Chapter 6 explores the interconnection between natural philosophy and liberation from rebirth, arguing first that knowledge of the world is necessary to change one’s being from mortal to divine nature and, second, that purifications play a central role in knowledge acquisition. After a consideration of epistemic reflections at Empedocles’ time and the role of initiation in attaining true knowledge, it is shown that Empedocles explains the change of being into divine nature at the level of the elements. Indeed, in processes of perception and knowledge acquisition, elements coming from external effluvia interact with elements in the body and thereby modify the mind’s mixture. It follows that the revelation of Empedocles’ philosophy can change our mind to the point that it will become a divine mind. The possibility of becoming divine through knowledge of the world goes along with the training one must undergo to be adequately prepared to receive it. This training coincides with processes of purification, and Empedocles explains from a physiological standpoint how these enable the structure of the elements of our mind to be enhanced to the point where it becomes attuned to the divine.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that Empedocles’ concept of rebirth can be reconciled within his physical system. In this regard I first show that, by drawing on the imaginary of metamorphosis tales, Empedocles conceptualizes rebirths as changes of forms that are analogous to those transformations the elements undergo when mixed in mortal bodies. Second, Empedocles’ concept of rebirth entails personal survival upon the death of the body and, indeed, upon several deaths. Third, although claims to personal survival are thought not to fit with Empedocles’ considerations on psychological and mental functions, and for this reason scholars generally do not consider rebirth as a positive, physical doctrine, here I suggest a different explanation. My argument is that the way in which Empedocles conceived of rebirth as a change of forms led him to marginalize the soul; that is, to fail a reflection on the relationship between personal survival and the self, and the role of the soul in it. Yet he had a traditional, Homeric concept of soul that can not only sustain the idea of disembodied existence, as it stands for personal survival upon death; it can also be adapted to the principles of his physics.

Chapter 4 deals with several concepts, most of them introduced in the proemial fragments, that translate Empedocles’ idea of the divine. In order both to address the disputed question of what can be considered true gods in Empedocles’ physical system and to explore some of the details of his belief in rebirth by defining what the final promise of divine reward entails, I analyze the entities Empedocles explicitly refers to as gods. Several entities are made equally divine, yet each of them is divine for different reasons, although some of them also share common qualities that allow us to delineate a notion of the divine. In this regard, as far as living beings are concerned, we can conclude that for them to be (or become) gods means having a divine status that is modelled on the divine characteristics of Sphairos, the perfect form of the universe and cosmic god. These characteristics are associated with Love as opposed to Strife and include purity, stability (continuity), symmetry and beauty, bliss and perfect knowledge. In this sense, the divine nature of Sphairos represents Empedocles’ paradigm of godhood in the cosmos to which all living beings aspire.

By first providing a summary of the main arguments in each chapter and then highlighting the ways, elaborated in this study, in which Empedocles’ physics is consistent with his religious interests in rebirth and purification, Chapter 8 sets out the main conclusion of this book, namely that rebirth and purification are an integral part of Empedocles’ physical system; indeed, that rebirth seems to be a premise of some of his physical principles and theories. In doing so, in addition to a new textual reconstruction of the proem of the physical poem, this book offers new insights into pivotal concepts and much debated issues of Empedocles’ thought, such as the conceptualization of rebirth and the notions of daimon, soul and personal survival, the purpose and role of physical doctrine for release from rebirth, the reconstruction of the cosmic cycle and the analysis of its moral significance. Finally, it is emphasized that this novel reconstruction of Empedocles’ thought, together with the book’s methodological standard, can provide a key to approaching and re-evaluating the character and aims of the thought of other early thinkers and of fifth-century natural philosophy in general.

Aiming at reconstructing the prologue to On Nature, the first part of this chapter focuses on the collocation of the demonological fragments which, by expanding on Empedocles’ exile introduced in B 115, depict his katabasis into the realm of the dead. The narrative of this extraordinary journey serves Empedocles as authorial legitimation on matters beyond ordinary human knowledge. The second part of Chapter 2 reconstructs the rest of the proem by interweaving traditionally introductory themes, such as the dedication to Pausanias and the invocation to the Muse, with novel topics concerning the rejection of ritual sacrifice based on Empedocles’ concept of rebirth. The proem thus reconstructed presents a coherent programmatic structure and makes sense of several Empedoclean fragments that are essential for a comprehensive and impartial understanding of his thought. Moreover, by showing that religious concerns inform the entire introductory section, the new proem indicates that the concept of rebirth is central to Empedocles’ physical system and thus offers a new basis to rethink the interplay of myth, religion, and physics in his natural philosophy.

