ON THE ATTIC TRIBES

The view we have taken of the four ancient Attic tribes, agrees in the main with those of Wachsmuth, Buttmann (in the Essay on φρατρία in the Mythologus), and Dr. Arnold, in his Appendix I. to Thucydides, vol. i. But some readers may like to learn the opinions of other learned men on this subject, and on some other points connected with it, to which allusions have here and there been made in the text.

Niebuhr in the first edition of his Roman History (i. p. 226.) considered the names of the four tribes abolished by Cleisthenes as significant of so many castes. In the second edition he retains the same opinion with regard to the origin of the names, but on account of the order in which they stand doubts whether they ever had any such meaning in Attica (i. n. 707.) And in the third edition he appears to have been induced by Hermann's arguments, in the Preface to the Ion of Euripides, to abandon his former opinion on this question altogether. But this is of less importance than his view of what the Attic tribes were down to the time of Solon. He conceived them to have included only a part of the population of Attica – the Ionian conquerors blended perhaps with a portion of the ancient inhabitants (see ed. 2. i. p. 307.) – and to have stood in a relation to the rest, similar to that between the Patricians and Plebeians at Rome.

We have already taken a survey of the legends relating to the origin of the people of Attica, and to the events of their history down to the Ionian migration. We must now look back to the same period, in order to trace the progress of their political institutions, from the earliest times to the establishment of that form of government under which the Athenians were living when they first came into conflict with the power of Persia.

Among the few facts which we are able to collect with regard to the state of Attica in the earliest times, there are two which seem to be so well attested, or so clearly deduced from authentic accounts, that they may be safely admitted. We read that the territory of Attica was originally divided into a number of little states; and tradition has preserved the names of some petty chiefs, who are said to have ruled in these districts with the title of king. These communities were independent of each other and of Athens in their internal government, and sometimes even made war on their neighbours. On the other hand, we are informed that attempts were made, at a very early period, to unite the forces of the whole nation for the purpose of mutual defence. It was Cecrops, according to an Attic antiquarian, who first established a confederacy among the inhabitants of Attica, to repel the inroads of the Carian pirates, and of the Bœotians, who invaded it on the land side.

The Thirty Years' Truce, though concluded upon terms seemingly disadvantageous to Athens, afforded an interval of repose highly favourable to her prosperity, only interrupted by one successful effort. It was during this period that Pericles was enabled to carry out his views into action, with the amplest means that the state could furnish at his command, and with scarcely a breath of opposition to divert him from his purpose. The history of Athens during the continuance of the Thirty Years' Truce may be properly comprised in a general survey of his administration.

Pericles, to describe his policy in a few words, had two objects mainly in view throughout his public life: to extend and strengthen the Athenian empire, and to raise the confidence and self-esteem of the Athenians themselves to a level with the lofty position which they occupied. Almost all his measures may clearly be referred to one or the other of these ends. There are only a few as to which it may seem doubtful whether they can be traced to any higher aim than that of establishing his own power, and whether they must not be regarded as a sacrifice by which, at the expence of his principles, he purchased that popularity which was the indispensable condition of success in all his undertakings.

The condition of the greater part of the states which composed the Athenian confederacy had, as we have seen, undergone a great change in the time of Cimon, and through his management.

Gylippus had been joined at Asine, where he had manned two Laconian galleys, by two others from Corinth, under the command of Pythen. With these they sailed to Leucas, where they were led by a concurrence of many false rumours to believe that Syracuse was already completely invested; and Gylippus, considering the affairs of Sicily desperate, only hoped that he might be in time to counteract the influence of the Athenians among the Italian Greeks. While therefore the Corinthians were fitting out a squadron, consisting of ten of their own galleys, two Leucadians, and three from Ambracia, he and Pythen pushed across to Tarentum, and proceeded to Thurii, where, through his father Cleandridas, who in his exile had been admitted a citizen there, he had connections which he hoped might enable him to arm the Thurians against Athens. But his small force, which seemed only fit for a piratical adventure, did not encourage them to comply with his wishes, and he continued his voyage westward. But before he reached Locri he was driven out to sea by a gale from the north, and with some difficulty made Tarentum again, where he was forced to wait for a time to refit. Intelligence of his approach had gone before him to the Athenian camp; and Nicias might easily have provided means for stopping or intercepting his little squadron. The military virtue which Nicias possessed in the highest degree was prudence; the failing toward which he most leaned, timidity.

