Milícias are mafia-style organizations, often composed of current and former state agents, that have rapidly expanded in areas with limited state presence and weak legal oversight. In Rio de Janeiro, their territorial control is not maintained by coercion alone, but also through strategic political alliances. This article theorizes and tests a mechanism linking milícia expansion to electoral politics: milícias deliver concentrated electoral support to specific politicians, who in return shield their operations by influencing bureaucratic appointments and law enforcement priorities. Using original geospatial and electoral data, we show that milícia entry into a new area increases electoral concentration and disproportionately benefits milícia-aligned candidates in adjacent territories. We further demonstrate that this electoral capital is converted into political power through key bureaucratic appointments that facilitate further expansion and institutional impunity. Our findings support a theoretical framework in which elections reinforce, rather than constrain, criminal governance in democratic settings.

This article examines the factors that enabled French merchants to enter the Spanish Indies markets during the 1620s, particularly in the period betwen the Peace of Monzón (1627) and the outbreak of the Franco-Spanish War (1635). It highlights how the French nation of Seville received unprecedented support from the Crown to develop their marginal enterprises in the Carrera de Indias. Royal patronage played a significant role in integrating—or exluding—wealthy merchant communities from the Spanish Atlantic trading system, therby expanding their networks for direct exchanges with the Americas. The study reconstructs French commercial connections within the Spanish Atlantic trade, contextualized alongside Flemish and Italian networks already operating in New Spain. These three nations dominated much of the cargo legally shipped to and from the viceroyalty in the 1620s and 1630s. The analysis details French business interactions with “native” and “foreign” merchants, their resilience following the economic reprisal of 1635, and observations on the reconfiguration of foreign trading networks alongthe New Spain axis during the Spanish Empire’s economic and political crises of the 1640s.

The established economic historiography asserts that Brazil’s per-capita GDP stagnated in the 19th century and that it grew extremely slowly in the period of the monarchy (1822–1889). We argue that these conclusions are based on inadequate methods, insufficient statistical evidence, and disregard for available historical evidence. Building on the methodology followed by one of us in a previous article, with the use of new databases, and a reasoned exploration of alternatives, our best estimate is that over the 1820–1900 period, Brazil’s per-capita income grew at a trend rate of 0.9% per year, a performance like Western Europe and other Latin America countries. Only a sharp economic contraction at the end of the period dulled Brazil’s performance in the 19th century.

This research note presents a new dataset of comparable and consistently defined series on wage inequality in manufacturing in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela (LA6) from 1920 to 2011. There are also series of unskilled labor with a wider sectoral coverage. This resource provides sufficient data to inform us about trajectories and turning points across distinct developmental epochs. Overall, the evidence shows a steady rise in inter-industry wage inequality since c.1960 in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and later in the rest. Additionally, a decline in white-collar premiums across the LA6 during state-led industrialization, followed by rising trends in the decades of export-led growth, and a reversal in the 2010s. Similar contrasting trends are observed in the wage dispersion of unskilled labor.

The literature suggests that several factors, including trade costs, influence price formation. However, testing this hypothesis requires rich data, usually unavailable from historical sources. We use a large cadastre from 1749 to analyze wheat price formation in the Crown of Castile in the mid-18th century. We follow the logic of Von Thünen’s isolated markets, which closely resemble historical Spanish grain markets. We show and measure how trade costs heavily determine wheat prices. Accounting for spatial autocorrelation, we observe important spatial effects around the capital. We divide the sample between the interior and the periphery, showing that determinants of price formation do not work well around Madrid, suggesting that the political intervention of grain markets around the capital acted as a potential significant disruptor.

This article explores the underlying causes of vigilantism, moving beyond existing explanations to propose a novel perspective: state absenteeism. Drawing upon an original dataset collected at the subnational level in Guatemala, the study utilizes police station data as a proxy measure of state presence. This research article sheds light on the intricate dynamics driving vigilantism by analyzing the interplay between state actions, security provision, and the emergence of extralegal justice mechanisms. Empirical findings suggest that existing theories do not fully explain the surge in vigilantism, underscoring the importance of considering state provision of security at the subnational level. This theoretical and empirical contribution highlights the role of uneven state presence in shaping responses to insecurity and calls for more equitable and locally responsive security provision to address the root causes of extralegal justice.

This article examines the reasons for the widespread use of sea loans in financing Spain’s transatlantic commerce before the 1780s, and for their subsequent decline. Although never in the hands of a company with monopoly rights, Spain’s colonial trade was heavily regulated before 1778. The system reduced market risk and unpredictability by operating through a single Spanish port, keeping the colonies undersupplied, and lowering the frequency of the exchanges to allow for silver accumulation in Spanish America. This afforded significant, though volatile, profit margins. Such conditions fostered the use of the sea loan because the instrument enabled the lender to reap greater returns by charging higher-than-standard interest rates while avoiding usury laws. In contrast, the 1778 free-trade regulations increased competition and unpredictability, narrowing profit margins. Trade expanded, and “marine interest” rates dropped, precipitating the end of the sea loan as the hallmark credit instrument of the Spanish colonial trade.

This paper examines whether the democratic shortcomings of Restoration Spain influenced the expansion of education spending. Specifically, we discuss how electoral outcomes conditioned the allocation of primary education investment across provinces from 1902 to 1922. Our results show that voting for minority parties and the extensive political patronage at the provincial level hindered public primary schooling outlays. We argue that the government punished “rebellious” provinces to preserve the regime, and that education was not well suited to support patron–client relationships. We also show that these effects diminished after World War I, as government control over electoral outcomes declined. Accordingly, by the end of the period, political voice gained a more salient role.

The transition to democracy in Chile, which took place under the rules established in the authoritarian constitution, led political parties and voters to align along an authoritarian/democratic divide. In the campaign for the constitutional plebiscite in 2022, some of those in favor of a new constitution linked their position to democratic values and labeled those opposed to the new draft as lacking democratic values. Many of those opposed to the new constitution purposely distanced themselves from the authoritarian legacy. We rely on a pre-electoral poll to explore democratic values in the vote choice in the plebiscite. When factoring for economic perceptions, ideological identification, and sociodemographic traits, while holding authoritarian values was positively associated with voting Reject, expressing democratic values had a weak association with voting Approve. The authoritarian/democratic divide in the party system in the early 1990s was not a relevant determinant of vote choice in the 2022 plebiscite.