In the Introduction I set out the main argument of the book, namely the demonstration that Empedocles’ doctrine of rebirth is not only a positive doctrine within On Nature, but is central to his physical system. Then, after briefly tracing the history of the reception of Empedocles’ thought up to the modern era and showing thereby the importance of this thinker in the history of ancient philosophy, I discuss the state of the art related to the book’s main argument. Building on Kahn’s fundamental reappraisal of Empedocles’ doctrinal unity, my book considers the Strasbourg papyrus as evidence for a new reconstruction of Empedocles’ physical poem and thus for a rethinking of his philosophy in terms of a unified system of thought. Therefore, by aiming to demonstrate the ways in which Empedocles’ physics integrates, on a textual and contextual basis, the details of his doctrine of rebirth, sometimes even giving the impression of being premised on it, it is argued that this study is also relevant to a reassessment of the nature and intent of ancient Greek philosophy in general.

Chapter 3 focuses on δαίμων and its significance in Empedocles’ concept of rebirth. I show that the demonological fragments and the term δαίμων, in particular, emphasize Empedocles’ divine nature in contrast to the rest of humankind and cannot represent, as is generally believed, the place where his personal vicissitude becomes exemplary of every soul’s destiny, thus grounding his doctrine of rebirth. To define what Empedocles intended when he called himself a reincarnated δαίμων, I analyze Plato’s myths of the soul’s otherworldly journeys and some fragments attesting to Pythagoras’ demonology. While Plato, in his concept of rebirth, conceptualized the δαίμονες as deities who guide souls during and beyond this life, Pythagoras articulated the idea that a god could exceptionally undergo rebirths, but these are usually reserved for ordinary souls. Following Pythagoras and anticipating Plato, Empedocles constructs his demonology which is linked, but does not overlap, with his doctrine of rebirth. Finally, addressing the issue of the ‘physical’ δαίμων in B 59 I argue that δαίμων is a predicative notion which, in all Empedoclean occurrences, is still intimately connected to the traditional sense of ‘god’.

Chapter 6 centres on Galen’s longest moral work, the Affections and Errors of the Soul, and explores the features of Galenic practical philosophy from a number of angles. The first section provides an analysis of the work’s programmatic preface and shows that Galen exploits the dynamics of polemic, self-promotion and self-effacement to cast himself as a prominent contributor in this intellectual area. The next section discusses Galen’s emphasis on self-knowledge, which is often blocked by self-love. It claims that in order to generate feelings of revulsion with regard to the latter, Galen works on ‘class fraction’ as a tactic with moralising intent. Another strand of special importance in the essay is the figure of the moral adviser, which Galen elaborates on so as to highlight the need for welcoming and indeed enduring moral criticism. Even though the moral adviser features in other authors of the Second Sophistic, in Galen it points to the applicability of ethics to a broad range of social contexts, thus credentialing his situational ethics. A separate section of Chapter 6 focuses on the concept of free speech (parrhēsia). While Galen debates the challenges of social and political interaction, he advises frankness at all costs. A genuine friend should never be reluctant to express the truth of someone’s moral situation and this makes him strikingly different from the flatterer, a disgusting stock figure in Imperial works on moralia, particularly in Plutarch, whom Galen seems to follow here. Another shrewd device that Galen uses to good effect to achieve the moral rectification of readers is the description of the pathology of anger (its origins and results), particularly in the episode featuring Galen’s Cretan friend, which is framed, I suggest, as an ‘ethical case history’, sharing characteristics with Galen’s medical case histories.

This Chapter explains in detail how Galen endows medical science with moral probity. In broad outline, he extrapolates moral principles from his ethical programme to feed into his medical accounts and thus reveal his personal responses to what he represents as the immorality of other doctors. Assigning praise and blame or stressing social shame and fear are central moral-didactic devices here, as is reproach with a view to moral amendment or Galen’s attempts at self-deprecation in order to affect his readers’ moral activity.

The Introduction familiarises the reader with Galen, his life and work, and offers essential information on his engagement with ethical philosophical writings. It also provides a brief introduction to practical ethics in antiquity, and foregrounds the contribution of the present study and the methodology through which the study will explore the topic under investigation. Finally, the Introduction gives an overview of the main chapters of the book.