The chapter analyzes the nature and evolution of the administration of criminal justice in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although current Iranian law incorporates a range of provisions intended to protect the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions, in practice these provisions are routinely violated. It is argued that the violations of due process in the Islamic Republic of Iran are the result of several factors. First, the criminal justice system has been configured to deal with political opposition as an existential threat to the state, resulting in frequent executive interference in the judicial process and arbitrary trials in revolutionary courts. Second, the structural subordination of the judiciary to the effective power of the Supreme Leader and specific executive agencies has eroded the rule of law. Third, the ideological imperative to Islamize the judicial system after the 1979 Revolution has led to the adoption of judicial procedures that have given judges very wide discretion in the conduct and outcome of cases, notably in criminal law.

The 1979 Revolution led to the construction of a penal system ostensibly based on Islamic principles of restitutive and restorative justice rather than incarceration. This was tied to an Islamic vision of justice as swift and efficient, with emphasis on corporal punishment as opposed to socially detrimental imprisonment. Despite this, custodial sentences have been used extensively since 1979 and imprisonment rates have often been above the median in global terms, even though the level of violent crime has been relatively low. Furthermore, Iran has been unable (or unwilling) to generate the prison capacity needed, leading to severe problems with overcrowding and attendant health problems, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and COVID-19. Concentrating mainly on “ordinary” rather than “political” prisoners, this chapter discusses the reasons behind the overcrowding in prisons since the revolution and the government’s attempts to alleviate the situation.

Workers’ rights and conditions have not been at the core of the Islamic Republic’s main policies, especially from the 1990s onward. The existent labor law offers far-reaching exemptions and loopholes that make it possible to circumvent workers’ rights, while prohibitions on independent unions deprive workers of the legal tools to claim their rights. This chapter gives a detailed analysis of the evolution of labor regulation and reform in postrevolutionary Iran, building on primary research and interviews with industrial workers, scholars, and legal experts, conducted in Iran. In particular, the chapter demonstrates how, from Rafsanjani’s neoliberal turn to Rouhani’s presidency, labor casualization and job insecurity have gradually – and systematically – undermined working conditions, exposing workers to severe exploitation and limiting their legal protection. The presidents’ policies have not been equally detrimental, as the values behind every administration, as well as the general economic contexts, influenced their choices: from Rafsanjani’s market-oriented rhetoric to Khatami’s participatory narrative of civil society, Ahmadinejad’s conservative populism to Rouhani’s business-friendly pragmatism.

The Islamic Republic of Iran prides itself on the extent to which it has codified Islamic law, and it bases its entire legal system, not only constitutional or family law, but ostensibly all realms of law, on legal codes in which Islamic notions of justice have been codified into positive law. The chapter first provides a brief survey of the various uses and connotations of the concept of rule of law. After offering an overview of the evolution of the modern legal system in Iran, it reviews the main elements of the 1979 constitution and its 1989 amendment. It then discusses three central concepts through which Islamic law as codified has been reformed and revised. The chapter then presents the main outlines of the legal and judicial system of Iran, before offering an overview of the chapters of the book. The chapter closes with reflections on the main challenges to the rule of law in Iran today.

This chapter provides a case study of how the rule of law was temporarily strengthened in one subbranch of health and medical law. The authors are doctors who ensured wider access to HIV/AIDS services to three key populations by setting up primary healthcare clinics for drug users, men who have sex with men, and sex workers. Providing services is challenging as the latter two groups are engaged in behavior considered criminal, and their very existence is officially denied. Sex between men and adultery can be punishable by death. The doctors’ harm-reduction approach was gradually expanded province- and nation-wide during Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005), allowing even for methadone treatment and needle exchanges. Under President Ahmadinejad, the government returned to the revolutionary “war on drugs” and policing approach, closing the triangular clinics and forcing the authors into exile. The chapter illustrates how legal challenges intertwine with cultural, religious, and political responses to Iran’s HIV/AIDS pandemic.

This chapter examines the rights situation of religious and ethnic minorities in the Islamic Republic. All state institutions are in some ways responsible for the Islamic Republic’s discriminatory policies. The intelligence and security apparatus intimidate and arrest members of minority groups, and the judiciary usually issues harsh sentences against them. The executive branch also engages in discriminatory action, such as denying higher education and public sector employment to minorities. The parliament, having passed discriminatory laws, does not hold other state organs responsible for extra-legal actions against minorities. Nor has it conducted investigations necessary to determine the extent of discriminatory practices in the country. Courts have reacted to minority cases in diverse ways, often validating discrimination but in some cases also protecting them against rights abuses. If this diversity in court rulings indicates anything, it is that not all courts are completely on the government’s line but retain some modicum of political independence. The bigger picture is, however, that minority cases are often treated as politically sensitive irrespective of the nature of the case and are therefore tried in the revolutionary rather than the general courts.

