagement with his two contemporaries points rather to a self-consciously antagonistic stance towards Epicurean ethics. Catullus’ attack on ‘Socration’ in Poem 47, combined with parodic echoes of Philodemus’ epigrams in Poems 13 and 43, bears comparison with Cicero’s deployment of anti-Epicurean clichés in the In Pisonem; similarly, Philodemean and Lucretian echoes underline a striking divergence both from Epicurean ideals of friendship and from the rejection of romantic love explicit in Lucretius and arguably implicit in Philodemus’ Xanthippe cycle.