A survey of the evidence for textile production and trade shows extensive market activities, supported by state enforcement of agreements. The most intrusive form of state intervention was the imposition of a monthly quota to be delivered by weavers, accounting for up to half of their production volume. This may have represented the transformation of an existing quota arrangement attested in New Kingdom Egypt. However, the cash-based Ptolemaic system, in which weavers were compensated and could substitute cash payments for their deliveries, had a different dynamic. The stable demand offered by the quotas offset some of the risk of production for the market by the weavers. This arrangement made the state into an oversized market player, but the textiles it collected were not sold through retail concessions but put to practical use or exported. In addition, weavers and other occupations were subject to taxation in cash, the state levied customs and sales taxes, and it derived revenues from flax cultivation and sheep husbandry, likewise without exercising exclusive control and using private contractors. Attempts at local monopolies were rather undertaken by professional associations.

The Ptolemaic ’oil monopoly’ shows extensive control of local economic processes over at least a century and a half. The so-called Revenue Laws lay out strict state control of cultivation, production and distribution, which is confirmed by many other Greek and Demotic papyri. The entire harvest of oil crops had to be sold to the state, oil was produced exclusively in state workshops, and retail was subject to exclusive local concessions. Import restrictions and severe penalties were introduced to safeguard the revenues from this system, which were leased out to private contractors. Although it contributed to the monetisation of the countryside, the ‘oil monopoly’ was a rather inefficient form of organisation. The parallel bureaucracy of officials and contractors created red tape, the confiscation of capital eroded trust, oil crop cultivation proved unpopular, and the resulting shortages in concert with high fixed oil prices led to considerable black market activity, which further disrupted the official circuit. Evidence from the Late Period and the reign of Ptolemy I shows that the ‘oil monopoly’ was a creation of Ptolemy II, representing a remarkable experiment in fiscal policy.

The last decades witnessed important developments in our understanding of Ptolemaic Egypt. Traditionally seen as a highly centralised state exercising close control over the economy, it is now clear that the king was part of a broader coalition with the primary aim of raising stable revenues. Recent work on land tenure and taxation furthermore challenges the idea of a ‘royal economy’. This book tackles the other major pillar of this model: the so-called state monopolies in industry and trade. Ill-defined and anachronistic, it has been a problematic concept from its inception in the early twentieth century, yet it remains in wide use. Inspired by the famous ‘Revenue Laws’ papyrus, it evokes a centrally planned state economy. The book offers a deconstruction of these ideas and provides the first full assessment of the actual organisation of the sectors involved. The institutions are analysed within the framework of New Institutional Economics, including an analysis of their effect on economic performance. The study takes full account of both the Greek and the Demotic Egyptian sources. The Ptolemaic institutions are, moreover, contextualised within Greek and Egyptian fiscal history.

The Ptolemaic state did not pursue a policy of ‘state monopolies’ in industry and trade. Although state intervention was extensive in some sectors, markets played an important role in others. Fiscal contracts leased out to entrepreneurs shared certain procedures and terminology, but the reality of state control was different in every industry, determined by strategic concerns and practical considerations. Together, these institutions show a pragmatic state concerned primarily with securing revenues from economic activities. While the papyri also highlight the limits of state control and the possibilities to evade regulations, they do not show a general decline of state capacity in the second century. The impact of the regulations on economic performance varied. While the ‘oil monopoly’ caused significant inefficiencies, the same was not necessarily true in other sectors. The regulations stimulated the circulation of coinage, leading to increased market performance, to an extent supported also by state enforcement of agreements and property rights. Finally, the analysis underscores the significant fiscal and economic role of temples and professional associations.

Contracts awarded to brewers suggest the existence of local beer monopolies. However, the beer industry was a very decentralised sector, involving many brewers, as well as full- and part-time sellers supplying local markets. Such local networks were difficult for the state to penetrate, hence the use of local intermediaries who were themselves active in the industry. The fiscal contracts concerned the administration of state revenues derived from the village beer industry. Their most significant component was the farming of a craft and sales tax. In addition, contractors were involved with the distribution of state-supplied barley. A comparison with bakers shows that these artisans were not supplied with wheat, which could be profitably exported. The motivation for the sale of state barley was thus the conversion of revenue in kind into cash. Royal breweries existed, but their significance is unclear, and private individuals and temples owned breweries as well. Temples were, moreover, frequently the lessors of contracts, underscoring their role in the Ptolemaic economy and fiscal system. Missing variables complicate the assessment of the impact of the institutions on economic performance.