The independence of the legal profession suffered immeasurably when the bar associations were dissolved after the 1979 Revolution. They only gradually recuperated and reorganized in the 1990s, being allowed to hold internal elections again in 1997 and regain a degree of political independence. Since the early 2000s, however, hardliners have ensured that regimist lawyers dominate the bars’ boards, with the effect that the human rights work of the bar associations came to a halt. What has undermined the work of the bar associations most, however, is the parallel training and examination mechanisms set up in the judiciary for a different kind of lawyer, so-called Article 187 legal advisors. These do not take a bar exam and also otherwise are not organized by the Bar. They are required to seek renewal of their accreditation from the judiciary every year, thus making them highly dependent on the judiciary’s goodwill.

This chapter focuses on the police and other law enforcement agencies. Mapping their transformation since the 1979 Revolution, it highlights the tensions and overlapping jurisdictions between different law enforcement agencies and units, arguing that their security mission has expanded alongside their disciplinary and religious morality mission, especially since the disputed 2009 elections. To maintain order, the Islamic Republic has taken several measures, such as the expansion of law enforcement units, the establishment of several special forces for crowd control and anti-riot missions, and heavy investment in the training and equipment of these forces. The police force has also dramatically intensified its ideological programs for the indoctrination of its members and has made changes to recruitment by shifting focus toward more conservative parts of society. Despite some attempts at reform, Iran’s various police forces are not consistently subject to the rule of law, nor are they accountable to elected institutions.

The authors – Iranian lawyers working in international trade law – examine the rule-of-law effects of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which limited Iran’s enrichment activities and implemented enhanced monitoring of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from all UN and European Union nuclear-related sanctions. From January 16, 2016, financial transactions and a range of associated service sectors in Iran were opened up for international trade. These included banking and insurance; oil, gas, and the petrochemical sector; shipping and transport sectors; metals; and software. At the same time, restrictions on the transfer of sensitive goods and ballistic missiles, as well as measures against certain entities, remained in force. The US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 has led to increased trade between Iran China, and, overall, has reversed the Iranian state’s forced withdrawal from certain branches of the economy, thereby resolidifying both its political and economic power.

The chapter delves into the iconic imagery and contested legacy of Moshe Dayan as the “minister of victory” during the Six-Day War. It examines the strategic decisions and military maneuvers orchestrated by Dayan, shedding light on his pivotal role in shaping the objective and management of the war. The emphasizing his focus on neutralizing the Egyptian military threat and avoiding unnecessary entanglements with other Arab armies. Dayan’s adaptability and opportunistic approach to seizing fleeting opportunities are highlighted, underscoring his influence on major decisions while attempting to minimize intervention in routine management. Furthermore, the chapter delves into Dayan’s considerations of international sensitivities, particularly regarding the Holy Basin and the potential involvement of the Soviet Union. The controversy surrounding the war’s objectives and priorities, as well as the tensions between the political and military echelons, is also examined. Additionally, the chapter delves into Dayan’s interactions with political figures and military leaders, revealing the complexities and challenges he faced in navigating the rapidly evolving dynamics of the war.

The chapter offers a unique perspective on strategy development and the role of a strategist, highlighting the importance of context-specific thinking, flexibility, and reflection. The chapter begins by examining Dayan’s early experiences as a revolutionary guerrilla fighter, which shaped his view of war as a phenomenon that can only be understood in its local, concrete geographical, cultural, and political contexts. This dismissal of rigid, established military patterns is central to Dayan’s approach to strategy development throughout his career. The chapter then explores Dayan’s unique approach to strategy development, which was characterized by contextualized learning, the application of the 80:20 principle for setting priorities, delegation and empowerment, time management for maximum flexibility, and the use of meetings to generate and test new ideas. Dayan’s ability to hold two opposing points of view simultaneously and his love for the land of Israel are also discussed. Overall, the chapter offers valuable insights into the development of a strategist and the importance of context-specific thinking and flexibility in strategy development.