Among the various predictions which were current at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, one only, Thucydides observes, was known to have been fulfilled; and it was, that the war should last thrice nine years. He does not consider the temporary and partial suspension of hostilities which followed the treaties mentioned in our last chapter, as a sufficient ground for questioning the accomplishment of the prophecy, since it did not lead to a state of peace. The treaties were inscribed on pillars or tables of stone or brass, and preserved in the most revered sanctuaries; but they were for the most part a dead letter. This did not arise from the want of a sincere inclination for peace in the two highest contracting parties. The radical vice of the transaction was, that the Spartans had undertaken more than they were able to perform, and the Athenians would accept nothing less than they had bargained for. The treaty could not be carried into full execution without the concurrence of some of the allies of Sparta, who refused to accede to it, and though according to the acknowledged laws of the confederacy they were bound by the will of the majority, she had no means of enforcing their compliance. Several others were displeased with those parts of the treaty in which they were individually concerned, or had particular grounds of jealousy or discontent; and there was one clause in the treaty of alliance which created general offence and alarm.

The failure of the expedition led by Datis and Artaphernes, in the invasion of Attica, was poorly compensated, by their success against Eretria; the insult it had offered to the majesty of the Persian empire was sufficiently avenged by its ruin, and when the captive Eretrians were brought to Darius, he was satisfied with planting them in a part of his own domain, in the Cissian village of Ardericca. But his anger was doubly inflamed against Athens by the event of Marathon, which did not suggest to him any wholesome warning; the conclusion he drew from it was, that his power had been defied with impunity, merely because it had not been fully exerted. Now therefore he resolved that the insolent people, which had invaded his territories, violated the persons of his messengers, and driven his generals to a shameful flight, should feel the whole weight of his arm. A year had been spent in the pre-parations for the last campaign: those he now set on foot were on a vast scale, and demanded a longer time. Every nation that owned his sway was called on to contribute to the new armament much more largely than before, and to send the flower of its warriors, such as were fit to meet the Greeks in the field, as well as an extraordinary supply, according to its means, of ships or horses, provisions and stores.

Athens had been permitted to complete the conquest of Samos without hindrance; but the addition which this success made to her power rendered it only the more evident, that peace could not last much longer between her and the Peloponnesian confederacy. Her ambition, the animosity which she had excited in several of the allies of Sparta, and the jealousy of Sparta herself, had reached such a height, that it was clear the Thirty Years Truce was much more likely to be violently abridged, than to lead to a lasting settlement. Nevertheless the two leading states, as if foreseeing the ruinous consequences of their conflict, shrank from striking the first blow, as well as from forfeiting the divine favour by a breach of the treaty. Sparta, as she had been a quiet spectatress of the fall of Samos, rejected an application which was made to her by the Mitylenæans, who, if they could have reckoned on her aid, would have renounced the Athenian alliance, and would probably have engaged the whole island to join in their revolt. According to Theophrastus a sum of ten talents distributed by Pericles every year among the leading Spartans, kept them in a pacific mood. But the expectation which generally prevailed of an approaching renewal of hostilities, contributed to hasten the event. Without it the occurrences which immediately occasioned the disastrous war which we are about to relate, either would not have happened, or would have passed by without such an effect.

NOTE TO PAGE 24. ON A PRETENDED POWER OF THE AREOPAGUS.

Some readers may perhaps be surprised to find no mention made here of a prerogative, which they may have seen elsewhere attributed to the Areopagus, and which it is said to have retained even to the time of the change effected by Pericles and Ephialtes. Till that time, we have been informed by a modern historian, the Areopagus directed all issues from the public treasury. The assertion is one of those—very numerous in the work where it occurs — which have owed their success neither to the force of testimony nor of reasoning, but simply to the placid assurance with which they are advanced. We have seen indeed (Vol. II. p. 296.) an extraordinary case, in which the Areopagus seems to have assumed such a power. But if any one thinks this a sufficient proof of the general assertion, we could only reply by the old Greek jest, of the simpleton who carried a brick about as a sample of a house, or by the Roman story, of the youth who finding a fragment of a boat on the beach, was seized with the desire of building a ship. It is one of those statements which can hardly be refuted until some attempt has been made to prove them. But we may observe that the very fact of Aristotle's mentioning the report on this subject for which Plutarch cites his authority — and after all it was no more than a report, and Clidemus (Plut. Them. 10.) gave a different account of the matter — raises the strongest presumption that, if true, it was an extraordinary case.